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ABSTRACT 
The domestic workers in New Zealand's hotels, hospitals and restaurants 
have been at the margins of the historiography of the labour movement. 
Operating largely within the arbitration system, they have not been a group 
of workers in the front rank of industrial confrontation. Nevertheless, 
they have played an influential role within the labour movement, if 
not one which has attracted the attention of the media or of historians. 
As one of the largest sections of the working class, and a section which 
has continued to rapidly expand, their experiences are of significance 
in the history of the New Zealand labour movement. 
The Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union (CHWU) founded in 1908, has been 
one of the three key unions within the hotel and restaurant industry in 
New Zealand, and at various times has made a significant contribution to 
the wider labour movement. In its first decade of operation, under the 
leadership of Liberal politician John Barr, the CHWU secured award 
coverage for most of the industry's workers in Christchurch as well as a 
six day working week. After Barr's departure in 1918, the union was 
guided for the next 36 years by Reginald Brooks, a staunch advocate of 
the Labour Party and the trade union movement. The union increased 
its strength in the 1920's, and after surviving the challenges of the 
depression, was able to further expand its coverage and greatly improve 
its members' wages and conditions under the first Labour government. 
Following the post- war period of dissension within the labour movement, 
Les Short became the new secretary and chartered the union through 
the new problems of the 1950's and 1960's. In 1967 and again in 1970, 
the CHWU undertook direct industrial action, breaking with a past 
tradition which had seen it abstain from strike action. 
By the end of 1970, the CHWU constituted one of the largest unions 
in Canterbury. Representing over 5000 largely semi-skilled or unskilled 
workers, two thirds of whom were women, the union had been able to 
substantially improve the incomes and working conditions of its members, 
while at the same time contributing to the cause of the trade union 
movement and the Labour Party. 
PREFACE 
This thesis attempts to document the history of hotel, hospital and 
restaurant workers in Canterbury between 1908 and 1970. Its 
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concern is with the experiences of the workplace - the hours of work, 
the rates of pay, the conditions and security of employment - and 
the collective struggle of the industry's workers as a trade union, to 
defend and advance their interests. The workplace and the union are 
the two elements present throughout the thesis, and while major 
developments in the operation of the industry are discussed, the thesis 
is not intended to be a history of the liquor trade, the catering 
industry or the hospital system. Similarly, the thesis does not attempt 
to examine the complex cultural matrix of the lives of hotel and 
restaurant workers; it discusses the workers in their role as trade unionists, 
rather than as complete individuals with home and social lives. 
Essentially, the story of the experiences of hotel, hospital and restaurant 
workers has been at the margins of the historiography of the New Zealand 
labour movement. Nevertheless, while not in the vanguard of industrial 
struggle, they constituted a large section of the working class, and wielded 
considerable influence within the labour movement. The Canterbury Hotel 
Workers' Union (CHWU) played an important role in the direction of the 
national Hotel Workers' Federation as well as within the local labour 
movement in Canterbury. Its struggles and successes on behalf of its 
members were often prosaic and achieved without recourse to direct 
industrial action. These experiences, were none-the-less a real and 
legitimate part of the history of the New Zealand movement. This 
thesis consciously sets out to portray the full range of the union's activities, 
the large and small battles that were fought over hours, wages, employment 
and union coverage. These were the issues that were seen by the workers 
to be of vital concern. While retaining this emphasis, the history would 
be incomplete without considering the political· and economic context 
in which the CHWU operated and by asking how and why the union 
acted in those larger historical events, of war, depression, and industrial 
conflict. Of particular concern is the CHWU's role in the Labour Party 
arid in the trade union movement in times of both conflict and co-operation. 
Each chapter discusses a distinct chronological phase in the union's 
history. The first ten years under the Liberal leadership of John Barr 
are covered by the first chapter. In the second chapter, the union 
rebuilds its organisation and faces the challenges of the depression; in 
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the third, the CHWU prospers under the first Labour government while in 
the fourth phase it experiences the dissensions and confusion of the post-
world war two era. In chapter five, from 1956 to 1969, the union 
steadily expands in size in a period of industrial tranquility, which is 
only broken in 1967. The epilogue examines the 1970 licensed hotel 
strike and the effect it had on the CHWU. Within each chapter the particular 
industrial and political issues of that period are discussed, but throughout 
the thesis there are five broad themes which reoccur: the wages and 
conditions of the workplace; the strategy and tactics adopted by the 
CHWU in pursuing its members interests; the internal politics of the union; 
the relationship with the wider labour movement; and the particular 
experiences of women workers, who continued to represent the majority 
of the CHWU's members. 
This history could not have been produced without the personal and 
organisational assistance provided by the staff of the Canterbury Hotel 
Workers' Union. The fullest possible co-operation and access to documents 
and office facilities was furnished by Graham Harding the union's 
secretary, while Allanah Mclean patiently translated the earlier drafts 
into type. Particularly valuable were the experiences of three individuals 
who have been closely associated with the union's development. Colin 
McCready (former secretary and executive member}, Bob Ferguson (past 
president and former vice-president of the CHWU} and Les Short (former 
secretary of the CHWU and HWF} all willingly shared their insights 
into the events and people in the union's past, and were important as 
sources in their own right as well as a cross-reference to written documentation. 
Len Richardson, as the supervisor of the thesis gave valuable guidance, 
comment and encouragement. Melanie Nolan provided ideas and inspiration 
while Wilma Falconer and Wayne Townsend assisted with constructive 
comments. The photographs were supplied by the Alexander Turnbull 
Library and by Graeme Patterson. Gail Rankin performed the vexing 
task of typing the final copy. 
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Assistance was also willingly given by Bill Brooks, son of the former 
secretary of the CHWU Reg Brooks, and by Peter Cullen and Russ 
Revell the respective secretaries of the Wellington Hotel Workers' Union 
and the HWF, who provided access to the records of their own 
organisations. 
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NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
In several instances the full or official title of an organisation or of an 
award has been referred to in the text by a more readable and shortened 
form. In other cases a term, such as 'sector' has been consistently employed 
to denote a specific category. Similarly 'union' and 'unions' have been 
applied to a specific organisation or group of organisations. 
















Auckland Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and 
Related Trades 1.U.O.W. 
Appendices to the Journals of the House of 
Representatives 
Alliance of Labour 
Annual Report of the CHWU 
These have fluctuated with variations in 
hyphenation and between singular and plural. 
Those below are the official titles in 1970. 
Licensed Hotels' Employees Award 
Private Hotels' Employees Award 
Tea-Rooms and Restaurant Employees Award 
Chartered Clubs' Employees Award 
Hospital Domestic Workers Award 
N.Z. (except Westland} Private Hospitals' 
Domestic Workers Award 
Book of Awards 
Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union was the 
shortened and commonly employed name. 
Officially the unions names have been: 
-Canterbury Hotel and Restaurant Employees' 
Industrial Union of Workers (1908 to 1937} 
-Canterbury Hotel, Restaurant and Related Trades 
Employees' IUOW (1937 to 1955} 
-Canterbury Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and 
Related Trades Employees IUOW (1956 to 19'0il,} 
-Canterbury Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant, Club 
and Related Trades Employees I UOW ( 19i'l) 
Correspondence 
Canterbury Trades (and Labour} Council 
Executive Minutes 
Hotel Workers Federation (see HWF) 
Flashlight (National magazine of the HWF} 
Federation of Labour 
General Wage Order 
HANZ 
'hotel and restaurant 
workers' 
HWF 
















Hotel Association of New Zealand (the employer's 
union in the licensed hotels formerly known as 
the LVA) 
usually employed as a shortened form to 
describe al I workers including after 1937 those 
in hospitals and clubs. 
Hotel Workers Federation. Its official name · 
underwent several changes but as in 1970 it 
was officially called: New Zealand Federated 
Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades 
Employees Industrial Association of Workers. 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. 
all hotels, restaurants, hospitals, clubs, rest homes. 
Licensing Control Commission 
Licensed Hotel 
Labour Party 
(North Canterbury) Labour Representation 
Committee 
Lyttleton Times 
Licensed Victuallers Association (the former name 
of the organisation representing employers 
in licensed hotels) 
Minutes (general & special meetings,notexecutive) 
North Canterbury Hospital Board 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 
Private Hotel 
Roberts Papers 
a particular area of the industry covered by 
an award. There are a total of seven sectors 
(excluding the special case of the Air New 
Zealand Flight Kitchen) as at 31.12.70 
-licensed hotels 
-private hotels (including motels) 
:-tearooms (inc. restaurants, licensed restaurants, 
tearooms, snack-bars, take-away bars, pie carts 
and cafeterias) 
-chartered clubs (inc. gentlemen's clubs and 











the Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union, except 
where the text indicates otherwise. 
generally, the affiliated hotel and restaurant 
workers unions acting collectively 
Wellington Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and 
Related Trades 1.U.O.W. 
Walsh Papers 
Wartime Price Index 
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NOTE ON TABLES 
Contained within the thesis are several tables on award provisions 
and on the internal operation of the CHWU. The following information 
is to explain the selection, composition and terminology of these tables. 
It also serves as a common list of the abbreviations and sources used, 
material which would be too large and repetitious to include in the 
note at the end of each individual table. 
1. Selection 
The tables within the text and the data within each table, have been 
selected according to their significance in the history of the CHWU. A 
substantial amount of material has been excluded as less relevant and 
too unwieldy to include within the thesis. The tables are intended to 
be read in conjunction with the surrounding text and provide a clear 
and succinct presentation of the significant data. Selecting which award 
and what provisions should be included has been designed to provide 
the following: 
-the major conditions of work, i.e. hours of work, holidays and sick 
leave; 
-the major wages for work, i.e. weekly cash wage, board and lodging 
penalty rates and service allowances of a general nature; 
-the wages of the major groups of workers, i.e. low graded kitchen 
staff, waitresses, maids and counterhands, and barmen; 
-the range of pay rates, i.e. the highest paid chefs in the licensed 
hotels to the lowest paid maids; 
-dychronic movement in the major awards, especially the largest and 
pacesetting award, namely that for the licensed hotels; 
-a comparison between the awards in the different sectors of the 
industry; and 
-the position of wages and conditions at significant points in the 
CHWU's history, e.g. the first awards, the first dominion awards 
or the awards of the depression period. 
As a consequence of this selection, supervison workers (such as head 
waitresses and head barmen) minor groups (such as waiters, porter-barmen, 
night porters and general hands) together with nuances of gradings in the 
kitchen, (e.g. 1st cooks in a five-handed kitchen or third cooks in a six 
handed kitchen) have been excluded. Similarly, the tables do not include 
the various minor allowances relating to either a specific task or reimbursing 
for a particular expense. 
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These allowances include payment for: night shifts, broken shifts, transport, 
uniforms, laundry, tools, the operation of kitchen boilers and beer systems. 
In the hospitals the basic rate of orderlies and maids was supplemented 
by the payment of several specific al Jowances for the performance of 
particular duties such as working in a mortuary, disposing of soiled 
material or handling mental patients. 
2. Composition 
The rates for wages provided in the tables are, of course, the legal minimum, 
and at certain times for certain workers, for instance senior cooks, the actual 
rates paid may be higher. In several awards the wage rate set out in the 
wages' schedule is not the real legal minimum. In addition to the cash 
wage, workers in hotels received free board and lodgings, or were paid a 
cash allowance for the board, or for both, if no facilities were provided 
by the employer. With most workers in the earlier part of the century living 
in the hotel this was a significant part of their effective wage, and while 
its value subsequently declined relative to the cash wage it continued to be 
a component of the worker's income. A further component was the service 
allowance payable first only to barstaff in 1951 but then to all licensed 
hotel workers, providing they had worked for at least 12 months with the 
same employer or in the same establishment. Its purpose was to raise the 
real wage of workers by avoiding the constraint of relativities operated by 
the Arbitration Court and was available to the majority of the workers in 
the licensed hotel sector. The final component in the weekly wage were 
the various General Wage Orders issued by the Arbitration Court, applied 
to the award but not always formally incorporated into the wages schedule. 
The figures used for wage rates incorporate these components and specific 
reference is made in the notes to the individual tables. 
The award tables enable a comparison between the pay rates for the same 
type of work across the industry" sectors. In comparing the rates between 
workers in hospital kitchens with those in hotels and restaurants, some 
qualification is necessary. For while the basis for pay rates in the latter 
was the number of workers in a kitchen, in hospitals the average number 
of meals prepared constituted the basis for the calculation. The comparisons 
in the tables provide an approximation in the instance between the sectors 
rather than an exact measure. Moreover, comparisons between the senior 
cooks and chefs in the licensed hotels with the senior cooks in other sectors 
has generally been avoided. The skills required in the kitchens of large 
licensed hotels and certain types of restaurants were qualitatively different 
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from the production line cooking necessary in hospitals, or the standards 
required in private hotels and general restaurants. Further, the senior cooks 
and chefs in licensed hotels were the omnipotent controllers in the kitchen, 
supervising and directing work. In the hospitals only limited authority 
' 
was possessed by the 1st cook in any kitchen. At the levels of second cook 
and kitchenhand, however, the tasks. in hospitals and hotels do enable a 
more reliable comparison to be made. 
In comparing other groups of workers across awards, the composition of the 
job may vary in some respects. For instance, a steward in a chartered 
club did not always perform the same amount of bar work as a barman 
in a licensed hotel. The rates given for stewards are either the standard 
rate, or when a higher rate for liquor service was introduced, the rate of 
pay for a steward who spent more than 50% of their time serving liquor. 
Similarly, the tasks of a porter or maid in a hotel were not identical 
to an orderlie or maid in a hospital. Nevertheless despite these qualifications, 
there is a sufficient degree of commonality present to ensure that the compar· 
ison is a useful one. 
3. Terminology 
The following is a common list of terms and abbreviations used in the tables: 
b & I board and lodging - the provision of meals 
and sleeping quarters in hotels. In restaurants 
and tearooms meals only were provided, 
usually two substantial meals each working 
day. Where a hotel or restaurant did not 
provide meals a cash allowance was paid, 
casual 
hk 
M & F 
PR 
Special holidays 
and in the case of the hotels a further 
allowance was paid in lieu of lodging. 
workers employed for less than five consecutive 
days. Distinct from regular part-timers employed 
throughout the week. 
number of hands (workers) in ,a kitchen. A 
plus sign indicates that the wage applied 
to kitchens of that size and greater. 
male and female workers. Where no gender is 
specified the wage rates orconditionsapplyto both. 
pro rata. The pro rata of the normal weekly 
cash wage plus the specified percentage. 




holidays, such as Christmas Day & Labour Day. 
If staff were required to work on these days, 
they would be paid at a rate either 50% or 
100% greater than the nor ma I pro rata pay 
rate for a day's work. 
the rate of pay is one quarter above the pro 
rata rate for a day's work, or 50% or 100% 
above the pro rata rate. 
The Book of Awards has been the source for the information in the award 
tables. For the tables on the CHWU's operation, the membership statistics 
are from the Annual Reports of the Department of Labour listed as either 
H 11 or H 11 A in the Appendices to the Journals of the House of 
Representatives, and the financial figures from the Annual Reports & Balance 
Sheets of the CHWU, filed in the CHWU's offices. 
INTRODUCTION 
The organisation of hotel, hospital and restaurant workers into trade 
unions, was a project essentially of the twentieth century. Prior to 
1900, a large number of hotels had been built in New Zealand but the 
industry's workers had failed to establish any permanent trade union 
organisation. The industry itself consisted of three sectors. The licensed 
hotels providing alcohol, meals and accommodation, represented the 
largest sector of the industry. In addition there were small numbers of 
private hotels and boarding houses which served food and furnished 
accommodation, and a third sector of tearooms, restaurants and oyster-
saloons which only provided meals. 
In the province of Canterbury, it was the licensed hotel sector that 
employed the largest numbers of workers, had the largest sales turnover 
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and the greatest number of establishments within the hotel and restaurant 
industry. Operating for six to seven days a week from 9am to 11 or 12pm, 
the licensed hotel functioned as a vital social centre in country and town 
alike. Besides providing for the thirsts of dusty travellers and work-weary 
locals, the licensed hotel was a place of musical entertainment and a 
rendezvous for individuals and political and social organisations. These hotels 
were concentrated largely in the heart of the provinces capital city, 
Christchurch, but along the highways from the city stood many other such 
oasis attracting the resident and the traveller. A cluster of licensed hotels 
had also developed in the late nineteenth century in the Port of Lyttelton 
to meet the needs of seamen and watersiders. 
By the early years of the twentieth century small numbers of tearooms, 
restaurants and oyster-saloons had emerged in Christchurch and Timaru as 
well as at the beach boroughs of New Brighton and Sumner. Private 
hotels and boarding houses had developed in the two major centres and 
at the holiday resort of Akaroa. 1 The characteristic feature of these diverse 
establishments was their small scale. Usually they were family owned and 
operated enterprises, generally employing fewer than a dozen workers. 
1. There were three large 'temperance boarding houses' 
in Akaroa see Cyclopedia of New Zealand: 3; Canterbury 
(Christchurch : The Cyclopedia Co. Ltd, 1903) 
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There were exceptions to this, such as the "Leviathan" (see photograph 3), 
but generally the larger concentration of workers were employed in the 
licensed hotels of central Christchurch. Compared to other industries, 
in the urban economy of the early twentieth century, this smallness of 
scale was not untypical - factories in 1901 employed only 12.7 workers 
on average. 
The workers who served the public in these hotels and restaurants were 
generally termed domestic workers. They were distinct, however, from 
domestic servants employed in the homes of the colonial elite and 
middle class. For while the two groups had in common domestic tasks, 
- cooking, serving and cleaning - they stood in decisively different relation-
ships to their employer and the economy. Servants as such were outside 
the wage labour relationship between capitalists and the working class. As 
a group they were part of a transitional phase in the development of 
capitalism, which met the temporary domestic demands of a growing urban 
middle class. Smaller families, new technology and public utilities were 
key elements in their decline and virtual disappearance. In contrast hotel 
and restaurant workers were part of a growing capitalist economy, immersed 
in the wage labour relationship. Their workplaces became increasingly integ-
rated into the economic system and their numbers and importance expanded. 
Women performed the domestic tasks in the family home, and it was 
women who largely composed the domestic labour force both as paid 
servants in private homes and as workers in hotels and restaurants. 
Generally, these workers were semi-skilled or unskilled and worked long hours, 
in squalid conditions for a low rate of pay. Within the hierarchy of the 
working class, domestic workers occupied the lowest levels in terms of wages 
and status. In the category of domestic workers in hotels and restaurants 
were cooks, kitchenhands, barmen and barmaids, waiters and waitresses, porters 
pantry and laundry maids. Large numbers of male workers were only present 
in the occupations of barmen, porters and as senior cooks. 
Organising the industry's workers into trade unions, to overcome their 
exploitation, was a task fraught with difficulties. As largely semi-skilled 
or unskilled employees, hotel and restaurant workers lacked the advantages 
in the labour market possessed by skilled workers. Skilled workers had the 
opportunity to obtain a better, albeit still poor, price for their labour and 
were generally more difficult to recruit and replace. Unskilled and semi-
skilled workers were more vulnerable to dismissal and in the event of 
industrial action could be more readily replaced by non-unionists. 
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Nevertheless, the new unionism in New Zealand in the 1880's and 1890's 
saw large numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled workers organise, even if 
many of the new unions enjoyed but a brief existence. Hotel and restaur-
ant workers, however, were unable to establish any permanent union in 
the nineteenth century, and those that were formed were limited to a 
small number of generally male workers in the main cities. 
The significance of the New Zealand experience, was that trade unionism 
was in fact constructed with success in the twentieth century, in the hotel 
and restaurant industry. Throughout the rest of the western world the 
difficulties of union organisation continued from the nineteenth into the 
twentieth century, so that even by the end of the 1960' s, most of the 
industry's workers, in most other western nations remained without the 
protection of a trade union. Where a hotel and restaurant workers' union 
did exist it was usually confined to the larger licensed hotels in the major 
centres, and even that level of coverage had taken many decades to achieve. 
In sharp contrast, permanent trade unions were established in the hotel 
and restaurant industry in New Zealand prior to World War One and they 
secured both a wide occupational coverage - including male and female 
cooks, barstaff, maids, waiters and waitresses - and industry coverage -
licensed hotels, restaurants, tearooms and subsequently private hotels. The 
coverage was further expanded in the 1930's to domestic workers in 
hospitals and chartered clubs. The reasons for the unique development in 
New Zealand of a strong hotel and restaurant union, lay in the first 
instance with the Liberal government's enactment of the Industrial Concili-
ation and Arbitration Act in 1894. By creating a system of compulsory 
arbitration, the Liberal government provided a protective legal shelter under 
which weak and vulnerable workers, such as those in hotels and restaurants, 
could organise into trade unions. Despite the weaknesses and limitations of 
the arbitration system, the presence of a paternal state apparatus in 
industrial relations enabled the hotel and restaurant workers to secure from 
their employers a small space in which their union could operate. From this 
base, modest progress was made by the various hotel and restaurant workers' 
unions. The second factor, that reinforced this progress and generated 
further strength, was the enactment in 1936 of compulsory trade unionism 
by the Labour government. New groups of domestic workers were brought 
under the protection of the Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union, and the 
union's resources and industrial strength were significantly increased. 
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The operation of the Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union was centered on 
Christchurch, where the majority of the province's hotel and restaurant 
workers were employed. Similarly, it was among the workers in the 
licensed hotels that the strongest support existed for the union. This 
reflected the larger numbers of workers concentrated in individual 
establishments and the greater proportion of male workers who for various 
cultural reasons generally exhibited a greater level of trade union conscious-
ness. The operation of the union has subsequently extended to all 
sectors of the industry - excluding those at sea, in the air and on rail 
- and to every corner of the province, but Christchurch and the licensed 
hotel sector have continued to be at the core of the union's activities. 
The geographical reach of the CHWU was marked by 'The Hermitage' 
at Mt Cook in the west, and the Chatham Islands in the east; to the 
south lay Waimate and to the north Kaikoura. While the CHWU was 
active in organising hotel and restaurant workers throughout the South 
Island, the union's official coverage remained within the traditional 
boundaries of the Canterbury province even after multi-district trade 
unions became legally possible in 1936. 
Hotel, hospital and restaurant workers in Canterbury remained the focus 
of the CHWU's activities, but the union performed an important role in 
determining the national direction of the industry's workers. As an auto-
nomous union in a national federation of hotel and restaurant workers' 
unions, the CHWU played an active and equal part in shaping decisions, 
and it was never reduced to the status of a backwater provincial branch 
carrying out the decisions of others. As a large union in its own right, it 
made a distinct contribution to the industrial and political streams of 
~,, 
the labour movement in Canterbury and nationally. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE ERA OF LIBERALISM, 1908 TO 1918 
1. TO BUILD A UNION 
The history of the Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union began on 24 Feb-
ruary 1908. 1 Held under the auspices of the Canterbury Trades and Labour 
Council (CTLC), the 56 workers who attended the inaugural meeting 
resolved to create "The Canterbury Hotel and Restaurant Employees' 
Industrial Union of Workers".2 The Hon. J. Barr (MLC), together with 
R. T. Bailey, from the CTLC were elected as president and secretary 
respectively. They were joined on the executive by workers from the 
industry, but it was Barr and Bailey who directed the union in its first 
year of operation. 
In the first decade of the union's existance, its efforts were devoted to 
securing an award for each of the three sectors of the industry - licensed 
hotels, tearooms and private hotels - and attaining a six-day week. 
Progress was made in lowering the hours of work, raising the rate of pay 
and constructing a union organisation. The overall character of the CHWU 
in this first decade was one of industrial and political moderation. 
The initiative for forming the CHWU was claimed by both Ted Howard,· 
a leading socialist trade unionist in Christchurch, and by the staff of 
Warners Hotel.
3 
Either way, in early February 1908, the secretary of 
the the Wellington Cooks and Waiters' Union, E. J. Carey, was contacted and 
he agreed to come to Christchurch to assist in organising the city's hotel 
and restaurant workers. This initiative paralleled the work of the CTLC in 
organising semi-skilled and unskilled workers during this period.
4 
Those 
who worked in hotels and restaurants merited attention as a large body of 





CHW Min 24 Feb 1908 p1 
I bid. For attendance see CHW AR 26 Feb 1909 
CHW Min 2 Aug 1908 (Howard's claim, Warner's claim p9) 
Most notably among agricultural workers and local body 
workers. 
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low wages. The CTLC was thus pleased to assist Carey, with the council's 
president Hon. J. Barr (M LC) and secretary R. T. Bailey both playing a 
leading role. Similarly Carey'·s involvement was part of a national effort 
by the Wellington Cooks' and Waiters' Union to establish unions for the 
industry in each of the main centres. An Otago union was formed in 
July 1908 and Auckland followed in October.1 
Attempts to organise hotel workers in New Zealand had occurred prior to 
1908, but with the exception of the Wellington Union all these unions 
had perished. In Christchurch two abortive attempts had been made. In 
August 1890 the "Canterbury Cooks' and Waiters' Union" with 25 members 
had been formed but disappeared in the same year in the wake of the 
defeated Maritime Strike. 
2 
With the widening of the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act (I C&A) in 1900 to include workplaces such as hotels, 
renewed but separate efforts were made by local workers to organise in 
each of the four main centres. The Wellington Cooks' and Waiters' 
Union obtained an award in 1902 but it failed to cover barmen or 
women workers, or provide any preference rights for unionists. In the 
following year the "Canterbury Hotel, Club and Catering Employees Union" 
was formed by 94 workers, which attempted to secure an award for the 
licensed hotels. 
3 
Unfortunately for reasons which remain unclear, Hooper 
the unions president, failed to file a case with the Arbitration Court. 4 
Although affiliating with the CTLC the union proved unable to organise 
itself and folded in 1905.
5 
2. THE POLITICS OF THE UNION 
With the creation of the new union in 1908, the priority was to secure three 
awards to cover the licensed hotels, the tearooms and restaurants and the 
private hotels. From the beginning the union's leadership was committed 
to an arbitrationist strategy, as the means to obtain better wages and conditions. 





H. 0. Roth "Under the Arbitration Act" Flashlight no. 7 1965 p11 
H. 0. Roth "In the beginning; the early years of hotel unionism 
in New Zealand" _EL 1 no. 6 1965 p11 
Roth "Under the Arbitration Act" op cit 
CTLC Min 1 Oct 1904 
Roth "Under the Arbitration Act" op cit 
JOHN BARR, first CHWU president and its secretary 1909 - 1918 
Barr was a leading Liberal in the Christchurch trade union 
movement. He was the secretary of several trade unions, 
an appointee to the Legislative Council - parliament's 
second chamber - and the Mayor of Sumner. Under his 
leadership the union remained a loyal participant in 
the arbitration system and opposed any attempts to 
create a labour movement independent of the Liberal 
Party. 
(CTLC Archives, No. 43 University of Canterbury Library) 
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overcome the evils arising from separate action and 
unfair competition, and by combining upon fair and 
honourable grounds ..... achieve the benefit and pro-
1 
tection of each individual member. 
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Schemes to 'elevate the calling', the constitution continued, would be 
considered and joint action taken with other labour bodies in the field 
of politics. All political questions however required the endorsement of a 
special meeting of the union's members. 2 
The focus of the CHWU was clearly to ameliorate the conditions of labour 
in the industry and not change the relationship between capital and labour. 
In the view of the executive, progress would be obtained through the correct 
legal machinery of arbitration. Peaceful negotiation and not the turbulence 
of direct action would mark the approach of the CHWU, in its first decade 
of activity. 
Such an approach was typical of the mainstream of New Zealand trade 
unionism in this period. Peaceful, legal reform was the characteristic 
orientation - an orientation derived from recent historical lessons. The path 
of militancy exemplified by the Maritime Strike of 1890 had been tried 
and the resulting debacle remained fresh in the minds of many unionists. 
Moreover the progress achieved by the trade unions on the milk of the 
IC&A Act in the Liberal nursery, appeared to provide a further demon-
stration as to the efficacy of moderation. Certainly the small scale, 
localised and craft nature of most unions rendered them unfit for combat 
with the capitalists, and the protection of arbitration at least ensured 
survival and modest progress. 
Times however changed. The development of new industry, the atrophy that 
beset the operation of the Arbitration Court and the rise of a new optimistic 
generation of union leaders all contributed to a breakdown of the system of 
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liberalism, three broad tendencies were evident by 1908: the Liberals 
concentrated in small craft urban unions who were part of the coalition 
of interests constituting the Liberal Party; the labour independents, city 
based but with semi-skilled and unskilled workers advocating an independent 
political party for the working class; and thirdly the 'Red Feds', comm-
itted to socialism, direct struggle in the workplace outside the framework 
of arbitration. The latter's strength lay with very particular sections of the 
working class such as the miners. 
While the struggle between these groups was reshaping the labour move-
ment, the CHWU persisted in its Liberal orientation until 1918, by then 
craft-liberalism was politically almost extinct. The reasons why the CHWU 
sustained for so long that political orientation lie with the structure of the 
hotel and restaurant industry and Barr's leadership of the union. 
To unionise hotels and restaurants was to organise small and dispersed 
workplaces whose staff lacked a tradition of union consciousness. When the 
union began in 1908 there were at least 126 licensed hotels in North 
Canterbury, 48 tearooms and 11 large private hotels in Christchurch city 
alone.1 In the rest of the province there were many more hotels and eating 
houses, small boarding houses, chartered clubs and hospital kitchens. The 
total in 1924 was approximately 400.2 Regular inspection to ensure union 
membership and the enforcement of the awards posed a substantial problem, 
but to organise any large scale direct action in support of a claim, was a 
course requiring sustained determination and was still unlikely to succeed. 
At the workplace a worker was in contact with generally only a few 
fellow workers. The employer often worked on the premises and in many 
establishments was assisted by family members. This close master/servant 
relationship tended to curtail the political articulation of the workers. 
Finally two further difficulties confronted union organisers. As largely semi-
skilled or unskilled the workforce could be replaced by 'free labour' in 
the event of a strike. The threat of substitution could also be used in 
daily practice as a disciplinary measure. Secondly, the predominantly female 
1. 
2. 
LVA claimed 126 hotelkeepers as members AJHR 5 19a (1913) 
p66. 48 tearooms cited 13___.Aw. IX (Wellington: Dept of Labour 
1908) p825; 11 private hotels _B.___Aw X (1909) p507 
172 licensed hotels, 123 tearooms, 110 private hotels, plus 
chartered clubs. 8-Aw XXV (1924) p274 & p1676; XXVa 
(1925) p630 
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workforce tended to militate against direct action for reasons of political 
consciousness and from their ability by marraige to· achieve individual egress 
or to remain, but with a reduced dependency on their work as a source of 
income. 
These structural factors while setting certain limitations do not completely 
explain the specific industrial and political outlook of the union. The persistence 
of a pro-Liberal perspective was a consequence of Barr's leadership of the 
union. Elected as president for 1908 he succeeded Bailey as secretary in 
February 1909 remaining in that office until 1918. For that period the 
politics of the CHWU were quintessentially the politics of the executive led 
by Barr. 
John Barr had migrated to New Zealand in 1902 at the age of 35. 2 
A Scot who had worked in North America,. his trade was that of a 
stonemason, although he had spent time as a weaver and as a lineman. After 
arriving in Christchurch Barr soon emerged as one of the leaders of the craft-
liberal faction within the CTLC with the building trades as his centre of 
power. He became an influential trade unionist in Christchurch providing a 
3 
regular column, "Labour's World" in the Lyttelton Times. As the labour 
movement and the Liberal Party became estranged Barr's continuing close 
association with the Liberals left him and the unions he led, increasingly 
isolated from the mainstream of the labour movement. While his influence 
within the trade unions declined his involvement in national' and municipal 
politics increased. A Liberal appointee to the Legislative Council in 1907, he 
continued on the Council until 1930. In the meantime he became Mayor of 
Sumner, 1917, and a year later the Chairman of the Christchurch Tramway 
Board. 
4 
Moderate reform, cautiously and legally pursued was Barr's political creed. 
Society might, in his view, be gradually reformed to improve the conditions of 
the people but not radically transformed to change their positions. The worker 
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entitled in Barr's view, to fair wages, profits and prices~ On the specific 
issue of arbitration Barr had "no hesitation in saying that the Arbitration 
Act... had been of the utmost benefit to the workers of New Zealand.
2 
The system had been beneficial in the past and was still so. As for the 
hotel workers, Barr believed that to destroy the Arbitration Court would 
be to destroy the union. 3 
Barr's views on industrial tactics and the politics of trade unionism should 
also be noted. Strikes were on occasion justifiable in Barr's view, but a 
'go-slow' was a dishonest act, a form of theft from the employer. Ideally 
workers and management should co-operate and management should en-
courage their employees to take an interest in the problems of business in 
order that they might gain a broader appreciation of the difficulties of 
industry.4 The role of a trade union was to defend the interests of its 
members by raising their working conditions and the standard of their 
particular trade. While they might co-operate with other trade unions, Barr 
consistently and emphatically rejected any distinct political role or ideal· 
ogical objective for the labour movement. General political issues were not 
in his view a legitimate province for a trade union. As to an independent 
party for the working class he commented 
I have stated time and again, that if a labour political 
party is deemed necessary let it be built outside of the 
trade unions, let it be an organisation entirely apart~ 
Such then were the cluster of views constituting Barr's political panopoly: 
an acceptance of capitalism whose worst abuses would be ameliorated 
through the arbitration system and the Liberal Party. 
To examine Barr's politics is not to cast him as the omnipotent actor, 
director and writer of the union's early history. The social structures and 
relationships of New Zealand society as operated and altered by social 
classes set the perimeters for the union's policy options, as well as influ-
encing the detail of their execution. Within and through such factors Barr 
was able to exercise a large degree of freedom because the union's 
members and its executive acquiesced to, or supported such policies. Barr 
provides the pre-eminent example of the craft-liberalist vista that so dom-
inated the union's outlook in its first ten years. 
1. NZPD 184 ( 1919) p224 
2. NZPD 156 ( 1911) p1188 
3. Ibid p1189 
4. NZPD 184 (1919) pp222·3 
5. b,yttelton Times 18 Mar 1911 p7 
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3. THE WORKPLACE 
What then were the conditions of work in the hotel and restaurant 
industry, to which this strategy or arbitration and legislative reform was 
to be applied? It was an industry with very long hours, low pay, squalid 
living quarters and insecurity of employment. A normal week of work was 
between 70 and 90 hours, and could on rare occasions exceed 100 hours. 
Aside from a break of one afternoon each week the work routine in the 
industry operated seven days a week throughout the year, unrelieved by 
either statutory or annual holiday. The work day for kitchenstaff often 
began at 5 or 6am preparing breakfast and continued until after the 
evening meal to 9 or even 10pm. This day was only broken by short 
periods of free time in the morning and afternoon. Housemaids, barstaff 
and serving staff similarly worked long hours although generally less than 
those in the kitchens. 
The daily reality of this experience was conveyed by several workers at 
hearings of the Labour Bills Select Committee on the Shops and Offices 
Act, in 1913. The various hotel workers' unions presented a number of 
cases to the committee and three of these expose the sort of workplace 
reality confronted by workers. Miss E. Sutton worked at G lenalvon, a 
private hotel in the North Island. She was paid a weekly wage of £ 1 for 
14 to 16 hours work per day, with her weekly hours varying between 95 
and 105. Miss Amy Hill was also employed at Glenalvon working as a 
kitchen maid for 1 Os per week. Her hours were from 6.30am to 4pm with 
two fifteen minute breaks, followed by a further three hours work in 
the evening. This was a six-day a week routine with slightly fewer hours 
on Sunday. The weekly total was 81 hours. The third worker, Miss McNeil, 
was employed at Stonehurst for 76% hours per week on 15s. Daily hours 
ranged from 10% to 13 except for Thursday when there was a half-day 
holiday and only seven hours were worked. 
Overall the working conditions for most of the industry's workers varied 
from the bad to the appalling. In addition to the issues of hours and pay 
there was the problem of cramp and unclean accommodation facilities. 
With hotel workers frequently living in their place of employment, the 
quality of their sleeping quarters, the washing facilities and the rreals were 
of considerable importance. Workers reported that: 
1. 
2. 
See AJHR 5 19a (1913) Labour Bills Select Committee on 
shops and offices Act also see G.J. Fryer 'Auckland Hotel Workers 
Union 1908-1914 (Research Essay, Auckland University, 1977). 
i\JHR 5 19a (1913) pp98-99 
In the majority of hotels in New Zealand 
there is no such room as a servants dining 
room or a sitting room of any kind where 
we could get our meals comfortably, and 
the sleeping accommodation is simply dis-
graceful. In some places there are five or 
six men - waiters, barmen and porters .,--
packed like sardines in a small .unhealthy 
space ... with no one to clean or tidy the 




To correct the worst of this exploitation, in hours, wages and "living 
conditions, was the first aim of the union and the first steps were to 
secure two awards; the first to cover Christchurch's licensed hotels, and 
the second the city's tearooms and restaurants.
2 
Private hotels and estab-
lish~ent5 outside of Christchurch would follow after these bridgeheads 
had been secured. 
4. THE Fl RST AWARDS 
The union's negotiators met with the hotel employers, the Canterbury 
Licensed Victuallers' Association (LVA) in March 1908. An agreement 
was reached in the following month 3 and on 6 May the Arbitration 
Court issued the first award for the industry in Canterbury, which 
would cover the key area of the licensed hotels. 4 It was the workers in 
the licensed hotels that were the largest, most organised and union 
conscious group and where the high profit of the liquor trade placed the 
employers in a more favourable economic position than their counterparts 
in the private hotels or tearooms. The pattern set in this sector would 
be vital in determining the conditions for the workers in the other weaker 
sectors and for those in the rest of the province. 
1. Fryer op cit p 3 G also see AJHR 5 19a (1913 ) p81 
2. CHW Min 30 Mar 1908 p11 
3. CHW Min 16 & 30 Mar (consider conditions); 24 Apr 
1908 (agreement) 
4. B Aw IX (1908) p252 
For this first award the CHWU had claimed a 60 hour week for male 
workers, 52 hours for women and a daily maximum for all workers of 
11 hours. 
1 
The daily maximum was obtained but weekly hours were 
set in the award at 65 for all workers. 
2 
In its primary goal of reducing 
hours the union had only been able to render unlawful the worst abuses 
and it remained still distant from the aim of achieving parity with the 
52 hours week of the shop workers. 
The weekly wage rates secured by the union ranged from £4 1 Os for 
chefs in the largest kitchens down to 15s for housemaids, with barmen 
on a minimum rate of £ 1 1 Os (see Table 1.1 ). The union's claims were 
of course for higher rates, for instance £5 for the first class of chefs 
and £2 5s for barmen. 3 It was the latter which showed the largest 
28 
disparity between the figure claimed and that which was obtained. This 
overall hierarchy of rates, with the chefs at the top then followed by cooks 
and barmen, and at the bottom waitresses and maids, would persist as ( 
the pattern for the future. 
These wage rates were all complemented by the provision of free board 
and lodging by the employer. The award prescribed that in the event of 
one or both not being provided then an allowance would be paid. As a 
result the effective wage rate for hotel workers was significantly higher 
than the weekly cash amount. A value of 15s per week was placed on 
the total of allowances for board and lodging. 
Below the standard rates of pay were probationer rates for waiters and 
waitresses. New waiters were required to undergo a 12 month so-called 
training period at a wage of 15 to 20s per week, while waitresses served 
as probationers for six months at a rate of 1 Os, half the fu II-wage rate. 
The ratio of probationers to full-wage workers was however limited in any 
establishment to 1 :3. Conversely, the union was able to secure payment for 
overtime at a rate of time-and-a-half with a minimum payment of 9d 
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TABLE 1.1 THE FIRST AWARDS OF THE CHWU, 1908 
Item Licensed Hotels (ChCh City) 
1 
Restaurants and Tearooms 





Wages : Weekly 
Chef 5+hk 
Chef 4hk 
2nd cook 4hk 
Kitchenhand 
Waitress 
Barman or Barmaid 
Housemaid 
Probationer waitress 
Add board & lodging 
4 
65 















1-7/6 (F 1-0) 
1-0 
15s 
Meals (unspecified value) 











Notes: (see Note on Tables) 
1. Electorates of ChCh North, South and East 
2. Restaurants, Tearooms, Oyster-saloons within a 10 mile radius of 
the ChCh Chief Post Office. 
3. Minimum rate of 9d/hr applies to workers earning £1 1 Os or less per week. 
4. 
5. 
Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid. Meals 
only for business days in R. & T. 
First day £1; 2nd and 3rd day 15s, thereafter ordinary. 
In relation to union coverage and union preference the CHWU had 
achieved a modest success. First there was a preference clause pro-
viding that workers would join the union within one month of 
commencing employment in the industry. If they failed to enroll, and 
a competent union member was available, then the employer would 
dismiss the non-unionist. This union preference did not however apply 
to women workers, the majority in the industry. Second, in dismissing 
any worker the employer was now required to give 48 hours notice 
where previously no notice needed to be given. The award's coverage 
was confined to the electorates of Christchurch North, East and South 
which while ensuring the majority of licensed hotels in and around 
the city were covered, did exclude those in Lyttleton, New Brighton 
and Sumner. The union was forced by the L VA to agree that it would 
not cite any hotel outside of the award area during the term of the 
award, that is not the award expired in April 1911. 
Following this settlement in the licensed hotels, Bailey the unions 
secretary, proceeded to cite tearooms and restaurants in Christchurch 
to a conciliation hearing September 1908. The union and the employers 
reached agreement on the majority of other issues. Only the question 
of the wages for waitresses remained in dispute; which was resolved 
by the Arbitration Court when it issued an award in December. A 
62 hour week for males and a 52 hour week for women was set by 
the award but the rates of pay after allowing for both the cash wage 
and the boarding and lodging allowances were lower than those in 
the licensed hotels. 
On the disputed question of the wage:..: rates for waitresses, the ruling 
of the Arbitration Court favoured the union. The employers had or-
iginally offered 17/6d per week but only after the waitress completed 
a 12 months probationary period, at a rate of 14s for the first six 
months and thereafter an extra 1 s for each subsequent three monthly 
period. Instead the court set a basic weekly rate of £ 1 and limited 
the probationary period to three months and at a rate of 15s per 
week. 
1 B Aw 1 X ( 1908) p252 clauses 8-10 
2 Ibid Memorandum attached to award 
3 CHW Min 8 Sep 1908 p35 
4 B Aw IX (1908) p825 
5 B Aw IX (1908) pp826-7 
30 
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The union did secure a preference clause for all male and female workers 
and the award covered some 48 tearooms, oyster-saloons and restaurants 
within a 10 mile radium of the Christchurch Chief Post Office, thereby 
including those in Sumner and New Brighton. 1 
Overal I, these two awards did represent an advance and in terms of their 
wages, hours and union coverage were comparable to the only current award, 
2 
for the industry, namely that of the Wellington union. Indeed in two 
classifications the wage rates were higher. The Auckland award that foll-
owed was also settled with the same hours and similar wages. 3 
The limitation of coverage to the provinces major city was typical of most 
union awards, with the workers in towns and in rural areas generally 
remaining unprotected by union coverage. Nevertheless the largest group 
of workers in Canterbury's licensed hotels and tearooms were now covered 
by an award for the first time. 
5. DISSENT 
Before the union could proceed to organise the workers in the private 
hotels, it was faced by internal conflict over the award for the licensed 
hotels. A group of 29 city barmen petitioned the CHWU claiming that 
they had not been consulted about the new award which rather than improve 
their wages affected them adversely. 
4 
They complained that at present 
they were earning between 35s and 40s per week for 60 hours, while the 
new award provided a rate of only 30s for a 65 hour week~ The executive 
responded that the award conditions were the minimum legally permitted 
and they had been assured by the employers that any existing rates of pay 
above the award level would remain. 'The barmen' said the .executive 
'had shown little interest in the award negotiation' and resolved to consign 
6 
the petition to the waste-paper basket. 
1. B Aw IX (1908) pp826-7 
2. B Aw VIII (1907) p970 
3. B Aw IX (1908) p875 
4. CHW Min 4 May 1908 
5. CTLC Min 30 May 1908 p258 
6. CHW Min 4 May 1908 
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After this rebuff, the barmen approached James Thorn, an active socialist 
on the CT LC, to seek a remedy. Thorn, seeing merit in their case and its 
political character, placed a motion before the CTLC stating, 'That a union 
in accepting a substantial reduction of wages ... and an increase in hours, 
falls seriously away from the true objects of Unionism.' 1The last four 
words contained the barb, for more was now at issue than the single 
complaint of the barmen. 
The conflict, which now shifted to the arena of the CTLC became part of 
the wider struggle between the forces of craft-liberalism and independent 
labour. If Barr the champion of 'true unionism' against the dragon of 
political labour, was now revealed to be in practice the proponent of a 
weak and ineffectual unionism, then what were the consequences for the 
whole labour movement? Would poor wages and long hours continue to be 
the 'lot' of the worker under the timorous leadership of Liberals, such as Barr? 
The battle that now ensued was sharp, and vigorous, and the resu It close. 
At the first meeting of the CTLC, when Thorn presented his motion 
criticising the CHWU, the craft-liberal faction was able to secure the 
motions deferral by 28 votes to 26.
2
1 nstead a deputation was sent to the 
CHWU, seeking an explanation of their actions. At the next meeting of the 
CTLC, Rushbridge an ally of Barr, moved that the explanation provided by 
the CHWU be accepted as 'entirely satisfactory' and that the council should 
'strongly condemn Thorn's discussion of the issue in the newspapers.' 3 
In the course of the acrid debate that followed an attempt was made by 
Thorn's allies to delete the criticism of his actions. The attempt failed 
only on the casting vote of the chair. Rushbridge's full motion defending 
the CHWU was then passed. 
While on this occasion the assault from independent labour had been 
repulsed, the closeness of the division revealed the fragility of the craft-
liberals control of the union movement in Christchurch. Soon the balance 
of forces would shift slowly but decisively to the side of independent 




CTLC Min 30 May 1908 
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6 THE PRIVATE HOTELS 
The leadership of the CHWU was pleased with having established its first 
two awards and with th,e progress made in organising the industry's 
workers in central Christchurch. With the term for the first two awards 
not expiring until 1911, and the agreement by the union with the LVA, 
that no additional licensed hotels were to be cited as parties to an award 
before that date, the focus of activity for the CHWU now shifted. Of 
course there were the daily tasks of award enforcement, but beyond this 
the two primary aims for the union in the next few years were first, to 
obtain an award for the private hotels, and second to secure a six-day 
week for workers in all sectors of the industry. In both these objectives 
the union would face a prolonged and frustrating struggle in the courts 
and in parliament. On neither issue did the union take the path of direct 
action. 
The workers in private hotels were unprotected either by legislation or, 
(except in the case of certain Wellington hotels) 1 by any award. Long 
hours for low pay was again the characteristic pattern. One angry 
correspondent in the_ Lyttelton Times claimed that large hotels in Christchurch 
were working their staff for 90 hours per week for a wage 'at .f.1. 
The owners, in the writers view, 'were grabbing every shilling' and urgent 
legislation was required to protect the workforce. 2 The nature of the private 
hotel sector was to prove a continuing obstacle in obtaining such protection 
either in the Arbitration Court or in parliament. 
A private hotel, as distinct from a licensed hotel, provided accommodation 
and meals but did not serve alcohol. Some private hotels served casual 
meals to the public, in addition to the provision of accommodation and 
food for both permanent boarders and the casual guest. In scope they 
ranged from smail, family owned ~9arding houses managed by the ubiquitous 
widow, 
3 
to large commercial establishments such as the Federal Hotel 
in Christchurch, with its 19 staff and in excess of 63 rooms. 4 The total 
workforce was sizeable, with 11 of the private hotels in Christchurch employing 




B Aw VIII (1907) p970 
LT 19 Oct 1911 
Opponents of reforrn, in and out of parliament, frequently 
referred to impecunious widows who would be made des1itute by 
any improvement in wages or hours. 
AJHR 5 19a (1913) pp3-5 
"MRS BROOKS ACCOMMODATION HOUSE" AKAROA, EARLY 1900s 
Large and small, in city and country town, the private hotel 
provided shelter and food but not alcohol. Sustained to a 
large extent by the strength of the prohibition movement, 
these hotels employed almost exclusively women workers 
and proved difficult to unionise. It was not until 1918 
that the CHWU gained coverage for the large private hotels 
of the "Leviathan" genre (see next page) and it took until 
the 1930's to extend unionisation to the family boarding 
houses such as "Mrs Brooks". 




province. In comparison to other city workers they constituted a very 
large body of non-unionised labour. Their variety made the obtaining of 
any legal protection difficult and politically sensitive. 
The first, award protection for the workers in private hotels 
'' 
had been obtained by the Wellington Cooks and Waiters Union in 1907, 
as part of a wider award for hotels and restaurants. 2 When the newly 
established unions in the other main centres attempted to follow Wellington's 
lead the Arbitration Court rejecte.d their attempts to obtain any award 
coverage for private hotel workers. The Otago Hotel Workers' Union had 
reached agreement with three large private hotels in 1909, but any award 
coverage was refused by the court on the grounds that private hotel 
employers as a whole could not afford to pay the wages demanded by 
h 
. 3 
t e union. 
In Christchurch the CHWU had initially planned the same approach by 
obtaining a general award for private hotels. Instead it decided to select 
11 city private hotels which operated both a boarding and restaurant trade. 
As the court had no intention of including all types of boarding houses 
and private hotels 1n any award, it was thus necessary for the union to 
establish that any private hotels it cited for an award had a special 
and distinctive character. This wou Id enable any award to be confined to 
that particular type, and leave the general genre of private hotels unaffec.ted.4 
The court, however, was not satisfied that the 11 hotels selected by the 
CHWU did represent a distinct class of establishment, and thus its general 
decision not to issue any award for private hotels stood. It was in the. view 
of the court, "out of the question that the proprietors should all be 
required to pay the same wage to their workers, for that would mean 
driving a number of them out of business." 5 In its view the provision of 
board and lodging together with a wage covering the necessities for. living 
was sufficient. Aside from "special circumstances" the court believed it 
II h I h f h k " 6 oug t not to attempt to regu ate t e wages o sue wor ers. 
B Aw x ( 1909) p507 
2 B Aw VIII (1907) p970 
3 B Aw x (1909) p18 
4 B Aw x (1909) pp507-8 
5 Ibid p508 
6 Ibid 
LEVIATHAN PRIVATE HOTEL, CHRISTCHURCH, 1912 
One of the largest private hotels in Christchurch, the 
Leviathan was taken over by the Salvation Army in 1912 
and renamed the "Peoples Palace". In subsequent decades 
there were intermittant skirmiches between the 'Army' 
and the CHWU over union coverage. 
(Alexander Turnball Library) 
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Moreover, the Arbitration Court gave a generous interpretation to exemptions 
from award coverage provided under section 71 of 1908 IC & A Act. 
This section prevented any award being issued in respect of workers in 
non-pecuniary institutions, such as hospitals or for workers such as domestic 
servants in private homes. The court considered that domestic servants in 
private boarding houses fell within the same category. J. A. McCullough, 
the workers' representative on the court, dissented from both this view and 
from the judgement not to grant any specific award. For McCullough 
the 'blatant sweating' in the industry necessitated award protection, a 
protection which he believed was legally possible for the court to give.
1 
Blocked in the court, the hotel workers' unions sought the assistance of 
J. A. Millar, the Minister of Labour in the Liberal government, and a 
former trade union leader. Millar agreed to provide a measure of protection 
for the private hotel workers, by including them within the proposed Shops' 
and Offices' Amendment Act of 1910. Under the definition in the Act 
of a restaurant, as, "places where meals are provided and sold to the 
general public", the phrase "includes a private hotel" was inserted. Legal 
advice indicated that such an insertion would be sufficient to extend the 
2 
Act's protective shelter to the private hotels. 
The experience in the courts proved the protection to be in practice 
essentially valueless. When the Auckland Hotel Workers' Union (AHWU) 
brought a case under the Act in 1911 the Arbitration Court interpreted 
the Act to mean that only those private hotels "selling a meal to the general 
3 
public" were to be protected. A private hotel ~ was not simply 
another variety of restaurant, as for instance was a tearoom or oyster-saloon. 
To provide meals to residents or sell them to casual lodgers was insufficient 
to constitute the establishment a restaurant and hence be covered by the 
4 
law. 
Following this setback, a deputation from the various hotel workers' unions, 
5 
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Millar stated that he was willing to initiate prosecutions in those instances 
where a meal was specifically sold he was not prepared to take action 
against boarding houses as a whole. At the most he might consider a 
further legislative change but only after the 1911 general election. Millar 
was, with good reason, concerned not to alienate further electoral support 
from the Liberals to the Reform Party, by initiating any more pro-labour 
legislation. Compromise suggestions by the union leaders which would 
enable the large commercial private hotels to be included but not the 
sensitive section of family boarding houses, were rejected by Millar. 
Rather he expressed his exasperation at being constantly portrayed by 
trade unionists as anti-worker. 1 
Worse followed. In 1912 the Wanganui Magistrates Court ruled in a further 
case involving a private hotel, that for the Act to apply, not only must 
the meals be sold by the establishment to the general public but that 
2 
such sales must constitute a substantial part of the business. The result 
of this and the earlier decisions was to effectively exclude virtually all 
private hotels from the Act. 
Despite submissions to the Labour Bills Select Committee of Parliament 
in 1912 and in 1913, no change was made to the Act. The unions thus 
failed to obtain legislative or award protection, except for two groups 
of hotels, one in Wellington and the other in Rotorui It was not until 
1918 that any award protection for private hotels in Canterbury was 
finally secured. 
7. A SIX-DAY WEEK 
Parallel with these attempts to protect the private hotel workers, the CHWU 
had been lobbying parliament for a six-day week for all hotel and restaurant 
workers. In the first decade of the twentieth century trade unionists had 
sought a shorter working week, both by reducing the total number of hours 
and number of days. Workers in industry had gained a six day 48 hour week 
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a 5% day week, with a universal half-holiday on Saturday was mounted 
from 1906 onwards. Trade unions had formed local organising committees 
while the labour wing of the Liberal Party had introduced a bill into parlia-
ment but failed to obtain the enactment. 1 
Such was the environment in which the hotel and restaurant workers 
pursued their case for shorter hours, and a six day week. Besides having 
among the highest number of hours, the seven day nature of the hotel 
section of the industry meant that kitchen staff and maids rarely had a 
Sunday or any other weekly holiday. Barstaff, however received an after-
noon off during the week, and with the law requiring bars to be closed, a 
full day off on Sunday. Staff in restaurants also were normally able to 
obtain one day off a week. Thus the union's primary concern was for the 
other workers in hotels. From 1909 to 1912 the various hotel workers' 
unions, supported by the labour group of Liberal politicians lobbied parlia· 
ment to obtain a legal right for al I hotel workers to a six day week.2 1 n 1912 
they finally secured the support of the Labour Bills Select Committee who 
recommended a six-day week for hotel and restaurant workers with a day 
in lieu of Sundal The employers however were able to mount vigorous 
and persistent opposition to the proposal and received a sympathetic 
hearing from the new Reform government of W. F. Massey. Massey, never 
to be a likely source of pro-labour legislation, after receiving some 140 
telegrams from worried employers, decided to defer the issue until 1913. 4 
He had promised the employers, he said, that they would have a further 
opportunity to present evidence to the Select Committee in the next 
. 5 
session. 
In the parliamentary debate of 1912 on the committee's original recommen-
dation, the Liberals argued for the fairness of the workers' claim, while the 
speakers for the Reform government spoke of the financial and organisation-
al burden likely to befall the employers. Liberal speakers pointed to the sub-
stantially lower hours and regular holidays enjoyed by other New Zealand 
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financial ruin and higher prices, they replied that employers were unjust 
to demand that cheap meals should be provided at the expense of fair 
treatment for the employees. 'If prices had to be increased, so be it.' 
1 
Conversely the Reform members talked of the enormous cost that a weekly 
holiday would impose on many marginally profitable employers and the 
impracticality in country areas of finding relieving labour. 2 Opposition 
was not, however, simply confined to impecunious country families. 
One could clearly discern the resounding voice of profitable city employers 
who were anxious to preserve the status quo. 
The proposal was referred back by the government to the select committee 
and when it re-emerged in the house in October 1913 a new recommen-
dation was made. After hearing extensive submissions the Reform majority 
on the committee had decided that the setting of a six-day week would be 
left to the discretion of the Arbitration Court.
3 
Massey summarised the 
opposition to an automatic entitlement for a weekly holiday thus: 
I think we all agree with the principle ... But 
... it is not expedient or possible to arrange 
either by legislation or otherwise, for a six days 
(sic) a week in the case of hotels or restaurants, 
unless by inflicting a very serious hardship in some 
cases on the proprietors . . . 4 
Liberal members of the committee had proposed a legal entitlement to 
a six-day week for all boroughs with a population over 6000. The more 
difficult country areas would be left to the discretion of the Arbitration 
Court. The government, however, was concerned first and foremost with 
ensuring the continuing profitability of the industry's employers, both in 
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those elsewhere would, in their view, place the city hotels at a competitive 
disadvantage. 1 
As with the protection of workers in private hotels, a general prov1s1on 
of a six-day week was rejected, by citing the financial fragility of small 
family operated private hotels and boarding houses. Those which were 
capable of absorbing the cost could not be automatically included because 
either, they could not be clearly distinguished as a group, or because of the 
alleged unfairness in including them but not others. 
The Arbitration Court exercised this new power in 1914. When the CHWU 
and other hotel workers' unions negotiated their awards they were able to 
2 
obtain from the court a provision for a six-day week. Parliament had, 
however, given a general exemption to those establishments where less than 
three non-family members were employed,3and only those areas covered by 
the union's awards were entitled to a six-day week. In Canterbury by 
1914 this meant the licensed hotels in Christchurch, its surrounding 
boroughs and in Timaru and Temuka, and the tearooms of Christchurch. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the court was more sympathetic to the 
workers' case as a result of their action in the General Strike of November 
4 
1913. In Auckland the hotel workers had expressed their frustration with 
parliament to grant a statutory entitlement to a six-day week, by partici-
pating in the General Strike. Initially they had acted in support of the main 
strike by refusing to serve the strike-breakers and special constables brought 
in to defeat the strikers. 5The situation escalated as the hotel workers 
struck for the specific demand of a six-day week and the hotel owners 
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Fryer suggests that the Arbitration Court was prompted to 
act by the AHWU's strike action. Rather the court now 
had a clear indication of the legislature's intentions to 
reduce hours. 
Fryer p37 
DREW'S REFRESHMENTS, SUMNER c1909 
In Canterbury, at beach boroughs such as Sumner and 
New Brighton, as well as in the cities, there were numerous 
small tearooms and restaurants. Family owned, and employ-
ing almost entirely women workers, this sector of the 
industry proved difficult to organise. Wages and conditions 
were normally inferior to those in the licensed hotels and 
improvements generally followed advances made in the 
hotel sector. 




;_'~'.;-;~';'.'~0,::; ·"~~iZQ~~~-~,;~V::~:~.@ii,1:~0,;;:.;~~"#~t::~'--'.,';i}'J·?" .. 
After two weeks the strike was over and as with the General Strike the 
unionists had been defeated.1 For the AHWU the defeat did prove to be 
a temporary one and the union rapidly recovered. 
Neither the CHWU nor the other hotel workers' unions, joined in the 
strike. They gained a six-day week through the legal machinery of the 
Arbitration Court, and it is unlikely that the defeat of the strikers would 
have prompted the court to be more sympathetic to the workers in its 
deliberations. 
8. AWARDS 1911 TO 1914 
By 1911 the CHWU's first Licensed Hotels' Award had expired. During 
its term one alteration had been negotiated, when in 1910 the parties had 
agreed to clarify the union preference clause? The union undertook to 
maintain an employment bureau and provide the service free of charge to 
the employer. Such a service aimed to ensure that there was a supply of 
union labour available to fill any vacancies that arose. The new clause 
sought to remove those areas which had led to disagreement by a clear 
enunciation of the mutual responsibilities of the union and the employer 
and the union appeared to be pleased with the new arrangements. 
46 
The new licensed hotel agreement of 1911, incorporated the reduction in 
the hours of work provided for by the 1910 Shops and Offices Amendment 
Act362 hours per week for men, and 58 for women were the new 
maximum ordinary hours of work in hotels. While some wages remained 
at their 1908 rate, the minimum rate for barmen was increased from 
£ 1 15s and a new category of second head barmen established at 
2 
3 
Fryer pp48-9; see NZ Herald 8-10 Nov 1913 pp8-9 
B Aw XI (1910) p76 
B Aw XII (1911) p358; Shops and Offices Act 1910 
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t:2 - the rate for head barmen was raised to £2.5s. 
Housemaids gained an extra 1/6d per week, and general hands an extra 5s. 
The only other significant change was in the extension of the coverage under 
the agreement to include the boroughs of Lyttelton, Woolston, Sumner and 
New Brighton, although the wage rates were slightly lower. 
A year later this expansion of the unions' coverage continued with the 
establishing of a separate Licensed Hotels' Award for the Timaru and Washdyke 
area. Timaru had been visited by the union as early as November 1908,2 
and an agent had been appointed in 1910. 3 The local employers had, 
however, refused to become parties to the existing Christchurch award 
and indeed in 1912 they attempted unsuccessfully to create a local 
union controlled by themselves. 
4 
Nevertheless an award was secured by 
the CHWU in 1912, which provided essentially the same hours, wages and 
general conditions as the 1911 Christchurch agreement. 
No new award or agreement was reached for the tearooms and the 1908 
award continued in force until it was renegotiated in 1918. By then, 
however the real value of wages had falfen substantially. In 1914 the union 
did enter into new agreements covering the licensed hotels. The first 
5 
encompassed central Christchurch, while the second provided for the boroughs 
of the 1911 agreement but with the addition of hotels in Papanui and 
Addington.
6 
The only two important changes to wage rates were the 
reclassification of barmen at the higher common rate of £2-5s 
per week, and the setting of the female rate for staff in kitchens with less 
than four hands at three-fourths of the male rate. This appears to have been 
a decrease. All staff did continue to receive free board and lodging, 
the effective value of which had increased as indicated by the rise in the cash 
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For the union it was the reduction in the hours of work that marked 1914 
as a significant year. First the Shops and Offices Amendment Act of 1913 
had set the maximum weekly hours for women workers in the hotels at 56, a 
reduction of two hours. 1 Second, the 1914 agreements formerly incorporated 
the Arbitration Courts ruling on the six-day week. While there was a 
qualification, which permitted an employer on up to four occasions per 
year not to provide a weekly holiday, if they failed to do so they were 
required to provide an extra day-off the following week or make a pay 
for the week at a rate of time-and-a-half .
2 
After these advances the war years brought a period of hiatus to the activity 
of the union. While the union itself was inactive it was nevertheless, 
affected by the wider political and social developments. In particular, changes 
within the labour movement and the ascendency of the prohibition movement 
had important consequences for the CHWU and its members. 
9. THE UNION AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 
The picture of the activities of the CHWU would be partial without 
painting in the wider background of the relations between the union 
and the labour movement. Central to this and constantly shaping it 
was the struggle between independent labour and craft-liberalism both 
at the national and local levels. In Canterbury the union had affiliated 
to the CTLC in July 1908, 
3 
but departed the following year as part of 
the stream of Liberal secession.4 The Liberal union leaders had been 
gradually losing control of the CTLC and resented the increasing political-
isation. By political they meant a non-Liberal perspective. Such a change 
in the balance of forces was slow; but by 1912 independent labour was 
clearly ascendent, although a few unions did remain under Liberal leadership 
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In seceding from the CTLC in 1909, the hotel workers criticised this 
'politizing' of meetings and claimed that the CTLC had neglected the 
particular concerns of the CHWU . 
... we do not wish to be affiliated to the Trades Council 
which is not in touch with us, and which has shown very 
clearly that it does not intend to help us. What do we 
as a. union care whether the P.M. visits England or not, 
or whether he sends Dreadnoughts .... they ou.ght to be 
discussed in their proper places .... we expect to discuss the 
affairs of our union and to receive the help we need. 1 
A deputation from the council addressed the union's general meeting. 2 They . 
denied that political issues dominated meetings but did not concede that 
such discussions were inappropri~te. To the charge of neglect they 
declared their readiness at any time to assist the CHWU with its problems. 
Some union members supported rejoining but when the vote was taken at 
the next union meeting the overwhelming majority favoured remaining 
disaffiliated. 3 Attempts in subsequent years by the CTLC to regain the 
CHWU's affiliation failed. 4 From this point until 1919the union was 
adrift from the main currents of the labour movement. Contact was 
confined largely to local liberal-led unions in the building trades, and 
no joint initiatives were undertaken with other trade unions, except for 
informal co-operation with the hotel workers unions in the other centres. 
With tbe formation of hotel workers' unions in all the four main centres 
by 1909, proposals for a national federation had soon followed.5 The div-
ision between independent labour and craft-liberalism slowed the development 
and ultimately the federation was formed without Canterbury by the 
independent labour leaders who led the unions elsewhere. In the course of 
the negotiations, Barr attempted to ensure the acceptance of arbitration was 
a condition for any union joining the federation, and that only 'direct 
interests' and not 'party political' interests were to be discussed by the 
!:T 10 Jul 1909 p10 
2 CHW Min 2 Aug 1909 p91 
3 CHW Min 30 Sep 1909 p97 
4 CHW Min 3 May 1910 p120; & 8 Jan 1912 p214 
5 CHW Min 28 Jun 1909 p79; 5 Jul 1909 p84 
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federation.1 In 1911 the proposal for federation was formally rejected 
by the CHWU, Barr cited three specific objections. First, the past 
tactical errors by the federation; second the proposed support for the 
New Zealand Labour Party's "Weekly Herald"; and third the capitation 
fee for 25% of the affiliates subscriptions.
2 
Co-operation did continue 
on an informal level between the unions, including joint delegations to 
the government, moreover, within the Canterbury union several members 
including Evans, the president from 1913 to 1915 had been prepared 
to support federation. In the wake of the defeat of the 1913 general 
strike however, and the call for a national strike by the Auckland exe-
cutive (the current federation executive) Evans praised Barr for keeping the 
3 
CHWU out of the national body, and thereby avoiding any disaster. 
The controversial political and industrial issues of the decade brought no 
change to the union's political viewpoint. For the Waihi strike and for 
the General Strike of 1913, the union's executive and for general meeting, 
rejected requests for support. 
4 
Nor did the CHWU participate in either of 
the Unity conferences designed to create a united political and industrial 
labour movement. This primarily reflected opposition to a labour movement 
independent of the Liberal Party. 5 Nor are any pacifist or socialist 
views evident in the attitude of the executive or general meetings towards 
World War One. While support for the war was typical of most unions, 
including many advocates of independent labour~ the CHWU's overall 
stance on labour unity placed them with a small minority of right-wing 
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10. ORGANISING THE UNION 
Such then was the Liberal outlook of the union on the outside world 
but how did the union organise and manage its own internal affairs? 
At one level was the union's formal structure, with general meetings 
each fortnight and a Board of Management performing minimal adminis-
trative functions. In 1909 the general meetings became monthly and four 
years later one in each quarter. 
1 
They remained ·until 1913 as the source 
of authority in theory and practice for all major decisions. The change in 
form to greater executive authority did not reflect a change in the 
union's industrial or political direction. At both the general and executive 
meeting it was Barr the secretary who was the leading initiator and shaper 
of decisions and the interpreter of the wider political reality. The change 
was not a response to any real or perceived fear of radicalisation at the 
general meetings. Except for one minor incident in 1918, there is no 
evidence of any challenge to the union's Liberal orientation. Rather the 
change reflected the generally low level of participation and the efficiency 
of greater executive authority. 
Participation in the affairs of the CHWU was generally low with a 
normal attendance of less than 20 at the union's general meetings. 
In some instances interest reached higher levels as in 1912 when 157 
members voted in the postal ballot on the six-day week. The organisat-
ional activity of the union was centered in Barr's rented office in Man-
chester Street and not the workplace. Barr, aided by two or three 
members of each year's executive, and an office assistant, directed the 
union's industrial work, supervised its finances and gave the Liberal 
colour to the union's public pronouncements. Barr's numerous commitments 
increasingly limited his work for the union and although Evans was 
appointed collector-organiser in 1917 2 the difficu !ties of regular contact 
were only partially overcome. 
Contact with the membership was through v1s1ts and circulars to the work-
place. 3 A high staff turnover and dispersed worksites made this difficult. 
An attempt was made to publish a union newsletter - 'The Recorder' 
1. CHW Min 30 Jun 1913 p271 
2. CHW Min 12 Feb 1917 p47 
3. For egs of circulars see CHW Correspondence Book Feb 1908 
to Mar 1912 pp261, 296, 299. 
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but only one issue was produced.1 Many workers were familiar however 
with Barr's political orientation through his column in the "Lyttelton Times". 
As to unofficial agitation by workers at individual workplaces, there is no 
evidence of any substantial struggle by workers to improve their conditions. 
Rather progress was made gradually by award re-negotiation and through 
its enforcement by the Labour Department and the unions officials. The 
strategy of vigorous workplace organisation promoted by the left of the 
labour movement was alien to the union's Liberal leadership. 
The union executive was concerned with more than the conditions of the 
worker at the workplace but not however in the sense of socialist education 
or political consciousness. Rather the focus was on the development of the 
individual intellect and the prompting of social interaction amongst union 
members. The organising of social· ·events was discussed as early as March 190f¥ 
and over the next five years irregular social, cricket and football events 
were organised. Attenda~ce fluctuated and no permanent social club 
developed.3 In 1910, a small lending library was created 4 and a year later 
the executive established a 'Distress and Funeral Benefit Fund' 
5 
The fund 
was modest with income from levies, fines and donations, making maximum 
payments of five pounds for sickness and ten pounds for funerals. F.ive 
members received payments in 1912 and again in 1913 but by 1918 the 
fund had ceased to operate.6 In add it ion to these activities the union 
supported apprenticeship schemes for cooks 7 and appointed a representative 
to the Technical College Board. 8 It further attempted to organise the 
labour market, and thus assist the provision of ·union labour, by establishing 
in 1909 an employment bureau as part of the new union preference clause. 
CHW E Min 27 Jan 1911 
2 CHW Min 9 Mar 1908 p8 
3 see CHW Min 21 Sep 1908 p42; 28 Jun 1909 p79; 3 Jul 
1911 p184; 3 Mar 1913 p262 
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8 CHW Min 3 Mar 1913 p261 
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At a further level, the executive promoted the notion of responsibility 
between the trades workers and pride in ones particular craft. It was 
promoted with little effect. Evans, the CHWU president noted the non-
attendance of members at a funeral of a fellow worker. He urged them 
to make ·an effort to show outsiders respect for customs and one another"! 
Such activities reflected the craft orientation of the CHWU leadership but the 
essentially non-craft membership was less responsive. Certainly employment 
and training schemes and mutual co-operation can form part of a class 
conscious industrial unionism. Co-operation however is on a different level 
to that of ··conscious class solidarity. Moreover such schemes for the 
industrial unionist are beginning points in a long struggle, for the craft 
unionist they are the end of the vision for the workplace. 
The collective effect of the CHWU's organisational efforts was to create 
a small union with modest finances centered in Christchurch city. The 
unions constitution had provided for organising an 'unlimited number of 
members in the "Hotels, Restaurants, Oyster Saloons, Tea Rooms, Clubs and 
Refreshment Rooms" 
2 
of Canterbury and a year later workers in Boarding 
Houses and Caterers were added to the· organisational scope~ Members 
paid an entrance fee of 5s for men and 2s for women with a weekly fee 
of 6d and 3d respectively, the differential reflecting the lower pay of women 
workers~ Total membership grew to 294 by the end of 1909 and after 
considerable fluctuation only stood at 551 by December 1918. (See Table 
1.2} In comparison to the other main centres, even after allowing for the 
differences in population, the CHWU appears to have achieved a lower level of 
unionisation. In 1918 the Auckland union had 3663 members, Wellington 2029 
and Dunedin 601.
5 
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the CHWU membership under the more energetic secretaryship of 
Brooks (see below) who had more than doubled the membership to 
1083 by 1920.
1 
In al I these unions it was women who formed the 
majority of the membership and who faced particular problems over pay 
and their rights. 
TABLE 1.2 CHWU MEMBERSHIP AND FINANCE, 1908 TO 1918 
Year Members 1 Annual lncome2 (£) Net Assets2 (£) 
1909 294 No record 983 
1912 362 272 246 
1915 454 219 264 
1918 551 4434 52 
Notes 
1. As at 31 December 
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All financial figures are rounded to the nearest pound 
£254 was collected by Brooks (Oct 1918 - Feb 1919) enabling the union to 
recover from a position worse than the figure of £443. 
AJHR 3 H 11 (1921-22) p23 
11. WOMEN 
'To serve, to clean and to cook' - these processes fundamental to the 
operation of the public service provided by hotels and restaurants were 
the same unpaid tasks prescribed for women in the private home. In 
the hiring of labour for the public tasks the employer sought those who 
55 
had traditionally performed that work and who could be paid the lowest 
possible wages. Women in turn sought such work, while men overwhelm-
ingly did not. As with the international experience the pattern developed 
of a predominantly low paid female workforce, a pattern once established 
that was self-reinforcing. The significant exceptions to this pattern of female 
dominance were the senior cooks in the licensed hotels, barmen and hotel 
porters. While there were both male and female cooks the higher level of 
status and pay associated with chefs in the larger licensed hotels did 
make this an option considered by men as well as by women. The serving 
of liquor was a function socially prescribed for men and women, but 
increasingly New Zealand society saw such an association with the mas-
culine character of the public house as unfitting for women. Porters per-
formed bar cleaning, carrying and security duties, and these tasks society 
had also ascribed as appropriate for men. 
Inequality in pay between men and women in the hotel and restaurant 
industry occurred at two levels. First, in the case of work outside of the 
kitchen women were paid a lower rate of pay for performing identical 
duties. For instance under the 1908 award a barman received a minimum 
of £ 1 1 Os per week and a barmaid £ 1 5s; the minimum for a waiter was 
1 
£ 1 1 Os and for a waitress £ 1. Within the kitchen the situation was 
mixed in that the full-time staff in the licensed hotel generally received 
equal pay but casuals and kitchenstaff in restaurants and tearooms were 
paid according to their gender. At a second level the highest paid jobs, 
the chefs and senior cooks, tended to have a higher proportion of male 
workers than the industry as a whole, while the very worst paid 
were the female-only jobs of waitresses and housemaids. To some extent 
the differential rates reflected the differences in the skills required. 
Nevertheless this is only partially correct as males performing similarly 
unskilled work as porters, or general hands, still received several 
shillings more than their unskilled, but female counterparts. Generally 
B_Aw IX ( 1908) p252 
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women beca1ne concentrated in those jobs with low skills, status and pay 
and in turn their concentration in those jobs perpetuated that pattern. 
If the union was to successfully organise the industry it was these women 
workers who needed to be enrolled in the union. Initially, from 1908 to 
1911, women in the licensed hotels were excluded from the union's prefer-
ence clause and the employer was able to hire non-union female labour~ Women 
were protected in restaurants and tearooms and subsequently in the licensed 
hotels but the unions recruiting drive was difficult and the place of women 
in the union a subordinate one. Beginning in 1909 and repeated irregularly 
thereafter special meetings were held to recruit women members. 2 In 1910 
as part of the preparation for the 1911 award for licensed hotels a 
committee of all women members was formed to examine and advise on 
the conditions of female workers. 
3 
Nevertheless, the union's executive 
remained almost exclusively male in its composition and general meetings 
reflected a similar dominance. Such a pattern was typical of trade-unionism 
and of most social institutions in the early twentieth century but giver:i 
that the majority of the industry's workers were women their virtually 
complete absence from the CHWU's leadership is significant. 
In a trade that was the target of the prohibition movement the place 
of women as workers or as customers was a particularly controversial 
issue. Reflecting the prejudices of society, prohibitionists perceived women 
who associated with liquor to be suspect as proper women, and as likely 
enticers of morally weak men to drink, or debauchery. 4 Hotel bars were not, 
in their view, a place in which women should work or visit. By removing 
barmaids they hoped to reduce the attractiveness of drinking for men, and 
agitation by the prohibitionists, of both genders, secured a section in the 
Licensing Amendment Act of 1910 effectively prohibiting the hiring of 
any new barmaids. 5 Only those barmaids registered by the due date could 
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three months continuous service in the proceeding 12 months who were sub -
ject to a test of their bona fides. An inadequate definition of a bar delayed 
the Act's effect and in 1912 the registration time was extended to June 1, 
1913. 1 Nevertheless there was a steady reduction in barmaids as those 
registered eventually left or retired. 
The liquor trade and the CHWU were prepared to acquiese in or support 
the abolition of barmaids. While the employers disputed the arguments of the 
prohibitionists as to the moral character of barmaids and their role as 
enticers of men, they were prepared to accept their removal as part of 
their own wider strategy of concession? a strategy that accepted particular 
restraints and thereby hoped to avert prohibition. The CHWU passed 
3 
a resolution supporting the elimination of barmaids, in 1912 and again in 
1914, when it urged "Mr Barr to do all in ·his power to secure the 
termination of barmaids' services in licensed hotels". 
4 
It was carried 
unanimously by the general meeting. Members appeared to have believed that 
the first preference for employment should go to barmen, that it was not 
appropriate for women to work in bars and that their lower pay affected 
male employment. 
The response of the barmaids to the Act was one of resentment but not 
organised opposition. One of the barmaids interviewed by the "Lyttelton 
Times" explained that she rejected the 'trivial and petty restrictions of the 
government'. 5 For herself having to support her mother and younger sisters, 
'the job was a source of good pay and was no less respectable than any 
other'. There were 'good and bad in any trade ... and while not better off 
morally or intellectually she was 'not no good' simply because she worked 
in a hotel'. 6 Finally she protested the continuing public and official 
surveillance. " .... I am not allowed to go to supper with a man ... in case 
anyone should speak about it. I am heartily sick of all the spying and 
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The attitude towards women on the other side of the bar, reinforced that 
view of public and official hostility towards women in licensed hotels. 
Hotels were predominantly male places but as customers women and men 
enjoyed an equal legal entitlement. To the reformers of the trade neither 
the public bar nor separate lounges were respectable places for women. The 
Auckland Licensing Committee, reviewing two hotel licenses in 1911, comm-
ented it was "more seemly for them to take their refreshments in their own 
1 
homes". Both the committee and the "Lyttelton Times" editorial admitted 
that the incidence of drunkenness by women in Auckland was less than in 
districts where women were excluded from hotels, nor were any disastrous 
results evident in Auckland due to the access of women to licensed hotels. 
Such drinking however was not viewed as a respectable activity and was 
clearly contrary to public opinion. In renewing the licenses the committee 
was assured by the hotel keepers that henceforth they would cease serving 
women.2 Through such discretionary power many women were excluded 
and in 1916 women were legally prohibited from being in or about a 
licensed hotel after 6pm unless they were staff or members of the licensees 
family. 
3
Again this was allegedly to remove the lure of undesirable women. 
12. PROHIBITION 
The effects of prohibition extended beyond the employment of women. It 
was a movement of enormous political, social and organisational strength, 
supported by tens of thousands of New Zealanders and advocated with 
passion. It had become the foremost social issue in the country. Its 
omnious figure was a permanent feature of the union's environment, and 
the struggle between the prohibitionists and the liquor trade - or between 
"fanaticism and greed" as Bollinger
4 
termed it - shaped the industry. 
In the union's first decade that struggle was one of concession by the 
trade in the face of the growing offensive. Such concessions were motivated 
by a genuine and certainly well-founded fear of destruction. From 1902 
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THE BARMAN, c1909 
When people thought of hotels or hotel workers, their 
visual image was usually the barman. The largest group 
of male workers in an industry with predominantly 
female labour, the barman was under threat of extinction 
in the earlier twentieth century as the prohibition move-
ment gained in strength. In 1909, however, barmaids 
were as numerous as barmen; and it was to them that 
the prohibition movement brought unemployment. 
From 1910 onwards it became illegal to hire new barmaids 
and within a decade the serving of liquor was a task per-
formed almost exclusively by men - as it would remain 
for nearly another 50 years. 
(Alexander Turnball Library) 
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licensing poll. They had succeeded in creating twelve dry electorates 
and obtained a significant reduction of hotel licenses in other districts 
61 
and only the requirement of 60% to carry prohibition and the fragmented 
nature of the ballot had averted the trade's destruction. Nevertheless with 
55% of the vote in 1911
1 
the threat remained. It grew with the alteration 
of the poll in 1919, lowering the majority to 50% although a third 
option, that of state purchase, was added. In the December ballot of 
1919 prohibition failed by only 3263 votes to secure its goal.
1
That was 
to prove its peak but the margin points to how close was the triumph 
of prohibition. 
Although the ultimate victory was not achieved the worst abuses of the 
liquor trade were rectified as a consequence of the movement's agitation, 
assisted by cultural changes in New Zealand society. In addition to 
rectifying the worst, a panopoly of restr ·ctions were instituted that re-
shaped the hotels operations both for the good and the bad. In the course 
of the ten years from 1908 to 1918 the closing time for hotels was cut 
from 11pm to 10pm (1910) and further cut to 6pm in 1917, bottle 
store licenses were abolished, anti-treating regulations introduced, the drinking 
age raised from 18 to 21, the granting of new hotel licenses prohibited, 
and new club charters made virtually impossible.
3
Through moral and legal 
coercion women were removed from both sides of the bar in many hotels, 
while non-drinking activities such as games and music were proscribed. The 
hotel ceased to be a centre of diverse social activity and became instead 
barren beer barns. 
For the CHWU the struggle between tile liquor trade and the prohibition-
ists posed two problems. First; the threat of prohibition made it difficult 
to argue for higher wages and improved job security. The hotelkeepers 
claimed declining profitability and the prospect of losing their capital and 
livelihood, and while the claims were exaggerated they did pose some 
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divided the labour movement primarily at the leadership level, creating 
a cross current in the conflict between independent labour and craft-
liberalism. Prominent Liberals such as H. G. Ell and L. M. lsitt were close 
associates of Barr but leading prohibitionists.1 Amongst independent labour, 
McCombs was a prominent temperance advocate and Howard while rarely 
making a public reference was similarly sympathetic.2 Nevertheless Barr 
did not commit the union to support continuance candidates, thereby 
av.erting the potentially acute problem where a Wberal prohibitionist 
faced an independent labour candidate. The jobs of many union members 
would have been unaffected by prohibition, but the barmen did desire 
a more active union policy. An unofficial meeting of barmen in November 
1911, resolved to "leave no stone unturned to carry continuance at the 
forthcoming election" and requested support from other unionists? Barr 
disclaimed any official involvement as the union was adopting a neutral 
position in the election. 
4 
In 1915 and again in 1916 the prohibition movement petitioned parliament 
for the early closing of hotels. Similar measures had been undertaken 
in other parts of the British Empire, including much of Australia, and 
the prohibitionists claimed that reduced drinking would result from six 
o'clock closing and thus 'aid the nations war effort, financially, morally 
and physically'. 
5 
The first petition contained 60,000 signatures and the 
second 100,000, 6and sufficient pressure persuaded parliament to enact the 
1917 Sa le of Liquor Restriction Act. The Act provided that for the 
duration of the war and for six months subsequently hotel bars would 
close at 6 p.m. A year later the hours were made permanent. They were 
not repealed until 1967, having profoundly influenced five decades of the 
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During the First World War the real value of wages, including those of 
hotel and restaurant workers, had fallen. Prices had increased by an average 
of 8% per year during the war and despite the Arbitration Court issuing 
a war bonus of approximately 10% to some lower paid workers, this was 
insufficient to maintain the wage levels of 1914. 1 The awards or agreements 
negotiated by the CHWU in 1914 received no increases or other changes 
until they were renegotiated in early 1918. Two new agreements for 
licensed hotels - one for Christchurch and the other for the rest of 
Canterbury - and a new award for tearooms and restaur.ants were made 
but they failed to recover the loss in spending power. 
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For the first time in Canterbury ·private hotels received award protection, 
with eight hotels being included under the Tearooms Award. 1 This was 
possible because of the more flexible attitude of the Arbitration Court 
under Justice Stringer and from whom the Auckland and Otago hotel 
workers had gained a similar interpretation.2 The court in accepting such 
inclusions confessed that the line drawn between different types of. 
private hotels as to which should or should not fall under an award was 
in practice an arbitrary one. 3 
Despite this, the majority of private hotel workers in Canterbury along with 
club and domestic hospital workers remained unprotected. The various 
hotel workers unions had from their creation sought, both in the negotiating 
of awards and through legislative reform, to gain protection for club workers. 
The courts and the government had rejected such claims contending 
that the clubs were essentially non-pecuniary organisations and hence 
precluded from award coverage by section 71 of the l.C. & A. Act. 4 From 
the perspective of the union all workers were entitled to decent wages 
and conditions, and these were clearly lacked by workers in clubs. Their 
wage rates were reported to be 20% less than their counterparts in the 
licensed hotels. 5 Agitation in 1911 over their conditions, where club 
stewards were alleged to be working up to 80 hours per week for £2 
did lead to some improvement.6 Nevertheless neither unionisation nor any 
legal protection was achieved. A similar situation prevailed in the. hospitals. 
There were 20 domestic staff - maids, porters and kitchen workers at 
Christchurch hospital with several others elsewhere in the province. They 
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13. 1918 
1918 also marked a change in the union's leadership. Barr had tendered his 
resignation as secretary in February 1918.1 Now aged 51 Barr's public 
commitments - in the Legislative Council, as Mayor of Sumner and as 
the newly elected Chairman of the Christchurch Tramway Board -
prevented him from continuing as secretary. It is unclear whether such 
a departure also reflected the final change in Barr's upward social progress 
from craftsman to the respectable member of the middle class. His 
departure was marked with a vote of thanks and certainly no acrimony. 
P. Evans, previously president and the current organiser, was elected 
unopposed as secretary. Evans continued the union's arbitrationist 
and Liberal orientation in his seven months in office. His negotiation of 
new industrial agreements in 1918 secured few gains and he proved 
incompetent in managing the union's finances. Although never large 
the union had amassed in excess of £260 in nett assets. 2 These 
reserves deteriorated from 1916 onwards and virtually disappeared in 
the course of Evan's seven months as secretary. Evan's expenditure 
exceeded the union's income by £88 and a situation of 
virtual bankruptcy was discovered upon his departure in September for 
military service. 3 His resignation marked the end of the union's Liberal 
leadership and the beginning of a new era. 
In the course of the ten years of Liberal leadership the union had endured 
and had been able to improve the hours and wages of its members. The 
union's primary success had been in the lowering of the hours of work. 
Where prior to 1908 a 70 to 90 hour week was not uncommon, the 
maxima prescribed in 1918 were 56 hours for men and 52 for women, 
and workers now had a weekly holiday. Such progress was of course 
relative given the preval,ence of 52 and 48 hour weeks in shops and 
factories but by the standard of the past and of the industry overseas 
the reduction was an important advance for many workers. In terms of 
wages progress had been modest, qualified on the one hand by the trade-
off in reducing hours and on the other by the inflationary impact of 
the first world war. As with the trade union movement as a whole, 
2 
3 
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It was not until the 1920's that the union was able to fully recover the 
loss in real wages and regain its pre-war peak. Nevertheless, in com-
parison to most other workers, the hotel and restaurant workers did 
improve their relative position. As to other conditions the CHWU had 
been able to improve the standard of hotel accommodation for its 
members and institute a system of preference for the employment of 
unionists. 
The union had established a firm organisational base in the provinces' 
largest population centre, Christchurch, and in the most important sector, 
the licensed hotels. Its financial resources were small however, and 
amongst its members there was a low level of union activism. The union 
also found itself outside the main stream of the labour movement led 
by the forces of independent labour. Its dependence on the arbitration 
system, its localised nature and the fragility of the union's finances, 
were all typical features of the New Zealand trade union movement 
at the end of the First World War. 
There was one distinct contrast between the situation in which the union 
had commenced its operations in 1908 and the scene in 1918. Liberal-
ism as a political force either in society at large or within the trade 
union movement, was almost extinct. It lingered in parliament for a further 
decade but only as a torpid and decaying irrelevance. While it did achieve 
office again in 1928, its existence as a distinct force with an ideology 
and life of its own had passed. To its right the Reform Party dominated 
government office while within the labour movement the forces of 
independent labour had achieved supremacy. With the election of Reginald 
A. Brooks as its new secretary in 1918, the CHWU finally ended its 
period of craft-liberalism and entered into a new, Labour era. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL, 1919 TO 1935 
The decade of the 1920's was a period of struggle for the CHWU, as it 
sought to rebuild and expand. After achieving some modest success it was 
then confronted by the abyss of the great depression and for five years 
struggled to survive as a union and to protect the jobs, pay and conditions 
of its members. 
After an initial period of instability, following the end of the Liberal 
leadership of the union, the CHWU was able to make progress in improving 
the conditions of work for the industry's workers, including a reduction in 
the hours of work. In 1924 the first dominion-wide award for the industry 
was obtained, and the remainder of the decade brought further, modest, 
advances. By 1931 the union was confronted by both internal difficulties 
and the onset of the darkest period of the depression. It survived both 
these problems and was intact to receive the rewards from the election of 
a Labour government in 1935, a victory, which its long years of co operation 
in the labour movement had helped to achieve. 
1. REBUILDING 
Between 1918 and 1922, the CHWU experienced a time of instability. 
Six presidents and three secretaries held office in the course of this period, 
1 
several of whom departed in unfavourable circumstances. Despite the 
difficulties the union was able to extend its award coverage to rural Canterbury, 
improve the provisions of its awards, and reconstruct its shattered finances. 
Central in these achievements was the figure of Reginald Arnott Brooks, 
2 
who had been elected as the union's new secretary in October 1918. 
In his first report in the following year, he criticised the recent lethargy 
of Barr and Evans in collecting union subscriptions and the union's lack 
of industrial strength. "The union has in the past been a joke" commented 
3 
Brooks, "but we are just about turning the joke on the opposite side." 
He went on to stress the importance of the union in securing better pay 
and conditions and in rectifying award breeches. Brooks and the executive 
2 
3 
Most notably Evans (CHW Min 5 Dec 1918) & Gilmore (E Min 28 
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THE LABOUR ERA - REGINALD A. BROOKS AND THE 1919 
CHWU EXECUTIVE 
From 1919 to 1955 - except for two brief intervals 
- Brooks (front row: 2nd from right) was the secretary 
of the CHWU. Under his leadership the union forged 
a close association with the Labour Party, the Alliance 
of Labour and its successor the Federation of Labour. 
The new executive in 1919 faced the twin challenges 
of recovering the decline in wages that its members 
had suffered in the war years and in extending the 
union's coverage to rural Canterbury. For the next 
16 years the union would struggle, first to build, and 




that he led were resolved to improve this situation, and Brooks possessed 
the determination and skills to do so. 
English by birth, Brooks had spent his earlier years on British ships, probably 
1 
as a steward. After migrating to New Zealand he worked as a barman for a 
2 
period in Christchurch hotels before being elected in February 1919 as vice-
3 
president of the CHWU. In October at the age of 35 he was elected to the 
secretaryship, a position he was to retain, except for two brief intervals 
until 1955. 
Brooks' politics were based on a dual commitment to trade unionism and the 
Labour Party. While operating within the arbitration system, he strove to 
maximise the possible gains for his members through vigorous advocacy and 
enforcement, complemented by an efficiently organised union. He believed 
that the workers needed both a political and industrial organisation to advance 
their interests and the CHWU played an active role in both spheres, throughout 
most of his secretaryship. Brooks belonged to the middle stream of the labour 
movement. Conscious of class, he supported the reform of society to achieve 
greater equality and justice and increased social ownership, but he was not 
a proponent of any Marxist revolution. 
The first measures undertaken by the union's new executive were directed 
at two areas. First, effective contact was re-established in the officially 
unionised workplaces of Christchurch, where the system of fees' collection and 
award enforcement had become spasmodic. Second, the union moved to 
establish awards for the remainder of Canterbury in the tearoom and private 
hotel sectors, and to renegotiate the old 1912 award for the licensed hotels 
of South Canterbury. All these goals were achieved, with the result that the 
unions membership grew to 1329 by 1922~The increase in members effected 
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The three awards negotiated for the non-Christchurch areas in 1919, not only 
contained rates of wages equal to those in the city awards, but several 
important advances. In the new South Canterbury Licensed Hotels Award 1 
all male and female kitchenstaff received the same rate of pay for performing 
the same task, whereas in North Canterbury (which included Christchurch) 
the female rate for cooks in the smaller kitchens was set at three-fourths 
of the male rate. Moreover, any work performed on a special (statutory) 
holiday would henceforth be paid at a rate of time-and-a-half, instead 
of the ordinary rate. The other two advances were contained in the new 
award for the Canterbury tearooms. 2 This provided for a weeks paid 
::mnual holiday and double-time payment for any work on Good Friday and 
Christmas Day, as well as payment at time-and-a-half for four other special 
holidays. This was the first provision for a paid annual holiday for any 
group of hotel or restaurant workers in Canterbury. 
In the year following these successes, however, the union underwent major 
internal dislocation. Already the CHWU had been forced to dismiss its 
country organiser for his unsatisfactory performance, and his successor 
in the job resigned after only one week. 
3 
In mid-1920, the union's 
president, vice-president, and R. Brooks the secretary all resigned.4 
Brooks tendered his resignation out of disillusionment he said with the lack 
of interest shown by members in the affairs of the union. 5 That September, 
T. Gilmore formerly a hotel worker in Wellington, was elected as the new 
secretary. 6 Three months later he was discovered by the police in Rakaia 
in a disorientated state, and the unions safe was found empty.7 Following 
this debacle Brooks was re-elected as secretary and in April 1921 he was 
joined by E. G. East as the union's new president. 8 This marked the end of 
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the union's period of instability, and except for a brief interval in 1930, 
Brooks and East would continue in office for the next fifteen years, 
shaping the direction of the union's development. 
2. HOURS AND WAGES, 1920 TO 1924 
The period 1920 to 1922 brought both a reduction in the hours of work and 
a rise in the level of real wages for hotel and restaurant workers. In 1921 
the new Shops and Offices Act set the maximum hours of work for the 
industry's workers at 48 per week. 1 This represented a reduction of eight 
hours for men and four hours for women, a significant advance given that 
the union's first award in 1908 had been for 65 hours. The new level re-
mained in operation until 1936, when the new Labour government introduced 
legislation for the 40 hour week. 
Hotel and restaurant workers benefited from the general rise in real wage 
levels that workers obtained from the Arbitration Court in the early 1920's.
2 
This increase arose through both award settlements and from the system of 
cost-of-living bonuses issued by the court, which had arisen in the First 
World War as a temporary means to compensate workers for inflation. The 
bonuses were not permanent adjustments, as the phenomenon of inflation 
was believed to be a temporary one. When prices continued to rise in the 
post-war period the government made a series of amendments to the court's 
powers, in an attempt to find an orderly mechanism for an increasingly 
confused situation.3 
In determining the level of any cost-of-living bonus the court was obliged 
to reconcile two potentially contradictory criteria: on the one hand to maintain 
"the standard of living of the average worker at a reasonable level", and on 
the other to consider the economic circumstances of the particular industry 
to which the decision was to be applied.4 
After issuing its first bonus in 1916, further bonuses followed between 
1918 and 1921. Generally they reflected the movement in the official 
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the court issued a wage bonus of 4s per week for adult males and 2s 
for females and juniors, effective as on 1 January 1920. 1 From May 
these bonuses were further increased to 1 Os and 5s respectively.
2 
In the course of 1921 the situation changed. The court decided that the 
method of calculating rises in the cost-of-living employed by the government 
statistician, had led the court to grant an over-generous compensation to the 
workers. 3 No further bonus was issued in 1921, and in 1922 the court moved 
to reduce wages. This decision reflected mounting pressure from farmers 
and employers, whose financial position had deteriorated from its post-war 
boom, for lower wage levels. The court now altered its method of determining 
a bonus by taking only the previous month's movement in the cost-of-
living index instead of the previous quarter, and on that basis projected 
a fall in the cost of living for the next six months. Hence it issued an 
order for the reduction of wage rates by 5s per week on the basis not 
of the price rises experienced but of the fall in prices it expected to occur. 
When indeed a decline did take place in the second half of 1922, it issued 
a further order reducing wage rates by an additional 3s per week for adult 
males 1/6d for females and 1s for juniors. 4 
For the CHWU, as for the wider trade union movement, the period from 1918 
to the court's reductions of 1922 had produced a rise in real wages, but the 
level of 1922 had only equal led that of 1914. In short, the rises of the post 
war period had only compensated for the decline experienced in the course 
of the high inflation during World War One? While the decision of the court 
was attacked by many unions and several affiliates of the Alliance of Labour 
initiated industrial action, the trade union movement lacked the strength 
politically or industrially to reverse the court's verdict. The CHWU sought 
specific exemptions from the cut for its lower paid awards but as with most 
other union applications the court declined the request. 6 
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After the wage cuts of 1922, the court's power to issue general wage 
adjustments expired. From 1923 until the end of the decade each union 
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was left to seek its own rates of wages back within the system of conciliation 
and arbitration. For the CHWU the most important step along this path 
was the establishment of dominion-wide awards. 
3. DOMINION AWARDS 
New Zealand's system of industrial relations was one of small, localised 
unions matched by a patchwork of local agreements. Those unions operating 
under the IC & A Act were prohibited from forming multi-district unions, but 
as with the hotel and restaurant workers several did form national federations. 
The awards, however, remained separately negotiated local agreements, 
operating only in those districts where a trade union existed for that industry. 
In the hotel and restaurant industry the four major unions, Auckland, 
Wellington, Canterbury and Otago, had each established in their own district 
an essentially two-tier award system. For each of the three sectors of the 
industry - licensed hotels, tearooms and private hotels - there was usually 
one award for the district's main city and one for the rest of the province. 
In Canterbury, in 1923, there was a Christchurch and a provincial award 
for tearooms, the same arrangement for the private hotels, but a North 
Canterbury (including Christchurch) Licensed Hotel's Award with a separate 
licensed hotel award for South Canterbury. In districts such as Westland 
no union or award existed and in others the award was of a lower standard 
and not effectively enforced. 
To rectify this patchwork the hotel workers decided to negotiate a dominion 
wide award for each industry sector. 
1 
All workers would then be covered, 
and all would obtain wages and conditions equivalent to those prevailing 
in the main centre awards. A dominion award was not a new concept in 
the trade union movement, as several unions such as the freezing workers 
and carpenters had already secured such an arrangement. Nevertheless, 
local awards were still the common pattern and employers in some 
industries remained opposed to any national agreements, believing they would 
strengthen the union's negotiating power and tend to raise wages. 
CHW Min 15 Jan 1923 p153 
The employers in the licensed hotels were prepared to enter into a dominion 
award and they met with representatives of the hotel workers union in 
November 1923.1 Brooks had been instrumental in initiating the prorosal 2 
and once it had been established in the licensed hotels the other sectors of 
the industry were likely to follow. In February 1924 the first New Zealand 
Licensed Hotels' Award was issued by the Arbitration Court, and dominion 
awards followed for the tearooms in November and for the private hotels in 
July 1925. (See Table 2.1) 














Chef 6hk 5-5 
Chef 4hk 4, 12 
2nd cook 4hk 3-2 
Kitchenhand 2-5 
Waitress or maid 1-11 
Barman 3-2 
Add board and lodging 1 1-10 
Wages: Casual per day 
1st cook (1st 3 days) 2 1-5 
Waitress (ht 3 days) 2 12/6 
Waitress (single meal) 7/6 






































Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid. Meals only in tearooms 
Thereafter at pro rata of ordinary rate. 
2 
CHW Min 5 Nov 1923 p175 
CHW Min 15 Jan 1923 p153 
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For the workers in the main centres there was little immediate benefit 
from the new arrangement, as the Arbitration Court had ensured a close 
relationship between the wage rates of the various local awards. The 
objective, however, of the dominion awards had been to improve ;the 
situation of those workers in the poorly or unorganised areas and to 
lay the basis for a future collective advance by all the nation's hotel 
and restaurant workers. Henceforth when awards arose for renegotiation, 
or a major dispute developed, the greater strength of the workers in Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch would pull-up those in the weaker areas. 
Similarly the potentially debilitating effects of non-unionised low wage 
areas on the main centre rates was removed. Underlying this was the 
principle that no matter where you worked in New Zealand you were 
entitled to the same rate of pay for doing the same job. 
4. WAGES AND THE WORKPLACE, 1925 TO 1930 
Following the establishment of the dominion awards, the remainder of the 
decade brought modest, unspectacular advances in the wages and conditions 
of the CHWU's membership. The union continued to operate within the 
arbitration system and there were no significant industrial disputes. 
Most of the union's attention was focussed on the active enforcement 
of the union's awards at the workplace. 
Enforcement was often a complex issue, as the structure of the industry 
and the complexities of the various awards provided extensive scope for 
disputation. For instance, the appropriate pay rate for most kitchen workers 
was dependent on the number of staff employed in the kitchen. A second 
cook in a four-handed kitchen was entitled to one rate but a different 
rate applied in a five-handed kitchen. The presence of casual staff and part-
time workers complicated the calculation of the staffing level, as did the 
performance of certain kitchen duties by non-kitchen staff such as waitresses. 
In small establishments workers might often perform a variety of duties, 
the rates of pay for which were differ'ent. Sometimes this could vary from 
week to week. It was a situation difficult for· the union to closely monitor 
and the employer could place pressure upon a worker to take a rate of 
pay lower than the one to which they were entitled. One common 
practice by employers was to use a general hand to relieve a barman during 
meal breaks or on their time off, but pay only at the rate for a general 
hand and not the higher rate provided for barmen. Employers were able 
to disguise the actual hours worked on the bar by falsifying the wnges book. 
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The unions did alter the award in order to raise the rate of pay applicable 
and regulate the hours for which a general hand could relieve. While the problem 
1 
was reduced it was not completely eliminated. 
The union was faced with an array of other enforcement problems from claims 
for overtime, special allowances, under-payment for holidays, incorrect weekly 
wages and sub-standard quarters or meal provided by the employer to the staff. 
The recovery of money for a worker frequently proved problematic for two 
reasons. First many workers apparently succumbed to employer pressure and 
signed the time book for less hours than they had actually worked. When the 
worker subsequently left the job they would often contact the CHWU to lodge 
a claim for unpaid overtime. The second factor hindering the union's recovery 
of wages was the IC & A Act. Under the act no claim could be lodged for the 
recovery of wages that was more than six-months old. Often by the time the 
union was informed of a case, action in the court was no longer possible. 
Award enforcement was a responsibility of the Labour Department, as well 
as a task for the CHWU, but the complexities of the union's awards and the 
multiplicity of workplaces posed problems for the department's Christchurch 
office. In the early 1920's the union criticised its operations suggesting it 
2 
exhibited an employer bias in its decisions. Brooks met with the Minister of 
Labour, G. J. Andersen, outlining some 70 instances of departmental inaction 
over cases in the industry and the meeting appears to have produced a marked 
improvement in the Christchurch operation. 3The department subsequently 
took a more vigorous role in enforcing the awards and prosecuting recalcitrant 
employers. 
Supplementing these enforcement activities the union was also responsible 
for obtaining compensation for injured workers and for operating an employment 
service. Under the Workers Compensation Act a worker was entitled to receive 
compensation at the rate of 66.6% of their total wage from 1926 up from 58% 
4 
in 1922. Generally the claims lodged by the union were small and uncontested, 
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THE CITY HOTEL - OXFORD, CHRISTCHURCH 1911 
The sale of liquor was a highly profitable activity 
and in the course of the first half of the twentieth 
century it became almost the sole activity in most 
city hotels. Accommodation, meals and entertain-
ment departed and 'vertical drinking' and the six o'clock 
swill arrived. For the CHWU it was hotels such as 
the Oxford, together with establishments with accomm-
odation and dining rooms like the United Service 
Hotel, that represented its strongest section in terms 
of both wages and union membership. 




fractured her hip while working and after several years of legal action by 
the union, she was able to receive .£850 in compensation. 1 As for the 
employment service, the union had reorganised it as a licensed employment 
agency and it had established a central role in the hiring of labour in the hotel 
2 
and restaurant industry. From the union's perspective it provided a low 
cost service for its members and a source of information on the movement of 
labour. 
In the last half of the 1920's the union successfully negotiated wage increases 
and extra holidays. In the 1926-27 round of award negotiations - which 
began with the licensed hotels - barmen gained a rise of 5/- per week, 
kitchenhands from 2/6 in the licensed hotels to 2/- or 1/6 in the tearooms 
and private hotels, while waitresses and maids in both types of hotels gained 
3 
an extra 1/6. The rates for cooks did not change. The major change in the 
1929-20 award negotiations was an extra special holiday and two days of 
annual leave for workers in licensed and private hotels. 4 This marked the 
high tide of the union's gains until the worse of the depression had passed, 
and a higher mark was not reached until 1938. 
5. LABOUR SOLIDARITY 
The decade of the 1920's had been largely one for marking time by the labour 
movement. Politically the parliamentary Labour Party had grown in strength 
but remained out of office; in the industrial sphere the movement remained 
divided and seemingly incapable of cohesively wielding industrial power. During 
this period the CHWU had pursued a consistent and deliberate policy of co-
operation with both the industrial and political arms of labour and regularly 
aided individual unions and progressive social causes. Such a policy was in 
sharp contrast to the conservative stance within the labour movement adopted 
by the union, during its first ten years under the leadership of the Liberals. 
Its support for both the parliamentary road advocated by the Labour Party and 
the path of industrial action emphasised by the Alliance of Labour, posed no 
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In the industrial sphere, the union had been instrumental in re-establishing 
the Hotel Workers' Federation in 1923. 
1 
The same year it joined the 
Canterbury Trades and Labour Council, 2 but disaffiliated 13 months later 
disillusioned with what it described as the council's industrial impotence 
and narrow craft outlook. 3 
In May 1925 the leaders of the HWF including Brooks met with the 
Alliance of Labour. 
4 
They decided to ballot their members as to whether 
or not they should affiliate to the Alliance, but the vote went against 
affiliation and it was not until early 1929 on the initiative of the CHWU 
that the federation joined. 
5 
While the HWF continued throughout the 
decade it was largely a paper organisation. The effective power rested 
with the troika of secretaries from the three major unions, Auckland, 
Wellington and Canterbury. Either the secretary of the Auckland or Well-
ington unions acted as a part-time secretary for the federation. These 
three major unions and Otago had achieved a high level of unionisation 
but areas such as Nelson, Westland and Southland remained poorly organised, 
and the CHWU played an essential role in organising and financing their 
unionisation. This proved to be an on-going process of nurturing and regen-
eration through until the late 1930's. 
6 
Outside of the federation the CHWU demonstrated a consistent policy of 
solidarity with other trade unionists within and beyond New Zealand. For 
instance, in 1924 the union gave its support to the railway workers in 
their dispute, extended its sympathy to the Seamen and the Cooks' and 
Stewards' unions for the death of several of their members at sea, and 
donated money to the New Zealand Worker to aid in the defence of a libel 
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the organising of the farm labourers, the Gardeners' Union and a resolution 
of support to the tramway workers in their opposition to the private bus 
companies. 
1 
In 1926 it sent £20 to Britain to support the General 
Strike 2 and in 1929 it gave money in support of Australian coal miners. 3 
The contact that was noticably missing was with the Brewery Workers' 
Union. It appears that the latter was relatively quiescent in this period 4 
and neither union developed any joint plans of action, such as the cutting 
off of beer supplies in order to bring pressure upon difficult employers. 
In the political sphere, the CHWU were loyal affiliates of the Labour Party, 
5 
having originally joined in 1923. In terms of ideology, the union's 
leadership was within the mainstream of the Labour Party and it rejected 
any contact with the small Communist Party.6 The specific topic of socialism 
did not arise formally in either the union's executive or general meetings. 
Rather there was a more general but nevertheless strong commitment to 
social justice which was to be achieved through the activities of the trade 
unions and by the election of a Labour government. The union supported 
Labour's electoral efforts by giving regular donations additional to its 
affiliation fees, and by providing the union's car and Brooks' time to aid 
in campaigning. 7 
Overall the relationship between the CHWU and the wider labour movement 
was a harmonious and valuable one throughout the 1920's, and this persisted 
into the turbulent years of the depression. Inside the CHWU the tranquility 
and order that had characterised its operations after 1922 came temporarily 
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6. THE UNION 
The direction of the union through the course of the 1920's had rested 
with the executive and, in particular, with its secretary, Brooks. Considerable 
formal power continued to reside in the union's general meetings, but the 
1 
level of attendance by members was usually 30 or less, although on two 
occasions it did reach 7'1. Generally the union's membership appeared to be 
either satisfied with or indifferent to the union's political viewpoint, its 
administration and its industrial tactics. At the annual general meetings 
the elections for the executive were normally uncontested affairs and there 
is no evidence of substantial discontent or organised opposition to the 
leadership of the union. 
As secretary of the CHWU, Brooks demanded the highest standards from 
himself and from the staff in the conduct both of the union's industrial 
work and of its financial management. As a consequence a number of 
inept or dilatory assistants departed in the course of the decade~ The same 
vigour and efficiency marked all Brooks' activity including the rebuilding 
of the union's finances.
4 
From a mere £52 in nett assets in 1919, the 
union had steadily advanced in the course of the decade to reach £516 
by 1931. 
5 
A rising level of membership coupled with efficient collection 
and a spartan administration had brought about this transformation of 
the union's finances. 
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In 1929, on the initiative of Brooks, the general meeting of the union 
amended the constitution to make the position of secretary a permanent 
rather than elective office. 1 In addition, the responsibility for appointing 
all staff and setting their rates of remuneration was transferred from the 
general meeting to the executive, although the maximum salary levels had 
already been set by a general meeting. Such alterations confirmed the 
concentration of authority with the executive and were passed without 
any opposition from the meeting. 
It was not Brooks, however, who was to benefit from these changes. At 
the end of 1929 Brooks resigned from the secretaryship taking up a 
managerial position at the Chateau Tongariro? F. J. Niall, a hotel workers' 
union official from Wellington, was appointed by the executive as his 
replacement, a decision supported by both Brooks and by East, the union's 
president. 3 
In the first year of Niall's term the decision appeared to have been a 
sound one, with the executive expressing its satisfaction with his performance~ 
By early 1931, disquieting facts began to emerge as to Naill's past and 
current activities. Brooks had returned to Christchurch, and had been 
elected the union's president in March 1931 ~At meetings of the union's 
executive in the course of the next few weeks, Brooks criticised Niall's 
handling of local complaints and his poor performance at the recent 
federation conference. 6 At the meeting of April 20, Brooks sought Niall's 
resignation, but the executive agreed instead to call a further special meeting 
of the executive.7-Before it could be held, Niall tendered his resignation and 
the executive then met to appoint Brooks as the new secretary. 8 He was 
instructed to proceed immediately to Wellington, to attend the wages' 
hearing in the Arbitration Court and attempt to retrieve what he could from 
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The replacement of Niall was an issue debated and determined within the 
confines of the executive. Nevertheless, it had been sparked by complaints 
from the union's rank-and-file. In the seven page indictment of Niall's per-
formance, formally presented by Brooks to the executive following Niall's 
resignation, these complaints constituted one of three broad charges levelled 
1 
against Niall. First, Niall was criticised for his failure to provide adequate 
leadership of the union, second that he had been guilty of the maladmin-
istration of the union's management, and third that he had neglected or mis-
handled numerous individual complaints made by the union's members. 
The chief charge under the first heading was Niall's failure, together with the 
other leaders of the federation, to formulate any strategy to combat the 
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impact of the depression upon the union's members. No plan had been 
determined for the forthcoming award negotiations, and nor had any pre-
liminary meeting been held with the licensed trade employers, the LVA. 
Moreover, Niall had departed from the federation conference before its 
completion, leaving the significant issues unresolved. 2 Under the second charge a 
number of administrative criticisms were made by Brooks, but it was the third 
area, that of the individual complaints that represented the more important 
set of charges. Here, Brooks cited several cases where claims by members of 
the union involving wages, holidays and insurance, had been neglected or 
handled in a poor or dilatory manner by Niall. One complaint, from the workers 
at the Terminus Hotel, had been deliberately withheld from the notice of the 
executive, as it revealed Niall's own inaction. Finally, Niall, in violation of the 
licensed hotel award, had agreed to permit an employer to hire 'buttons', 
junior staff employed for porter duties, at a low rate of pay. 
In sum, the document presented to the executive demonstrated substantial 
deficiences in Niall's secretaryship. In other circumstances they may have only 
brought severe censure, but given the turbulent economic period that the union 
was now in and the traditionally high standard of performance demanded, and 
met, by Brooks the outcome was understandable. The presence of a proven 
alternative for the job made the decision easier. With the issue now resolved 
Brooks, the executive and the union's members all turned their full attention 
to combatting the catastrophy of the depression. 
1 
2 
CHW E Min 18 May 1931 p222 
see HWF Min 1931 conference 
THE WAITRESS c1925 
Usually young and single, most waitresses who worked in 
hotels lived at their place of work. Together with maids 
they were the lowest paid strata of hotel workers; and 
as with other female hotel workers they were not covered 
86 
by any union preference clause when the CHWU negotiated its 
first award in 1908. In 1910, preference was finally extended 
to women, but they continued to play only a minor part in the 
direction of the union's affairs. 
(Alexander Turnball Library) 
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7. THE DEPRESSION : AN OVERVIEW 
Beginning in 1930, the depression cra~hed down upon the labour movement in 
a series of waves. Factories closed, farms were abandoned, wages cut and 
a period of deprivation and despair settled upon the nation and in particular 
upon the working class. Unemployment was the greatest menace and most 
severe experience. By the end of 1931, 52,085 people were officially 
registered with the Unemployment Board and in September 1933 a peak of 
1 
79,435 had been reached. Many were without a job for most of the 
depression; some did have part-time work, while others experienced alternative 
periods of work and joblessness. If not directly affected, many workers 
had a family member who was without work, and the ever present threat 
of redundancy left few workers free from the fear of unemployment. For 
those fortunate to retain work for most of the period the suffering was 
significantly less. They did however endure cuts to their wages which were 
only partially offset by the fall in prices. The standard of living for most 
workers, and especially for low paid groups such as the hotel workers, had 
not been high when the depression began and only a small fall in living 
standards was necessary to produce widespread poverty. In or out of work, 
the members of the CHWU could not remain unaffected by the depression 
experience. 
It was to combat these twin problems of job losses and pay cuts, that the 
energies of the union would be directed for the next five years. Determining 
the best strategy for this task was a dilemma for the CHWU, as it was 
for the labour movement as a whole. They did not know how bad, or 
for how long the depression was to be. The historian has seen this film 
and knows the last reel, and its actors. For the participants, the subsequent 
triumph of the Labour Party however was an undated hope. They were in 
the midst of a disaster, the worst in their experience, divided and hesitant as 
to the best means to defend their interests and survive the abyss that was 
opening beneath them. As the depression deepened, each union sought its 
own solution to the particular matrix of problems confronting it, a solution 
reflecting its own political consciousness and industrial strength. Seldom was 
there a comprehensive plan· of battle developed by a union, but simply a 
general goal of minimising the impact of each new threat. In the course 
of the depression the tactics not only varied between unions but between 
occasions, as various weapons were deployed, bringing both victory and defeat. 
AJHR 3 H11A (1939) AR of Dept of Labour 
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This general strategy, of minimising the impact of each new problem, 
characterised the approach of the CHWU. Its tactics were flexible but 
marked by caution. Through its general approach ran two consistent 
themes: the avoidance of any s,t,rike action, and the maintenance of the 
' closest possible cooperation with the labour movement. In dealing with the 
first of its problems, unemployment, it is this second theme of cooperation 
that was central to its activities throughout the depression. 
Cooperation with the labour movement on the issue of unemployment and 
the general crisis of depression occurred at three levels. First, at the avertly 
political level, the union supported the activities of the Labour Party in 
its campaign to secure government office. Within the hotel and restaurant 
industry unemployment had begun to have a marked effect by early 1931, with 
many hotels operating skeleton staff.1 The CHWU's membership fell from 
1520 in 1929 to a mere 909 by the end of 1933. 2 It was clear to the union, 
that the problem of unemployment among its members, as for that of the 
working class as a whole, was a consequence of the particular course taken 
by the Coalition government in managing the economic crisis. The government 
had determined that the problem would be resolved through deflation and 
unemployment, with the economic burden to be born by workers and small 
farmers in particular. To elect Labour was to remove, if not the entire 
problem, then at least a major cause for its severity. 
In the meantime, at a second level, the CHWU played an active role in the 
labour movement's resistance to the government's measures. The Alliance 
of Labour played a central part in this opposition organising conferences, 
initiating delegations to the government, and protest campaigns and providing 
support and advice for individual trade unions. In practice all these efforts 
failed to effect a change to the government's strategy or modify significantly 
any of its proposals in respect of wage cuts, unemployment or the abolition 
of compulsory arbitration. There were many brave, and militant words, but 
1 
2 
CHW E Min 16 Mar 1931 p305 
AJHR 3 H11 (1930) p22 & (1934) p21 
the various resolutions and attempts to organise boycotts proved quite 
ineffectual.
1 
Nevertheless, the CHWU continued to advocate support for 
the Alliance as the only viable means to preserve even the limited strength 
of the labour movement. 2 It opposed moves by the WHWU to withdraw 
and participated in the national conferences and in numerous committees 
and delegations. It supported the demand for increases in the payment for 
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the unemployment benefit, a shift in the burden of the unemployment tax 
from wage earners to other income earners, and the extension of the benefit's 
coverage for women workers, to an entitlement equivalent to that for men. 3 
With its predominantly female membership the issue was important for the 
CHWU, as was the question of the level of the unemployment tax levelled 
against women. Female workers were paying £700,000 per annum in tax 
to the Unemployment Board, but were only receiving £20,000 in unemployment 
payments. Again the delegation to the government, which included Brooks, failed 
to effect any reduction in the tax on women workers. 4 
The third level of cooperation was in attempting to ameliorate the effects of 
unemployment or aid those workers suffering the hardships of industrial 
action. Unemployment had been present during the 1920's, and the CHWU had 
been a member of a local inter-union unemployment committee, and had 
provided it with periodic financial assistance.5 As the depression deepened the 
commitment of the union widened. The union gave financial support to 
6 
unemployed workers' groups and joined several inter-union delegations to 
local bodies on behalf of the unemployed.7Brooks was appointed to the 
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a donation from the CHWU soon followed. 1 Financial aid was also given 
to the striking freezing workers in 1933, Tramway workers and to the lnangahu 
gold miners, despite the union's own precarious position.2 Finally, the 
CHWU joined and supported the Christchurch Women's Unemployment Committee~ 
This committee created cooking and sewing centres employing some 70 workers, 
provided free meals and assisted women workers with rent payments. 
This wider cooperation and assistance was an important element in 
maintaining the overall strength of the labour movement, but the CHWU also 
faced the struggle of maintaining its own strength, and indeed its continuing 
existence. The dramatic fall in the union's membership in the course of the 
depression cut the union's income and drained its financial reserves. In 
response to this the executive initiated a series of economy measures, 
including cuts to their own allowance and to the wages of Brooks and the staff. 
4 
Moreover, Brooks was successful in persuading the union's members to 
raise the subscription fee in 1932 from 6d a week to 9d. 
5 
Such an increase 
in the depth of the depression was a difficult step to take, but together 
with the cuts in expenditure was sufficient to ensure that the union remained 
solvent. 
More than money, however, was necessary for the union to remain truly 
effective as a union. An able leadership was already present, and the hardships 
of the depression served to generate renewed activity from the union's rank-
and-file. Meetings during the depression saw attendances regularly between 
70 and 100, compared to the 30 or less common in the 1920's.6 The final 
element was to organise the union's resources and direct them to fight the 
second battle of the depression, the struggle to defend the wages and award 
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8. THE WAGE STRUGGLE IN THE DEPRESSION 
In the award round of 1929-1930, the CHWU had reached a high point in 
the standard of wages and conditions for its members. The next five years 
were spent in retreat as the union struggled to minimise the damage and 
prevent the complete rout of its hard won gains. In the early years of the 
depression it was faced by the two general attacks launched by the govern-
ment in the form of the 10% cut in wages in May 1931. 1 and the abolition 
2 
of compulsory arbitration in December. Subsequently, as its awards 
expired in 1932, it had to develop the tactics appropriate to each partic-
ular situation. 
The portent that there would be deep and widespread cuts to wages came 
with the decision of the Arbitration Court in December 1930, to reduce 
the wage rates in the Manawatu Flaxmill Workers Award by 33%~ Niall 
then still the secretary of the CHWU, correctly observed that 'wage reduct-
ions were to be forced upon the weaker unions'.4 While the flaxmill 
workers were an affiliate of the Alliance of Labour, the Alliance had been 
powerless to prevent the reduction, either by the organising of effective 
political or industrial action. 
In early 1931 the government announced a 10% wage cut for all civil 
servants as part of its economic policy of deflation. It further empowered 
the Arbitration Court to reduce the minimum award rates of pay in the 
private sector, which the court subsequently did with a general reduction 
also of 10%. In response to the government's announcement, the Alliance 
of Labour organised the 'No Wages Reduction Conference' bringing together 
a large number of the country's trade unions including the CHWU. °The 
conference affirmed its opposition to any wage cuts and called upon workers 
to cut their own rent or mortgage payments by 15% in response to any wage 
cut and to boycott those firms which agreed to cut their employees' wages. 6 
Protest meetings were to be organised and trade unions were recommended 
to cancel their registration under the IC & A Act to avoid the reductions 
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There was consideroble talk of industrial action, and even of a General Strike 
from the Communists and the left of the Labour Party.
1 
In practice there 
was a substantial gulf between the word and the deed. Despite the condemnation 
of arbitration by union leaders such as the Alliance's secretary, J. Roberts 
from the Waterside workers, and the exhortations for industrial action, 
Roberts realised the vulnerability and impotence of most unions and in 
practice he pursued a very cautious strategy. 2 For the hotel workers, the 
cancellation of their registration was not a serious option.3 They choose to 
retain what protection they could within the arbitration system, rather .than 
directly confront their employers in a battle in which the balance of forces 
and circumstance clearly rested with their opponents. 
These circumstances were rendered more adverse by the government's 
decision, in December 1931, to abolish compulsory arbitration. Henceforth, 
in the event of the parties being unable to reach agreement in the conciliation 
stage of the system, either party could refuse to accept arbitration. If no 
settlement was reached within the specified period the award would lapse. As 
the various awards came up for renegotiation the employers insisted on 
making substantial wage cuts in addition to the 10% reduction that had 
already been ordered by the Arbitration Court. The unions resisted, the 
award would lapse and thus the employers were in a position to enforce their 
demands, unless the union could employ other action to modify their claims. 
In some industries compromises were reached, in others workers struck or 
took on-the-job action. Some unions were successful in modifying the 
employers' claims, but many suffered defeat and others the destruction 
of their organisation. 
2 
3 
Liddell to Roberts 7 Nov 1932 RP I 4/2 
As for example in rejecting strike action in support of the 
1932-3 freezing workers strike. 
CHW Min 13 Jul 1931 p307 
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The shelter of the arbitration system had enabled many weak New Zealand 
trade unions to survive, and to achieve modest advances in the standard 
of living of their members. Conversely, the system's emphasis on legal 
protection, enforcement and sanction had tendered to di lute union activism 
and the material and psychological preparation necessary for waging a successful 
industrial struggle. 1 Now exposed to the onrushing waves of the depression 
most trade unions were neither mentally nor materially prepared to struggle 
and swim by themselves. Like the others, the CHWU now had to learn 
in the depths of the depression, the skills of survival. 
In deciding how to survive and preserve what it could of its members' 
conditions, the CHWU was sure about one issue: if it was to organise 
a strike, defeat was almost certain and its members would suffer severe 
hardship, far greater than the temporary losses the union might be forced 
to concede in negotiation. The hotel and restaurant workers lacked the 
economic leverage at the workplace, the political consciousness, financial 
resources and the favourable political and economic climate necessary 
to wage and win a strike. The workforce, being largely unskilled or semi-
skilled could be easily replaced by 'free labour' drawn from the city's 
unemployed workers. No extensive training would be necessary nor would 
the workers need to be transported into an isolated and hostile community. 
Numerous, small and dispersed workplaces made effective picketing and control 
extremely difficult. Neither the CHWU nor the individual worker possessed 
the money necessary to sustain any protracted strike nor did they have 
direct political and industrial experience born of previous struggles. In the 
midst of a depression the ability of any union to wage and win a strike 
was at its lowest, when ironically the need to win was the greatest. At 
the most, the union could only hope to organise selected strikes, short in 
duration and confined to urban areas of the union's strongest sector, the 
licensed hotels. Any more radical course would be to invite disaster, an 
experience that was to befall much stronger unions in the depression years 
who took the path of direct action. 
1 CHW Min 26 Apr 1932 p326 (Pickards report) 
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The CHWU had to find other means to protect its members' interests. 
At first the leadership of the CHWU and the HWF was hesitant and confused. 
This was overcome with the return of Brooks as the secretary of the CHWU 
and the emergence of a new secretary from Auckland in the person of 
Frederick George Young. 1 Young was elected the federation's secretary in 
19322 and together with Brooks was able to provide the determination 
and skill necessary to guide the hotel workers through the worst years of 
the depression. Before they were confronted by the renegotiation of their 
three sector awards, however, there was the more general problem of seeking 
an exemption for their industry from the government's amendment abolishing 
compulsory arbitration. 
In the government's original proposal a general exemption was to have been 
made for those trade unions whose membership was 60% or more female. 3 
There was an acknowledgement that these workers constituted a special 
case meriting protection because of their especially low wages and lack of 
industrial leverage. In short without recourse to the Arbitration Court 
they were especially vulnerable to severe exploitation by their employers. 
Such a general exemption ·did not materialise in the 1931 amendment to 
the IC & A Act, and representations by those unions with a high female 
membership, such as the CHWU, were made to the government in March 1932.4 
While the government was not prepared to make a general exemption, it 
did empower the Arbitration Court to make a specific order for women 
workers in a particular industry, setting the minimum rates of pay in 
the event of their award lapsing. This concession subsequently proved 
useful to the CHWU in dealing with the private hotels. 
The first award battle for the CHWU was in the licensed hotel sector, where 
the 1929 award had expired at the end of 1931. Traditionally, it was the 
licensed hotel sector which contained the union's largest and most organised 
group of workers and where the basis for the rates of pay in the tearooms 
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for the CHWU, but the employers, the L VA, were equally determined to 
effect substantial cuts in wages and conditions. Their trade had fallen 
dramatically as the depression deepened, but many continued to pay high 
rents or mortgages on their properties. The L VA claimed that since 1928 
annual income for a publican had fallen from£ 10,675 to a mere 
£5,432, or a fall of 49%. 1 Even allowing for possible exaggeration by the 
LVA it was clear that the employers were facing substantial economic 
difficulties and hence they sought a total reduction of 20% in wages -
inclusive of the 10% order of the Arbitration Court - changes in holidays 
and hours, and a new under 17 year old wage rate.2 
No new award was settled until late in 1932 as a consequence of the mutual 
determination of both the parties, and in particular the deliberate strategy 
of the HWF to prolong negotiations. 3 This enabled the union to maintain 
the provisions of the old award for as long as the conciliation hearings 
continued. Simultaneously the unions applied pressure on the LVA with 
the assistance of the Alliance of Labour. In Wellington, the Watersiders' 
and Seamens Unions boycotted hotels who attempted to cut their employees 
wages while Roberts, the Alliance's secretary assisted the HWF in the negotiations.4 
Within the industry, the HWF threatened to organise stop-work meetings 
in Auckland and Wellington .5 The cumulative effect of all these tactics 
was an award settlement in November 1932 that the unions found satisfactory 
in the light of the wider economic circumstances. Wages were cut by 5% 
in addition to the court's 10%, but the cut had been effectively delayed for 
6 a year. Chefs in the larger kit.chens did lose slightly more and the annual 
holiday was reduced from seven to five days. The award continued until 
March 1935 when the union was able to renegotiate a new award providing 
for a general. in crease in wage rates of around 8%. 7 The unions had been 
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2nd Cook 4hk 
Kitchen hand 
Waitress or maid 
Barman 
Add board & lodgings 1 
Wages : Casual per day 
Chef (1st 3 days) 2 
Waitress (1st 3 days) 2 
Barman (1st 3 days) 2 


































Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid 

















The CHWU faced more acute difficulties in defending the interests of 
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the workers in the tearooms and private hotels. In the union's view the 
award claims of the tearoom employers were scandalous 
1 
and they respon-
ded by extracting themselves from the conciliation hearing on a legal 
technicality. It decided that each union would try to reach a district 
agreement with its local employers. Auckland and Nelson reached new 
agreements, while the CHWU attempted to selectively enforce the conditions 
of the old tearooms award but without the force of legal sanction~ The 
union was not prepared to negotiate a local agreement in 1932 or 1933 
as it believed any settlement would prove unacceptably harsh. By mid-
1934 the economic situation had improved sufficiently for the unions in 
Wellington and Canterbury to make a local settlement. Generally the rates 
were compatable with those in Auckland and represented a reduction of 
between 5.6% and 24% from the high level of 1930. (see Table 2.4) It was not 
until 1936 that the wage levels of 1930 were reached again. 
2 
Eg of employers claims see CHW Min at 19 July 1936 
CHW E Min 25 Jan 1930 
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A different course of action was taken by the CHWU in dealing with the 
private hotels. Their 1930 award had expired in 1932 and the unions were 
unable to reach a satisfactory agreement with the employers in conciliation. 
They decided to apply for a special minimum wage order from the Arbitration 
Court under the 1932 amendment to the IC & A Act to protect the pay 
levels of the female workers. The level set by the court represented a 20% 
reduction on the previous award rates. Furthermore the court altered the 
method of classification in the kitchens, changing the basis from the number 
of hands to the number of cooks.
1 
This had the effect of lowering the pay 
of certain cooks still further, and while the unions sought legal advice 
as to whether the court possessed the power to reclassify the basis for 
determining rates or merely the right to set minimum rates on the existing 
basis, the advice received confirmed the court's authoritl 
TABLE 2.4 TEAROOMS AWARD 1930 TO 1934 
Item 1930 
Weekly hours 48 
Annual holidays 5 
Special holidays 7 
Wages : Weeki'[ £ 
(Femalel 3 
1st cook 6+hk 4-14 
1st cook 4hk 4-1 
2nd cook 4hk 2-13 
Kitchen hand 1-19/6 
Waitress or maid 1-15 
Add meal allowance 4 12s 
























Wages : Casual ~r da'{ (M & F) (M & Fl 
1st Cook (1st 3 days) 5 2-5 18s 15s (M) 12/6 (F) 
7/6 Waitress 12/6 10s 






No Dominion award operated in 1933, no award negotiated in Canterbury 
Local award 
As the vast majority of staff were women only the female wage rates are given. 
Two substantial meals provided each working day, or cash value paid 
Thereafter at pro rata of ordinary rate 
B Aw XXXll (1932) p546 
Corr Brooks to Roberts & R to B 29 Nov & 3 Dec 1932 
RP 0137 
TABLE 2.5 PRIVATE HOTELS AWARD 1930 TO 1936 
Item 1930 1932 (Arbitration Ct 1936 
Minimum Order) 1 
Weekly hours 48 482 44 
Annual holidays 7 Not specified 7 
Special holidays 7 Not specified 7 
Wages : Weekly £ £ £ 
(Female) (Female) (Female) 
1st cook 6+hk 4-14 {5cl 4 3-17/6 4-14 
1st cook 4hk 4-1 {3c) 2-17/6 4-1 
2nd cook 4hk 2-13/6 2-13/6 
Kitchenhand 1-19 1-10 1-19 
Waitress or maid 1·12/6 1-5 1-12/6 
Add board & lodging 1-10 1-4 1-10 
Wages : Casual per day {M & Fl {M & F) {M & F) 
1st cook {1st 3 days) 5 2-5 Pro rata of weekly rate +50% 2-5 
Waitress {1st 3 days) 5 12/6 P.R. +50% 12/6 
Notes : {see Note on Tables 
After award lapsed, Arbitration Court issued a minimum rate of pay for all 





As provided by Shop & Offices Act 
As virtually all staff were women, only their rate is given 
The 1932 Order reclassified wage rates according to the number of cooks 
instead of previously the number of hands. Any comparisons are only 
approximate. 
Thereafter at pro rata of ordinary rate 
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There was a second dimension to the problem of the private hotels -
the scope of the minimum order's coverage. In the course of the 1920's 
the criterion for coverage under the Private Hotels Award had been the size 
of the establishment. For the earlier 1920s those with facilities for less than 
20 guests were excluded but in 1927 the figure was lowered to less than 16.
1 
With the new minimum order the question arose as whether only those 
private hotels which had been parties to the previous award were covered, 
or whether the whole industry was now to be encompassed? The court's 
decision effectively extended protection by applying the order to any private 
2 
hotel irrespective of size which provided casual meals and accommodation. 
Where the hotel was essentially a boarding house providing services to permanent 
or semi-permanent residents the order would not apply. This redefinition 
did represent a gain for the unions one which they were able to utilise in 
obtaining expanded award coverage after the election of a Labour government. 
As to the award conditions it would not be until 1936 that the wage levels 
of the 1930 award were again obtained, until that date the 1932 Arbitration 
Court order applied. 
While the CHWU had been to reduce significantly the impact of the 
depression on wages in the largest sector, the licensed hotels, it had to 
accept much larger cuts in the tearooms and private hotels. It believed, 
nevertheless, that delaying the negotiation of any new tearoom award 
enabled it to obtain a better settlement when the economic circumstances 
were more favourable. An earlier negotiation would have led to a poor 
agreement which would have proven subsequently difficult to rectify. 
Overall, given the limited industrial strength at its disposal the CHWU was 
able to perform comparably well, as well indeed as many stronger unions 
who were forced to accept wage cuts of 20%. 
The depression did reveal the union's vulnerability especially in the tearooms 
and priyate hotels and the need for it to strengthen its workplace organisation 
3 
and create a 'fighting fund' for future conflicts. The election of the Labour 
government removed the urgency for any such action, and while the union 
did accrue substantial funds, workplace organisation continued to rest essentially 
with the visits of union officials. 
2 
3 
B Aw XXVI I (1927) p877 Memorandum; eg of exclusions XXll 
(1923) p578 
fLAw XXXlll (1933) p1121 
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THE COUNTER HAND 
As in the home, the task of serving food in public facilities 
in New Zealand was one assigned almost exclusively to 
women, either as counterhands or as waitresses. Whether 
in hotels or in tearooms, the lowest paid strata were the 
counterhands, waitresses and maids. In part this reflected 
lower levels of skill. However, the fundamental reason 
was the prevalence throughout the economy of lower pay 
for women performing the same job as men and lower 
pay for occupations where women workers predominated. 
Equal pay for the same job would not arrive for most 
women workers until the 1970's; improved relativities 
for jobs such as counterhands is a struggle not yet 
completed. 




9. DISUNITY ON THE EVE OF VICTORY 
With the worst of the depression now passed and the Labour Party 
preparing itself for electoral victory, the CHWU found itself embroiled in 
intra-party conflict. Political disagreements in the labour movement were 
a common occurence, but given the past record of close cooperation 
evinced by the CHWU it was ironic that the conflict should occur now and 
with such bitterness. The discord was to prove a temporary one, but was 
viewed very seriously at the time. In fact there were two distinct disputes, 
one between the CHWU and elements of the Christchurch Labour Party 
and the other at a national level between Young and the Labour Party, 
but inevitably affecting the CHWU. Together they damaged the relationship 
with the party. 
The first conflict had originated in late 1933 over the actions of the Labour 
mayor of Christchurch, D. G. Sullivan. Contrary to an express resolution 
of the Labour Representation Committee he had appointed two conservative 
1 
chairmen to important committees of the city council. The CHWU was 
further dissatisfied with the general performance of the Mayor and his 
counci I lors in the management of the city and the particular praise bestowed 
2 
by Sullivan on the Mt Cook Tourist Company. Sullivan had given a public 
speech congratulating the company on its 'excellent business practice' 
apparently unaware of their poor labour relations. Brooks rebuked Sullivan 
for making such a compliment ignorant of the facts. The effect of these 
disputes was that the CHWU withdrew its delegates from the LRC in 
3 
November 1934, not returning until September 1935. 
Young's dispute with the Labour Party was more serious and more acrid. 
He was faced with expulsion from the party for allegedly manipulating the 
party's candidacy for the Auckland mayoralty so as to ensure that the 
conservative opponent would win. In addition he was alleged to have 
described the Labour members of parliament 'as a slimy lot of grease 
4 
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heart of the disputes were larger political struggles, especially in Auckland, 
where leading trade unionists battled with leading politicians such as 
John A. Lee and W. Jordan. The unionists insisted on party discipline, 
while the politicians opposed the bloc voting power being used by the 
1 
unionists to determine policy and candidates in the Auckland LRC. 
That bloc vote, organised by Young with the enormous voting strength 
of the AHWU, had been decisive in selecting J. Sayegh as the Labour 
candidate for the mayoralty. Their opponents in the LRC saw Sayegh 
as inept and certain to lose, which he did, to the conservative Ernest 
Davies the managing director of New Zealand Breweries Ltd. Lee and others 
believed that Young and Davies had reached a deal to ensure that Davies 
would win the mayoralty in return for future favours to Young, the hotel 
2 
workers and the Labour Party. Certainly Young and Davies, and the Labour 
Party, would enjoy a close and controversial association over the next two 
decades, but on this occasion the party's investigation of the charges failed 
to find clear evidence of any manipulation, although they did hold to 
3 
be proven Young's comment on the 'grease merchants'. A vote to expel 
Young was narrowly defeated but he was nevertheless censured. 4 
Brooks had attended the conference on behalf of the CHWU, and he believed 
Young to be an innocent victim of political intrigues. Indeed he was incensed 
at the party's treatment of Young as indicated by his report to the union's 
executive. Describing 'Big Jim' Roberts' (Alliance secretary and Labour Party 
vice-president) support for censure Brooks wrote 
In voting, Roberts, like a white livered cur, 
stuck his head down into his guts and just 
put his slimy death-like hand up a few 
inches above his shoulder. 5 
Brooks first loyalty was to Young rather than to politicians such as Lee. 
He was predisposed to support Young, even though he was largely unaware 
of the particular circumstances and certainly not involved himself in the 
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The overall consequence of these local and national conflicts was the temporary 
alienation of the CHWU leadership from important elements within the Labour 
Party. The sensitivity shown by the CHWU over both local issues and the more 
serious questions surrounding Young's activities was the sort of sensitivity 
common when close friends discover suddenly a reprobate in their midst. 
For Brooks the policies and actions of the labour movement were central to 
his life, and where the party pursued a different course to that held by Brooks 
to be correct, his protests would soon follow. In the realm of party politics 
where Brooks went the CHWU executive largely followed. 
Nevertheless, despite the intensity of feeling, the bitterness proved short-
lived. The CHWU and the HWF remained within the Labour Party and with 
Labour's election soon assumed a position of importance within the party and 
within the soon to be formed Federation of Labour. The struggle to build 
and survive had ended for the union. Now it would enter a period of unparralled 
advance, securing better wages and conditions for its members, expanding and 
strengthening its organisation, and helping to construct a new welfare state. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LABOUR IN POWER, 1935 TO 1944 
The years 1935 to 1944 were a time of unrivalled success and expansion 
for the Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union. With the election of the 'first 
Labour government, the labour movement proceeded to the recovery of the 
ground it had lost in the course of the depression and to the creation of 
a new and better society for the working class. Heading the agenda for change 
to the lives of workers, were the issues of employment, shorter hours and 
higher pay, the extension of trade unionism to vulnerable and unorganised 
workers and the construction of a welfare state. 1 The agenda was unclear 
on many details and on the means by which many aspects of the policy 
would be implemented. Nor, was it complete, in that the question of social 
ownership was left unanswered. While the party's constitution continued 
to state the socialisation of the economy as one of its objectives, there was 
no clear programme or deep commitment by the Labour Party leadership. 
Nevertheless, the first four years of Labour rule did see the introduction of 
key planks in Labour's platform for reform, such as the 40 hour week, com-
pulsory unionism and the 1938 Social Security Act. For the hotel workers 
this pre-war period brought significant gains in wages and conditions and the 
extension of the CHWU's coverage to domestic workers in hospitals, char-
tered clubs and institutional cafeterias. The onset of the Second World War 
however inaugurated a more difficult period, first with the conflict within 
the labour movement surrounding the Lee affair, thence the constraints 
of the war economy and finally the dispute between the CHWU and the 
HWF in the CHWU middle years of the 1940's. Throughout the period the 
CHWU was a loyal and close associate of the Labour government and played 
a leading role in the labour movement. Essentially in the centre of the labour 
political spectrum, the union was primarily concerned to improve the wages 
and conditions of its members and support the building of a welfare state. 
While it did exhibit some support for more widespread social change it 
was not at the cutting edge of the debate over Socialism, rather it exhibited 
a more general commitment to greater equality and social justice. 
Labour's Election Policy 1935 in J. T. Paul Humanism in 
Politics (Wellington: N.Z. Labour Party, 1946) pp164-74. 
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1. 1936 TO 1938: A NEW ERA 
The first full year of the new government saw the implementation of 
several key policies in the field of industrial relations, which provided 
concrete benefits for workers and structural changes favourable to the 
trade union movement. For the workers, the wages cut in the depression 
1 
were restored to their per-depression levels, the principle of a minimum 
basic wage enacted,2 a 40 hour working week introduced :?and the level of 
workers' accident compensation' increased to 66 2/3% of the ordinary 
weekly wage together with an improved entitlement to compensation. 4 For 
the unions the system of compulsory arbitration was re-established 5and a new 
system of compulsory unionism introduced. 
6 
As a consequence thousands 
of previously unorganised workers were incorporated into existing unions 
or formed into entirely new trade unions. The effect was to transform 
the union movement. Henceforth the once dominant group of active 
militant unions, such as the seamen, the miners and the watersiders, would 
have to share some of their power within the labour movement with much 
larger but industrially less active unions, such as the now greatly expanded 
Clerical Workers' Union. These unions possessed the large blocs of votes 
which were to become increasingly important within the Labour Party 
and the FOL, but while they were rich in votes and in financial resources 
they were poor in union consciousness and activism. 
The union movement was also strengthened in its industrial work by 
several further legal changes enacted by the government. Under the 1936 
Statutes Amendment Act the right of workers to join a trade union was 
7 
extended to those employed by local authorities. The IC & A Amendment Act 
extended the length of time in which action could be initiated for the 
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Amendment Act (No 2) introduced the principle of the "common rule" 
for citing employers to an award.1 Once a majority of an industry's 
employers in a particular district became parties to an award, all employers 
were subsequently bound, thus removing the difficulties encountered by 
unions such as the CHWU in locating and citing each and every employer 
in a district. The government also amended the Shops & Offices Act to 
extend legal protection to all boarding houses and private hotels, and 
expanded the definition of a restaurant to include a hotel with more than 
five boarders.2 
All these changes were beneficial to the CHWU and its members, but foremost 
amongst the advances of 1936 was the securing of the 40 hour week. 
Traditionally, domestic workers had been forced to work longer hours 
per week than most other workers and the new legislation of the Labour 
government enabled them to reduce their weekly hours from 48 to 44 or 40. 
Labour's amendment to the IC & A Act had empowered the Arbitration 
Court to set the maximum working week at 40 hours in all awards, except 
where it was specifically shown to be impracticable for that particular 
industry in which case the week would be set at a maximum of 44 hours. 3 
The HWF first sought a 44 hour week for the licensed hotels when it 
held award negotiations with the LVA in April 1936. 
4 
This it secured, 
(although the government had not as yet enacted the new 40 hour week 
legislation) and in August it applied to the Court and obtained a 40 hour 
week. 
5 
However the union was not so successful in the tearooms and private 
hotel sectors. When the application was made to the Arbitration Court, 
under the new legislation, the court was only prepared to set the maximum 
at 44 hours per week. 6 The court agreed with the employers that a 40 
hour week, a cut of eight hours, would be impracticable for their businesses, 
which had already incurred the extra financial costs of the 1936 award round 
with its increased wage rates. While the more profitable licensed hotels could 
afford the extra costs of a shorter week the court believed the burden 
would be too great for the other two sectors. As had been a common 
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of the twentieth century, the domestic workers had once again been 
treated as a special case undeserving of the 40 hour week principle that 
was a right for most other workers. Although those in the licensed hotels 
had finally achieved parity with industrial workers, it was not until after 
World War Two that the 40 hour week was finally gained for all the workers 
represented by the CHWU. 
The introduction by the Labour government of the principle of a minimum 
wage also led to problems for the CHWU. While it supported the concept, 
the union along with the Alliance of Labour, was concerned as to the actual 
levels set by the Arbitration Court. For although the government had 
enacted the principle it had delegated to the court the power ·to set the 
actual rate of the minimum wage. Under the Act the level was to be 
that which would be "sufficient to maintain a man, his wife and three 
children in a fair and reasonable standard of comfort." 1 The court's 
decision in 1936 provided for a minimum wage for males of £3-16 
per week, and for females a wage of £ 1-16 per week, 
representing 47% of the full male rate. 2 The CHWU and the Alliance 
were displeased, believing that both the full rate for males was too low, 
and that the female wage rate shou Id have been set at least at 57% 
rather than 47%.3 The specific concern of the CHWU lay·with the implications 
of the female rate for its members in the tearooms and private hotels. These 
workers were currently receiving a level of remuneration, including free 
board and/or lodgings in addition to their cash wage, substantially above 
the courts minimum level and the union feared that setting the female 
rate at 47% would lead to pressure from the employers for lower wages. 
The Alliance made representations to the government urging it to intervene 
and set the minimum wage rates itself. While such intervention did not 
eventuate, the Minister of Labour, H. T. Armstrong, did alleviate the fears 
of the CHWU by assuring the union that no subsequent reductions would 
occur in the wages of its female members.4 This was to prove correct 
and the union was able to preserve and in later years advance the wage 
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The first award to be negotiated under the new government was that 
for the licensed hotels in April 1936~ Negotiations took place in an 
environment favourable to the unions. The Labour government had 
already made it clear that it intended to introduce a 40 hour week, 
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raise the level of wages, restore compulsory arbitration and reflate the 
economy. With the licensed trade gaining considerable benefit from the 
government's stimulation of the economy the LVA was prepared to agree 
to the main demands of the HWF, realising at the same time that it would 
soon be forced by legislation to accept such changes. Thus wage rates were 
restored by the new award to their 1929 level, an increase of 7 to 8%, 
and the weekly hours of work lowered from 48 to 40. Nevertheless, the 
HWF had achieved these gains in advance of the legislation thus providing 
an earlier benefit than would otherwise have been possible~ Moreover, 
as the actual 1935 award was not due to expire until 1937, its early 
renegotiation in 1936 represented a tactical coup by the HWF. 
In the course of the next two years further gains were ma de by the union 
for workers in licensed hotels. In 1937 an informal agreement was reached 
between the federation and the L VA to extend the entitlement of workers 
to the 'dry wage'.3 The 'dry wage' was the weekly cash wage together 
with the cash value of the board and lodgings allowances. Traditionally, 
where the employer provided suitable board and lodging the worker was 
required to live on the premises, unless they were married in which case 
they could elect to live away from the hotel and be paid the 'dry wage'. 
Now, in 1937, single barmen and other single males outside of the kitchen 
- except for night porters - could choose to receive the dry wage 
provided they lived in one of the four main centres. 
In the new award round of 1938 the CHWU, as with the trade 
union movement as a whole, achieved a substantial rise in real wages. 
The year 1938 marked a peak in the level of real wages for New Zea-
land's workers and in the course of the next ten years they would fall 
slightly in value. 4 It was not until the end of the 1940's that the peak 
of 1938 would be exceeded. As to the specific case of the hotel and 
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of between 4 and 5% with larger gains being made by the kitchenhands.1 
These low paid workers received an additional 12/6 per week, an increase 
of 26.3%, on their cash wage. Annual holidays were increased by an 
extra day to eight days while improved payments were secured for uniform 
and laundry expenses. Finally, the right of single males outside of the 
kitchen to choose the 'dry wage' was extended to those in towns with a 
population of 5,000 or more. 
As in the past the benefits gained by the key Licensed Hotels Award in 
both 1936 and in 1938 generally flowed on to the tearooms and private 
hotel sectors. The Arbitration Court supported the re-establishment of 
the wage relativities between the three sectors that had existed prior to 
the depression, and the awards in 1936 and 1938 showed a similar rise in 
wages to that of the licensed hotels~ Two important differences did 
exist however. First, the hours of work in the tearooms and private hotels 
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were now four hours longer than those in the licensed hotels. Seconday 
the wage rates for kitchen workers in tearooms and private hotels continued 
to distinguish between male and female workers, with the rate for the 
latter remaining significantly below that for men. While female kitchen-
hands in the I icensed hotels benefitted from an increase of 12/6 in the 
1938 award, their counterparts in tearooms and private hotels received 
only an extra 2/6 per week, leaving them at a wage of 19/6, below that 
received by men and women in the licensed hotels. 
Despite the problems in these sectors, the union had nevertheless made 
substantial progress in the course of only three years. Its largest group of 
workers, those in the licensed hotels, now worked eight hours less per week 
than they had in 1935 for a cash wage that was 20% higher for barstaff, 
13% more for kitchenhands and 18% or more for cooks. Besides advancing 
the interests of its existing membership the CHWU had also expanded its 
coverage to previously unorganised groups of domestic workers, most notably 
those in the public hospitals and chartered clubs. 
TABLE 3.2 TEAROOMS AWARD 1934 TO 1938 
Item 1934 (Canterbury! 1 1936 1938 
Weekly hours 48 44 44 
Annual holidays 5 5 7 
Special holidays 7 7 7 
Wages : Weekly £ £ £ 
(Female) (Female) (Female) 
1st Cook 6+hk 4-0/6 4-14 4-16/6 
1st Cook 4hk 3-10 4·1 4·3/6 
2nd Cook 4hk 2·10 2·13/6 2·16 
Kitchen hand 1-10 1 ·19 2·1/6 
Waitress or maid 1-10 1-15 1-17/6 
Add Meal allowance2 1 Os 12s 11 or 12s 
Wage~ : Casual Ql[ day (M & F) (M & Fl 
1st cook (1st 3 days) 3 15s(M) 12/6(F) 1-5 1 to 1-104 
Waitress (1st 3 days) 3 
Notes : (see Note on Tables) 
Local award 
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2. ORGANISING THE HOSPITALS 
Until 1938 virtually all domestic workers in hospitals remained unprotected 
by union coverage. In Canterbury, discussions had occurred in the past 
as to the poor wages and conditions under whic~ these domestic workers 
were required to work. Prior to the First World War and again in the 1920's 
the CTLC had discussed the issue and representations had been made to 
the North Canterbury Hospital Board.1 In 1926 the then president of the 
CHWU, E. G. East, had raised the problems being experienced by domestic 
workers at the Bottle Lake Hospital at a meeting of the union's executive. 2 
For the CHWU the priority was to organise those workers within the hotel 
and restaurant industry rather than to commence a battle on a new front. 
Much remained to be achieved for its current members and any new initiative 
faced the legal barrier of the IC & A -Act. Under its provisions workers 
employed by local authorities and public bodies were excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the Act. With either the Reform or United parties holding 
government office there was little prospect of the Act being amended to 
permit a union to organise such workers and obtain an award from the 
Arbitration Court. 
With the advent of a Labour government in 1935 the political and legal 
situation was transformed. The Statutes Amendment Act of 1936 removed 
the restrictions of the IC & A Act enabling the Arbitration Court to issue 
awards in respect of local authorities and public bodies. 3 Secondly, the 
introduction of compulsory unionism necessitated the provision of union 
coverage, but it was not a hotel workers' union that was the first to act. 
In 1937 the Wellington Cleaners Union obtained an award covering male 
'I 
porters and orderlies at Wellington Hospital. Meanwhile in Auckland a 
group of domestic hospital workers had applied to the government for the 
registration of a separate hospital-based union. While the Minister of Health 
P. Fraser, did express support for the concept of one union embracing all 
\ 
hospital workers, including domestic staff and nurses, H. T. Armstrong, 
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HWF for all domestic hospital .workers, 1 Securing the support of the FOL 
and of the government not only reflected the merits of the claim by the 
HWF for coverage, but also the personal and political influence that both 
Young, the federation secretary, and Brooks, possessed within the labour 
movement. 
With their right to organise the hospital workers now secure, the HWF 
decided that the major unions, Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago, 
would each negotiate their own local agreements according to the particular 
problems of their region. 2 The first development in Canterbury, had been 
the enthusiasm shown by hospital workers to join the CHWU. Some 77 
workers had signed to join the union, but because the union's rules had not 
yet been amended to encompass domestic hospital workers their membership 
had to be suspended. 3 In the meantime the union took the first steps 
towards creat,ing a local agreement by investigating the existing conditions 
of work and the operation of the workplace. A special meeting of hospital 
workers was held on March 23 1938 at which Brooks discussed with the staff 
their existing hours, wages, conditions and duties. 4 The discussion revealed 
several problems such as long hours, poor pay and inadequate staff facilities. 
There was also variation between hospitals, with some such as Christchurch 
Public Hospital generally having superior conditions. For instance while 
domestic workers at the Public Hospital received 10 days annual holiday 
per year, those at Bottle Lake were only paid for five days.5 Hours 
between institutions also varied with the staff at the Sanatorium working 
a 48 hour week while those at the Nursing Home were employed for 45 
hours per · week. The meeting also identified other anomalies such as the 
lack of any special allowance at the Fresh Air Home for domestic staff 
working under dangerous conditions. The workers present empowered Brooks 
to negotiate an agreement on behalf of the domestic hospital employees 
on the basis of the new agreement negotiated in Auckland. 6 
HWF Circular 8 Nov 1937 in CHW E Min;£L 1 no. 11 1938 p3 
2 HWF Circular op cit 
3 CHW Min 19 Jul 1937 




Now with a clear understanding of the workplace and with the backing 
of the domestic staff, the CHWU proceeded to the negotiation of an 
industrial agreement. The AHWU had already negotiated an agreement for 
its district and after discussions with the other hotel workers' unions, the 
decision was made to enter into a multi-district agreement for the rest of 
New Zealand. Negotiations were begun with the Hospital Boards' Association 
and in 1938 a settlement was reached. The agreement while slightly 
inferior in terms of wages to that in Auckland did, nevertheless, constitute 
an important first step for Canterbury's workers. 1 Wages and hours varied 
with the hospitals bed capacity and type. For instance, the large Wellington 
Public Hospital received the highest schedule of wages and a 40 hour week. 
Christchurch Public Hospital together with the other major provincial hospitals 
received the next highest schedule of wages and a 42 hour week. For the 
rural hospitals, maternity homes and specialist institutions, such as the 
two sanatoria · in Christchurch, the hours were longer and the wage 
rates slightly lower. Although a 44 hour week was the maximum number 
of hours, hospitals could average the maximum over two or even four weeks, 
so that in any one week 50 hours might be worked without any payment 
for overtime. 2 The wage rates for male domestic workers were standard 
throughout, and as with the kitchens in the union's other ·awards, the pay 
rates for cooks varied with the size of the kitchen's operation. Kitchenhands 
and maids, however, whose duties were not affected by the hospital's size, 
nevertheless received a lower rate at the other institutions in comparison 
to Wellington. The better conditions of the larger hospitals reflected the 
larger resources of the major boards and the unions· inability for the moment 
to raise the conditions in the smaller and rural institutions up to an 
equivalent level. In particular, the longer hours were a consequence of the 
smaller staffing establishments of these hospitals and their inability to pay 
for either more staff or incur the costs of overtime. The achievement of 
standardised hours and wages was a task that would remain incomplete 
until the late 1940's having been interrupted by the advent of the Second 
World War. 
2 
see Agreement (dated 31 Aug 1938) in CHW E Min 15 Nov 
1937 
Agreement op cit 
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3. NEW DEPARTURES: CHARTERED CLUBS AND TOURISM 
While the hospitals had represented the major area of e'xpanded responsibility 
for the CHWU, the union had also increased its coverage to include chartered 
clubs, non-pecuniary institutions such as the YWCA and golf clubs, and 
government establishments including tourist hotels and hostels. Attempts 
had been made by the CHWU and other hotel workers unions to secure 
protection for chartered club workers since prior to World War One. 1 
The Arbitration Court had declined to issue any award, exercising the 
discretion it held under the IC & A Act in respect of non-pecuniary 
institutions such as chartered clubs.2 There the issue rested, despite some 
subsequent efforts by the unions, 3 until the election of the Labour government. 
In 1937 the government amended the IC & A Act to enable an award to 
be negotiated by the HW F. The agreement reached in October 1938 
provided for a 44 hour week with wage rates comparable to the private 
hotels but less than those in the licensed hotels. Chartered club workers 
did, however, receive a two week annual holiday, longer than that for any 
other members. of the HW F. 4 
As had occurred with the chartered clubs the Labour government removed 
the barriers to union coverage of the government's tourist hotels. Under the 
1938 Licensed Hotel Award wages and conditions were extended to these 
institutions, except that special provisions were made in the award to meet 
the dual problems of the isolation of the hotels from the cities and the 
special demands of seasonal work. 5 For instance, at The Hermitage free 
travel was provided for workers between the hotel and Timaru while staff 
could be employed for up to 48 hours in any one week, consisting of 
six 8-hour days, without incurring any overtime payments provided they 
received compensatory holidays.
6 
Despite these provisions the CHWU had to 
deal with an array of disputes concerning The l:iermitage, covering overtime, 
weekend pay and travel costs. The claims were generally resolved to 
the unions satisfaction but the problems tended to reoccur and the CHWU 
made representations to the government and the head office of the Tourist 
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The Hermitage, while the union moved to improve its level of contact with 
the many itinerant workers who sought work at The Hermitage__ and in other 
tourist hotels.1 
Yet the activities of the CHWU in the field of tourism were not confined 
to the question of industrial relations. A close association between the union 
and the Labour government led to its participation in the government's 
schemes to promote tourist development in the late 1930's. In particular the 
CHWU became involved in the Group Travel concept introduced in 1939 
by the Minister of Internal Affairs, W. E. Parry. Group Travel was intended 
to provide low cost travel for New Zealand workers within their own country 
and to reduce the problems of seasonal lows in tourist hotel occupancy.2 
The CHWU fully supported the scheme and Brooks was appointed as 
secretary of the South Island Group Travel Association, which represented 
the various organisations with an interest in tourism. 
3 
The Association was 
successful in promoting and organising several group schemes and the 
increased numbers of tourists that it generated benefitted the CHWU by 
providing more work for hotel workers particularly in the off-season.4 
The advent of World War Two interrupted the progress of the tourist 
industry and it was not until the war's end that development was recommenced. 
4. ENFORCEMENT IN THE COURTS AND AT THE WORKPLACE 
Under the Labour government the CHWU was able to pursue a more vigorous 
policy towards the enforcement of its awards. The union was financially 
secure and confident of support from other members of the labour movement 
as well as sympathetic.support fromthe government. It was in this assertive 
mood that the CHWU challenged not only individual employers but the 
actions of the courts, and of government departments. In an industry where 
legal enforcement played an important role in the protection of its members 





CHW Min 14 Mar 1938 
FL 1 No. 5 1938 p5; CHW E Min 8 May 1938 (Group Travel 
Conference) 
CHW E Min 8 May 1938 
Ibid 
118 
The first difficulty experienced by the union lay with the leniency shown 
by magistrates in fining employers for award violations. While the max-
imum legal penalty for a particular offence might be £ 100, the Labour 
Department would recommend a mere £10 and the magistrate impose 
a Lilliputian fine of only 10/-. In one case the union became especially 
incensed, when a 17 year old worker, with no legal counsel present, 
received a fine of £2 for failing to claim overtime, while the employer 
escaped with a penalty of only 5/-. 
1 
The Labour Department had re-
commended fines of £2 and £10 respectively. Such experiences, the union 
soon realised, were not confined to Canterbury, having been made aware 
of similar difficulties with the magistracy in other industrial districts. 2 
Little however could be done. 
A second area of difficulty arose for the CHWU from the inertia of the 
Christchurch office of the Labour Department in dealing with violations 
of CHWU awards. In several instances a breach of the award was shown 
to have occurred, but the department either declined to act or was dilatory 
in its proceedings. 
3 
Ironically, the officer-in-charge of the Christchurch 
office was R. T. Bailey, the founding secretary of the CHWU. (See Chapter 
1 ). Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction with the department's operations 
was such that the union decided to initiate its own legal proceedings in 
selected cases without recourse to the Labour Department. At the same time 
it met with the Minister of Labour and head office officials of the depart-
ment to express its concerns. A temporary improvement in local enforce-
ment resulted from these discussions but, by October 1939, the CHWU 
was once again dissatisfied with the Christchurch office. The CHWU 
executive expressed its lack of faith in Bailey as a fair and unbiased 
officer and requested the Minister of Labour to remove from Bailey his 
responsibility for award enforcement in the hotel industry and to initiate 
an enquiry into the department's operation in Christchurch~ Bailey 
remained in the Christchurch office until his retirement in 1944, but in the 
meantime, beginning in January 1940, the union had initiated a new policy 
of dealing directly with all complaints instead of sharing the responsibility 
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In 1939 the union encountered a further problem with the courts, which 
threatened to remove or to reduce the scope of its award coverage. A 
series of cases arose in the course of that year involving workers who performed 
a variety of duties only some of which clearly came within the boundaries 
of the CHWU's awards. For instance, in the Perry case a worker was 
employed as a housekeeper/supervisor, spending some of her time on 
domestic duties covered by the Licensed Hotel Award but the remainder 
of her work was outside the award.1 While in the so-called milk-bar cases, 
the shop-assistants operated milk-shake machines which fell within the 
Tearooms Award but were otherwise employed as shop· workers. 2 
In the Perry case the magistrate ruled against coverage by the CHWU's award, 
while in the milk-bar cases· one magistrate had ruled in favour of the 
CHWU and the other against. 
For the CHWU, as for the other hotel workers' unions, the decisions of the 
courts had important implications for union coverage. On behalf . of 
the CHWU, the HWF appealed to the Arbitration Court against the two 
decisions which had rejected coverage. At the centre of the court's 
consideration was the applicability of the doctrine of substantial employment. 
While the magistrates had tended to give the doctrine a generous interpretation, 
deciding that the award did not apply as only a small proportion of the 
worker's duties fell under the CHWU's awards, the Arbitration Court took 
the opposite view. Justice Callan ruled that the doctrine could only be 
applied in very limited circumstances. 3 In the Perry case two distinct 
jobs were being performed by the housekeeper/supervisor, and the first of these 
that of housekeeping, clearly fell within the Licensed Hotel Award and thus 
coverage by the CHWU. Similarly, Justice Callan stated that as the 
essentials of a milk-bar were present in the other cases then the Tearooms 
Award was to be enforced. 
With this victory in the Arbitration Court, the union was then surprised 
to learn of the decision of the Supreme Court in a case involving the identical 
issue of substantial employment. While the case arose in a different industry, 
the Supreme Court made it clear that the doctrine of substantial employment 
2 
3 




was to be given a generous interpretation and that it disagreed with 
Justice Callan's decision) The Supreme Court's decision alarmed the union, 
not only because of the effect on award coverage but also because of the 
extent of authority now claimed by the Supreme Court to overrule Arbi-
tration Court decisions. The former possessed such power in respect of 
wage claims and in conflicts over jurisdiction. While this particular case 
was related to a wage claim the central question was one of industrial law; 
a question which was the responsibility of the Arbitration Court where it 
had already been ruled upon by Justice Callan.2 
In response to this new development, the HWF together with the Federat-
ion of Labour made representations to the Labour government in an attempt 
to amend the law and re-establish the clear authority of the Arbitration 
Court. The government was slow to act on the issue 3 and in 1942 
another employer successfully appealed to the Supreme Court on the 
issue of substantial employment. Once again the court gave a generous 
interpretation to the principle of substantial employment and reiterated 
that it had no intention of being subordinate to the Arbitration Court on 
any claims involving wages. 4 In 1943, after further problems between the 
Supreme Court and other trade unionists, the government amended the 
l.C. & A Act, to grant the Arbitration Court final authority over all 
wage claims relating to breach of an award, thus removing the problem.
5 
In the course of these difficulties with the judiciary the union continued 
to go about its daily business of resolving problems at the workplace. 
The disputes continued to be small in scale but nevertheless numerous 
and on occasion complex. Generally they were resolved through action 
by the union's officials who, once aware of the circumstances of the case, 
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obligations. These disputes were not the material for dramatic headlines 
but an extract from an organising report in 1944 for South Canterbury 
demonstrate something of the reality of the union's work. 
Waimate Hotel: Non-union staff being employed 
and no staff list kept. 
Ideal Milk Bar: Proportinate holiday allowances 
not being paid nor wages in lieu of notice. 
Zenith Milk Bar: Failure to provide an allowance 
in lieu of meals. 
Empire Hotel: Wages in arrears and overtime not 
paid. 
Commercial Hotel: Non-union staff being employed 
as casuals. 
Gladstone Hotel: Overtime not paid. 
The Hermitage: Problems with accumulated 
holiday pay. 1 
Overall both the volume and the monetary value of claims handled by the 
union rose rapidly between 1935 and 1937 before levelling out and 
declining in the course of the war years~ The union's industrial work 
was marked by a sense of pride and commitment to its members welfare 
and by a continuing emphasis on efficiency and 'scientifically controlled 
office systems'. 3 Between Brooks and the union's two organiser-collectors 
regular contact was maintained with city and provincial workers while the 
tasks of award negotiation and liaison with the government and the labour 
movement rested largely with Brooks. 
5. BEER AND THE UNION 
While the CHWU was engaged in these industrial activities the liquor 
industry was experiencing its own problems on the eve of World War Two. 
This time the threat came neither from prohibition nor from a depressed 
economy. The licensing polls of 1935 and 1938 had both shown a 
majority of more than two to one in favour of continuance,4 while 
121 
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reflation of the economy. The new problem was taxation and the effect 
it had on the price of beer, an item traditionally sensitive amongst trade 
unionists. In the 1939 budget the Labour government levied an extra 
tax of 6d per gallon on the wholesale price of beer and followed this 
a few weeks later with a further tax of 3d together with a 15% levy on 
wines and spirits as part of its emergency war measures~ The breweries 
proceeded to pass the full increase in price on to the publicans and they 
in turn raised their price to the public. 
In response to the rise in beer prices the Communist Party, together with 
several trade union branches, initiated a boycott of beer, demanding that 
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the brewery companies absorb the tax increases. 2 While the boycott was 
short-lived and largely confined to Auckland it did prompt the government's 
Price Investigation Tribunal to review the rises in price. As a result the 
Tribunal decided on a new rate which provided for more than three-quarters 
of the tax to be passed on to the consumer but did provide for a proportion 
to be absorbed by the breweries and the publicans. 
3 
The public agitation, and the agitation within the labour movement, 
generated by the boycott raised special problems for the hotel workers' 
unions. On the one hand if the liquor trade was forced to absorb sub-
stantial tax increases then the ability of the unions to extract higher 
wages was reduced. Conversely, to support a higher price for beer would 
tend to alienate many other trade unionists. While the problem of wage 
rises leading to price increases existed in other sectors, the price of beer 
was traditionally especially sensitive to workers and the companies that 
manufactured it were commonly perceived - with good reason - as the 
archetypical profiteering capitalists. Moreover, there was the suspicion 
surrounding Young (the HWF secretary) and his close personal associations 
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Supporters of the boycott alleged he was a friend of the breweries 
placing their interests before those of the workers while Young charged 
his opponents with ulterior motives. 1 The net result of charge and 
counter-charge was to further harden the antagonism between Young and 
the left-wing of the labour movement, although the CHWU retained 
a distance from the conflict. Problems over the relationship between the 
liquor trade and the HW F would occur again in 1942 and 1947 (see 
Chapter 4) but for the moment they represented just one more element 
in the growing conflict in the labour movement. 
6. THE CHWU AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 
Close and productive relations characterised the association between the 
CHWU and the Labour government between 1935 and 1944. The antagonism 
in 1934 and 1935 between the union and the Labour Party had proved 
to be an aberration and with the party's election to government office 
the union entered into a new period in which it played a loyal and 
active part in the rule of the Labour government. Both Young and Brooks 
came to occupy several important positions within the labour movement and 
together they acquired considerable power and influence. Brooks became 
the secretary of the new Canterbury Trades Council in 1937;1 was 
elected a member of the National Executive of the FOL and in the course 
of the war became a member of the go'vernment's Industrial Emergency 
Council. 3 Young's influence was even greater with his membership of 
the FOL's National Executive, a term as president of the Auckland 
Trades Council, the secretaryship of both the HWF and the AHWU and 
an active player in the politics of the Auckland LRC. 4 Indeed, Young 
emerged as one of the five most powerful union leaders of the era of 
the Labour government and proved himself to be a skilled, ruthless 
and ambitious leader. 5 Brooks, on the other hand, retained a certain 
distance from the internal political machinations amongst the leadership 
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of the CHWU's members. Nevertheless, the CHWU and HWF did secure 
political leverage and political allies within the government and the FOL, 
and, in particular, a close relationship developed with Fintan Patrick Walsh. 
From the 1930's until his death in 1963 as the then president of the FOL, 
Walsh was the dark colossus of the labour movement possessing a power 
that few dared to challenge. For the hotel workers he proved to be a 
valuable ally. In the depression he had acted as an advocate for the 
HWF in award negotiations as well as organising the selective boycott of 
licensed hotels in support of the union's position.1 In 1936 Walsh had 
given Brooks his personal assistance in dealing with a recalcitrant employer 2 
while he had also assisted Young with the reorganisation of the Wellington 
Hotel Workers Union in 1938.3 This pattern of cooperation between Walsh 
and the HWF continued in the 1940's and the combined power of Walsh and 
Young gave the hotel workers considerable leverage in advancing their 
interests. 
Aside from holding an influential position in the labour movement the 
CHWU also held a particular political outlook. Essentially its viewpoint 
was a moderate one. It sought to advance the wages and conditions of 
its members, support its fellow trade unionists and the programme of the 
Labour government for the construction of a welfare state. While it did 
not actively campaign for the radical transformation of New Zealand society 
into a socialist state, and declined to have any association with the Communist 
Party, the union did favour greater economic equality and gave its support 
to several progressive causes. For instance, financial aid was sent to the 
Spanish Republicans in the course of the 1930's4and for relief workers 
in China.5 Similarly the union was aware of the experiences of workers 
elsewhere in the world including those in hotels and restaurants,6 and be-
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a donation to striking iron workers in New South Wales in 1938.1 
Within the HWF the first six years of the Labour government witnessed 
a period of close cooperation between the three major unions, Auckland, 
Wellington and Canterbury. These were confident years as the HWF grew 
in political and industrial influence, expanded its coverage to new groups 
of workers and established for itself a firm financial base. Two important 
organisational questions arose in the period of the late 1930's, the first 
of which was the proposal for a national union to replace the existing 
structure of a federation. 
The desire for a more centralised structure had emerged in the depression 
years~ Both Young and Brooks became dissatisfied with the perennial 
disorder and low ~tandards of union organisation that characterised the 
small unions and believed that a national union would produce more 
' 
effective and efficient results, than nine separate district unions. Two large 
unions, Auckland and Wellington covered all of the North Island except 
for Taranaki where a separate union operated. With six industrial districts 
in the South Island six independent unions had been created whose total 
membership was less than that of either Auckland or Wellington and who, 
except for Canterbury, suffered from poor organisation and a lack of 
finance. As the IC & A Act prevented the formation of multi-district 
unions this legal problem persisted until the Labour government amended 
the Act in 1936.3 
The approach of the HW F to the creation of a national union fell into 
two phases. From 1932 to 1936 the federation made a series of visits 
to the smaller unions which resulted in the reorganisation of their 
operations on a more efficient basis and the establishment of regular 
supervision by Young and Brooks.
4 
Young took responsibility for the 
Taranaki and Wellington unions while Brooks became the federation's 
South Island supervisor. These steps led to an improvement in the situation 
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intention to create one organisation remained and the prospect of its 
realisation was viewed seriously. "We have fully made up our minds", 
wrote Brooks, "to have one big Union of Hotel Workers in New Zealand 
and no branch secretary or secretary are going to be allowed to obstruct 
us." 
In September 1936, with the IC & A Act now amended to permit multi-
district unions, the HWF resolved on a formal scheme to unify the country's 
hotel workers. 2The first stage would see the creation of three large unions, 
Auckland, Wellington and a South Island union based in Christchurch. 
Once this had been achieved the federation would then consider the formation 
of a single national union. Inevitably, convincing the leaders and members of 
nine separate unions would take time and the programme for unification 
was a cautious one. Although there were no serious political barriers 
between the various unions, all of whom supported the Labour Party 
and the arbitration system, there was nevertheless opposition to the creation 
of a national union. Both the AHWU and WHWU were concerned that the 
cost of a national union would be borne largely by themselves but the 
benefit would essentially accrue to the smaller unions. 
3 
The Otago union 
was opposed to the loss of its local autonomy and was not prepared to 
become part of a South Island union based in Christchurch.
4 
While 
discussion on the issue continued Brooks had moved to become the 
honorary secretary for all of the South Island unions except for Otago. 
Each union retained its separate legal entity, its own executive and a 
local assistant secretary but Brooks supervised the union's operation and 
presented the annual report. This arrangement proved to be a success but 
it was the closest that the HWF came to union amalgamation. 
By 1940 it was clear that no national union would be created. 
5 
Firstly 
the necessity for a strong national body had receded with the improvements 
that Young and Brooks, together with local workers, had been able to 
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to be a viable arrangement and the issue of amalgamation shrank in importance 
in comparison to the more pressing issues of award negotiation. Secondly, 
Young was satisfied with the power he possessed under the existing 
arrangement with his dual secretaryship of the HWF and the AHWU, the 
largest and richest union, and showed no desire to press for amalgamation. 
Finally, the recent experiences of some national unions indicated to Brooks 
that such a scheme could generate considerable internal problems and that 
if any further changes in the HWF's operations were required they could 
be made within the existing structure. With neither Young nor Brooks 
advocating a national union the other union leaders were similarly satisfied 
to retain the existing system. As a consequence the autonomy and impor-
tance of the CHWU continued, with Brooks together with Young and the 
WHWU secretary F. O'Sullivan forming the inner circle of decision making 
for the HWF.
1 
The CHWU did not suffer the fate of several other 
Canterbury unions who were reduced to branches of new national unions 
whose central direction lay with officials in Wellington. Rather it was able 
to develop its own particular approach within Canterbury and play a key 
role in the national strategy for the industry's workers. 
The creation of a nationwide union magazine was the second important 
organisational development of the 1930's. Bearing the title "Flashlight" 
the first issue of the monthly magazine appeared in August 1937? Young 
had been the instigator and driving force behind the magazine and had 
secured sufficient advertising from the liquor industry to finance its 
publication costs. With the stated aims of improving contact with the 
federation's members, raising their level of understanding and protecting 
the interests of the liquor industrl the magazine published a variety of 
articles covering award negotiations, industrial disputes, the federation's 
conferences and the achievements of the Labour government. A prominent 
personality of the labour movement featured as the magazine's cover photo, 
with Michael Savage on the first issue, Harry Holland on the second with 
subsequent appearances including Jim Roberts, John A. Lee and 'Paddy' 
Webb. 
4 
On occasion articles also appeared on wider social and political 
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Front government in France, the contribution of Lenin to the labour move-
ment and the exploitation of auto-workers in the United States employed by 
1 
Ford. Union leaders and rank-and-file workers were able to learn of the 
experiences of other workers as well as being informed of the developments 
and difficulties in their own industry. "Flashlight" continued until July 
1940 when it was decided to suspend publication during the war, but a 
suspension which lasted until 1963. 
Besides its importance as an innovation in the HWF's organisational methods, 
the magazine also serves as an insight into the antagonisms within the labour 
movement between the Labour Party and the Communists. Initially 
"Flashlight" made no reference to Communism aside from the one article 
praising Lenin. By 1939 however, a series of articles were published attacking 
the Soviet Union and local Communists.2 Marked by their vitriolic tone 
the articles reflected the responses of many labour leaders to the reports 
of the Moscow trials and subsequently the German-Soviet Non-Aggression 
Pact. More than this they represented wider conflicts within the Labour 
Party and the trade unions, as Communists sought to increase their activity 
in local branches~ In such a conflict Young, a former Communist4 was now 
a bitter opponent of Communism, and the magazine reflected his viewpoint. 
It was not to be the Communists however, who were to be at the centre 
of conflict within the Labour Party in 1940. That distinction fell to one 
John A. Lee, parliamentary under-secretary in the Labour government. 
7. THE LEE AFFAIR 
The year 1940 witnessed the culmination within the Labour Party of the 
struggle between Lee and his supporters and the leadership of the party. 
In part it was a conflict over policy, reflecting differences in the combatant's 
visions of socialism and their attitudes towards financial reform.5 In part, 
it was a conflict over power - power of the caucus in relation to the cabinet 
and the power of the parliamentarians in relation to the leaders of the trade 
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and ambitious men. By the conflict's culmination these three elements 
had become fused, and for many it was impossible to distinguish between 
the question 'which road does the party now take' and the personalities 
that were advocating the alternative routes. While the battle was always 
more than the disciplining of an individual, the issue of policy could 
never relegate Lee's character and actions to the incidental. 
Since the election of the Labour government in 1935, Lee had become 
embroiled with Savage and other party leaders such as Nash over the 
conservative drift in the government's policy in several areas but in 
particular in relation to financial reform. Moreover, his failure to receive 
a cabinet appointment, when others clearly less able were so rewarded, 
together with the authoritarian attitude that Savage showed towards the 
caucus, further increased Lee's hostility towards the party's leaders and 
their policies. The party leadership similarly became increasingly resentful 
of Lee and his supporters and their continuing agitation for changes in 
the party's policies. 
By June 1939 the forces within the labour movement opposed to Lee 
had begun to organise for a decisive battle, that would eliminate the 
agitation along with the agitators. 
1 
The leaders of the anti-Lee group 
were key trade unionists and officials within the Labour Party. F. P. Walsh, 
L. Glover, the HWF secretary F. Young together with J. Roberts who was 
now also president of the party, constituted the powerful trade union 
element in this alliance.2 They IMlre powerful both as a group of skilled 
and determined individuals and as officials who controlled a large bloc 
of votes within the party. Inside the party D. Wilson and M. Moohan, 
respectively the secretary and deputy secretary, were the chief organisers 
of the anti-Lee campaign. The antagonism between Young and Lee 
was a conflict that dated back to the early 1930's. Both were deter-
mined and ambitious individuals who disliked the methods and the 
views expounded by the other and neither was prepared to surrender 
a centimetre of ground to the other. Lee saw Young as a corrupt and 
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To Young, Lee was a dangerous egotist whose views and actions threatened 
the party and who gathered support from 'Trouble-making Communists 
placessekers and money cranks.' 
1 
With Young playing a leading role in the anti-Lee campaign it was inevit-
able that the CHWU would become embroiled in the conflict. The union's 
politics tended towards the middle stream of the labour movement and 
Lee's views exerted little attraction. More significantly however, Brooks 
placed loyalty to the labour movement as one of his highest values. Lee's 
attacks on the party leadership and his dislike for party discipline were not 
characteristics that endeared themselves to Brooks. In addition Lee's low 
opinion of the value of the trade union movement 
2 
was not one likely to 
win trade unionists as supporters and given the organisation al I in ks between 
Young and Brooks in the form of the HWF, it was understandable that the 
CHWU found themselves against Lee. While Brooks was not a leader in the 
campaign as he was aware of the plan, contributed to the discussion and 
ultimately provided the votes of the CHWU for Lee's expulsion. 
While the campaign against Lee was recruiting further supporters Lee 
obligingly provided his opponents with the ammunition for his execution. 
In his article 'Psycho-Pathology in Politics' 3 Lee attacked those politicians 
no longer mentally capable of leadership, but who persisted in retaining 
power with disasterous effect on their own political movements. While 
never named it was implied Savage was a present instance of the phenom-
enon. The article's publication enabled Lee's opponents to define the issue as 
an attempt by an ambitious Lee striving to destroy the beloved leader of the 
party. For many party members, it provided a stark choice. On 10 January 
at the Auckland LRC Young initiated the first battle in the final phase 
in the anti-Lee campaign.4 Young's motion, which had been drafted by 
Walsh, sought to censure Lee for his article on Savage but Lee's allies were 
able to turn the attack. They amended the motion to one expressing 
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of the LRC to pass the amended motion. With this defeat in Auckland 
the arena of conflict shifted south to the National Executive of the Labour 
Party. Instead of expelling Lee a temporary political compromise was 
reached with Lee agreeing to submit future political articles for the 
executive's approval and to apologise to Savage~ 
The truce in the conflict endured until March 1940, when Lee decided 
to break the agreement on submitting political articles. Censorship was 
not a solution that could have lasted and when Lee did decide to act 
he believed that he could win the battle that would inevitably follow 
at the party's annual conference. His confidence proved to be mistaken. 
Lee's opponents were able to control the conference's handling of the 
issue and with the introduction of card votes and the timely revelation 
of Savage's imminent death they secured his expulsion from the party by 
546 votes to 344. 2 The HWF provided 40 valuable votes for the expulsion~ 
Neither before or after Lee's expulsion were the merits of the issues 
surrounding the Lee affair debated within the CHWU. Brooks simply 
explained the issue to his executive as a conflict between politicians 
where the union's role was to ensure that the living standards of its members 
were protected and that the Labour Party. remained intact.4 For Brooks, 
Lee and his associates, such as D. C. McMillan, A. H. Nordmeyer and W. E. 
Barnard were ambitious and egotistical individuals unwilling to accept party 
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Such a remark said much about the distance between the trade unionists 
and many politicians. Yet it would be erroneous to portray Brooks as 
completely antagonistic to both Lee and his political ideas. For while 
Brooks criticised Lee the man, he invited Clyde Carr the Labour member for 
Timaru to speak to the Timaru hotel workers. Carr was sympathetic to 
several of Lee's views, but was not, said Brooks, a Leeite, as he was 
loyal to the party. 1 Young's view on the expulsion was quite unequivocal. 
"His (Lee's) exit from the Party ... provides a wonderful opportunity of 
getting rid of elements within the Party which we have all known (it) 
would be better without." 2 Young promised prompt action against 
"those who declined to accept Party discipline." 3 Discipline became an 
increasingly common phrase for the labour movement in the 1940's as 
it shifted from the construction of a new society, to the management of 
a war and a war economy. 
8. THE WAR ECONOMY 
From 1940 until late in 1945 the incomes and working conditions of New 
Zealand's workers were shaped by the political and economic decisions 
made in response to the exigencies of World War Two. It was a period 
in which the advances of the late 1930's were preserved but in which no 
further progress was made. 1940 was the last full round of award negot-
iations for the CHWU until 1945. By 1940 the union had become respon-
sible for a total of five awards. As well as hotels and tearooms the union 
now covered large numbers of domestic workers in the public hospitals 
and in the chartered clubs. Essentially the 1940 award round saw the 
maintenance by the union of the gains that had been made in 1938 for 
the licensed hotels, private hotels and tearooms. The peak in real wages 
of 1938 was maintained through the issue of a General Wage Order of 
5% by the Arbitration Court, effective from August 12 1940.
4
This 
increase compensated workers for the recent rises in prices and was the 
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In the negotiations between the employers and the HWF, both parties 
were aware of the imminence of a GWO and rather than changing the 
award rates simply accepted the increase of the Arbitration Court. Overall 
most trade unionists, including the CHWU, were satisfied with the GWO 
of 5%, although an extra 1 or 2% wou Id have been preferred. 1 
In comparing the wages and conditions in each of the union's five sectors, 
it was clear that the Licensed Hotel Award continued to provide the best 
wages and conditions. Most significantly they continued to be the only 
section where workers had obtained a 40 hour week and where ma le and 
female kitchen workers received the same rate of pay for performing the 
same job. In the two new areas of the public hospitals and the chartered 
clubs the hours of work and rates of pay continued to be poor even though 
they represented an advance on the situation prior to their unionisation 
by the CHWU. Notable among the differences were the lower rates of pay 
for stewards in the chartered clubs in comparison to the barmen in the 
licensed hotels, even though the work was almost the same. The margin 
between wages in the two sectors was, however, reduced in the 1940 round. 
With the Arbitration Court having issued its GWO the immediate problem 
of adjusting wages to meet the increases and prices was resolved. Now the 
Labour government proceeded to embark upon the creation of a compre-
hensive economic policy to meet the demands of the war. In September 
1940 the government met with the leaders of the trade unions and the 
employers' associations in the Economic Stabilization Conference to discuss 
a wages and prices strategy. 2 While desirous of preserving the standard of 
living the government's dominant aim was to minimise any inflational 
spiral of price and wage increases. The Conference considered the various 
problems but it was not until September 1941 that the first of its 
recommendations were implemented with the stabilization of the prices of 
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of stabilization was being prepared by the new Economic Stabilization 
Committee, the Arbitration Court granted a further wage increase of 5% 
effective from April 1942.
1 
This increase together with the earlier .GWO 
ensured that the movements in prices and wages since the beginning of 
the war were approximately equal, and thus the real wages of most of 
the country's workers had been maintained. 2 Certain workers on higher 
incomes did not receive a full 5% rise as the GWO only applied to the first 
£5 per week of the wage for adult males, and £2-10 for females. Few 
of the CHWU's members however earned sufficiently high wages to be 
I 
significantly affected by this qualification. 
When the Economic Stabilization Emergency Regulations were introduced 
in 1942 a total of 110 essential items were stabilized at the prices 
prevailing on 15 1?ecember 1942. Wages were stabilized at the award 
rates current as at November 1942 and indexed linked to a new Wartime 
Price Index (WPI), comprising housing rental rates and the costs of 
commodities and services. The Arbitration Court was empowered to adjust 
wages, initially only if the WPI moved by more than 5%. In practice 
the government's policy of subsidisation ensured that the WPI moved by 
less than 5% and therefore the court issued no general order to alter 
3 the rates of wages. 
The demands generated by the war inevitably led. to sacrifices in domestic 
consumption and in the quality of life. Who was to sacrifice what was, 
however, an issue requiring political determination. For the Labour government 
and the leadership of the FOL, the system of economic stabilization was 
intended to ensure that the war effort would be a success without pro-
ducing any significant decline in the wages and conditions of workers. 
They wished to avoid a repetition of the World War One experience 
where a cut in real wages was imposed upon the working class~ The 
system established by the Labour government strove to maintain pro-
duction for the war effort and company profits by ensuring that there 
was a minimum of industrial disturbance. Price stabilization was part 
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in order to meet production demands without the additional costs of 
overtime. With labour shortages in several industries overtime substantially 
increased enabling many workers to receive a rise in their weekly earnings.1 
The increased cost did place pressure on the policy of stabilization but 
the levels of prices were held down through increased subsidization. 
The trade unions played a central role in ensuring that this system of 
economic stabi I ization operated successfu I ly. Besides their acceptance of 
the system, leading trade unionists were active participants in the control 
mechanisms. Within the government structure an Industrial Emergency 
Council was established to consider any proposed changes to the conditions 
of work in response to the requirements of the war. Young and Brooks 
both served on the council and along with other union leaders they were 
able to help in the shaping of the government's decisions. 2 This combination 
of state control and self-discipline proved generally effective in ensuring 
that particular 'groups of workers did not violate the polky of wage 
stabilization and hence disturb the careful balancing of interests under 
the stabilization regime between workers, employers and the war effort. 
However, the place of the trade unions in the structure also enabled them 
to resist the demands of employers, ensuring that when the demands of 
the war economy did produce a problem the solution was a balanced one 
that protected the rights of workers. 
In the hotel and restaurant industry several individual employers attempted 
to use the war as a reason to obtain extra work from their staff without 
proper payment or sought to circumvent other provisions of the awards. 
Brooks reported instances where an employer had told workers that overtime 
payments had been removed and that no extra payment was now required 
for work above the weekly maximum. 
3 
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also raised problems in the public hospitals but the union and the North 
Canterbury Hospital Board (NCHB) were able to reach a satisfactory 
arrangement for the employment and payment of part-time staff.1 While 
retaining its belief in the principle of full time employment, the union 
recognised the particular labour problems caused by the war and reached 
a compromise with the NCHB. The only major change in the hotel and 
restaurant industry to the legal conditions of work was in respect of hours 
for female staff. Since the First World War women had been legally 
prohibited from working in a hotel or restaurant after 10.30 p.m. With 
the development of night time cabarets and more social functions in the 
late 1930's, employers lobbied the government and the unions to relax 
this restriction. It was not until 1943 however, that the unions and the 
employers agreed to a special arrangement permitting an extra hour to 
be worked after 10.30 p.m.,2 provided that the woman was over 21 years 
of age, an extra payment of 3/- per week was made and satisfactory 
transport was provided by the employer to take her home. 
3 
Two of the CHWU's awards were renegotiated in the course of the war. 
In 1942 the Tearooms Award was amended by the parties to include the 
two GWO's of 1940 and 1942,4 but more importantly the HWF was able 
to renegotiate the hospital award to raise the wage rates of domestic staff 
employed outside of Auckland and Wellington to the levels in those 
cities. The initiative for the change had come from hospital workers in 
Canterbury. A total of 80 staff petitioned the CHWU in 1943 in favour of 
negotiating a new award,, and while Brooks explained that the Economic 
Stabilization Regulations prevented any general rise in wages, the possibility 
did exist for seeking an exemption to be granted by the Arbitration Court 
on the basis of an anomaly in the wage rates~ An agreement was negotiated 
between the CHWU and the North Canterbury Hospital Board, increasing 
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was in fact an irrelevant consideration to the job performed by the 
worker. As a result a new national award was negotiated and kitchen 
hands, wardsmaids and male domestics outside of Auckland and Wellington 
received a substantial rise in pay to bring them up to the levels prevailing 
in those cities. 1 In the case of male domestics this meant a rise of 5/-
to reach a weekly wage of £5-2/6, with kitchen hands and wardsmaids 
gaining an extra 2/6 per week to raise their respective wages to £3-7 /6 
and £3-1/-. 
The war years saw one further gain for the CHWU when the government 
passed the Annual Holidays Act in 1944. 2 The Act established a minimum 
entitlement of two weeks annual paid leave for those workers who had 
completed 12 months continuous service. Where the period of service 
was less, a proportionate entitlement was provided. As a result workers 
in the licensed hotels and chartered clubs received an extra two days 
paid leave while those in private hotels and tearooms gained a further 
three days per year. Any other changes to wages or conditions had to 
wait until 1945 when the first full round of award negotiations since 1940 
took place. 
Overall, the CHWU was relatively satisfied with the operation of the system 
of economic stabilization. Its members had largely retained the gains of the 
1930s despite the demands of the war and in contrast to the experiences 
of workers in other western nations, many of whom had suffered considerable 
hardship, and in contrast to the New Zealand experience in World War One. 
For one section, the hospital workers, the war years had brought a further 
advance in wages. From the perspective of the CHWU the most difficult 
problem in this period arose not in the realm of wages and conditions 
but in its relationship with the Hotel Workers Federation and in particular with 
its secretary, Fred Young. 
1. 
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9. A FEDERATION DIVIDED 
The once cooperative relationship that had existed between the CHWU and 
the Hotel Workers Federation deteriorated in the early years of the war 
to reach a point of crisis by 1942. Up until this change the control of 
the federation had rested with the troika of .secretaries from the three major 
affiliated unions - Young from the AHWU, Brooks from the CHWU and 
F. O'Sullivan of the WHWU. The first two in particular had been 
vigorous and able advocates of the cause of the hotel and restaurant workers 
and the federation had achieved major advances in the wages and conditions 
of its members as well as expanding its coverage to new groups of workers 
in hospitals and chartered clubs. Moreover, the level of organisational effic-
iency and financial resources among the affiliates had substantially improved. 
Yet after this period of success, the CHWU found itself increasingly dis-
satisfied with Young's secretaryship of the federation. They were concerned 
with both Young's attitude and lack of interest in the affairs of the HWF and 
with particular policy issues. Besides being both the secretary of the AHWU 
and the HWF, Young was increasingly involved in the internal politics of 
the FOL and the Labour Party. His organisation of the anti-Lee forces in 
Auckland was one of the more public examples of Young's 'extra-union' 
activities and with. the onset of war his membership of the FOL National 
Executive and the government's Industrial Emergency Counci I further reduced 
his available time for the business of the HWF. As a consequence there 
were increasing delays in dealing with the business of the HWF, such as 
replying to correspondence and circularising information to the affiliates!. 
Moreover, there seemed to be a . .lack of vigour and initiative about Young's 
conduct of the federation's affairs as evinced in his delatoriousness 
in securing an award in 1940 for the hospitals. 
Young's apparent lack of interest in the affairs of the HWF angered Brooks. 
While Young was undoubtedly an able negotiator and possessed of a 
certain dynamism and charisma his commitment to the interests of his 
members was less than complete. In contrast, Brooks was an able if 
scarcely dynamic union administrator, but one who combined intelligence 
with a total dedication to his union. He resented Young's mismanagement 
1. CHW E Min 15 Jul 1940 
l'-tU 
and had removed from his own union, and from other South Island unions, 
corrupt or incompetent officials. Increasingly, it seemed to Brooks that 
Young regarded the negotiation of the HWF's awards as an amusing 
power game incidental to his wider political and personal ambitions. It 
appeared that the HWF provided an important power base for his wider 
ambitions in the labour movement, rather than the focus for commitment. 
Brooks came to believe that Young's performance and his expensive life-
style, partially financed by the HWF, were damaging to the interests of 
the members. At the same time there was a sense of personal animosity, 
Brooks knew that he could be a more dedicated federation secretary than 
Young. Nevertheless, personal ambition was clearly secondary in the 
criticisms levelled at Young's performance and attitudes. 
By early 1942 Brooks was determined to take more direct action against 
Young. In 1938 and again in 1940 he had confronted Young with his 
criticisms and despite promises to improve his performance Young had in 
fact become worse. 1 At a meeting of the CHWU executive in March 1942, 
Brooks repeated his criticisms of Young's inattention to the affairs of 
the HWF, his lack of initiative and the high financial cost of Young's 
management, especially considering the federation's inactivity.
2 
Describing 
Young as "temperamental and able to hypnotize himself into believing 
that he was doing a good job" he secured the executives' authority to 
'go the full distance' in rectifying the situation at the March conference 
of the federation. What exactly the full distance was remained unclear. 
Specifically, however, the CHWU sought to reduce the fees capitation 
paid to the HWF by the affiliated unions from 17.5% down to 10%. 
In addition, it wanted a significant improvement in the reporting of the 
HWF to its affiliates and in the recording of the federation's expenses to 
ensure there was no waste or corruption.3 The conference did agree that 
in the light of the lower level of activity of the HWF during the war the 
capitation would be reduced to 15.5%. Young again assured Brooks that 
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Between March and August 1942, however, relations between the CHWU 
and the fedenition rapidly deteriorated. There was no improvement in the 
conduct of the HWF's affairs arid numerous letters from Brooks seeking 
information or inquiring about particular actions went unanswered.1 By 
this stage the CHWU was in conflict with the HWF over both its general 
conduct and over speci fie issues· of policy. Among the latter there were 
four major issues. First, the CHWU disagreed with Young's actions in 1942 
to support the L VA in defence of the liquor industry.2 Without the 
authority of the federation and unbeknown to Brooks, Young had met 
with the leaders of the L VA. Once Brooks became aware of these develop-
ments he sought information from Young on what was occurring to which 
Young failed to reply. Subsequent statements by Young on behalf of the 
HWF - in association ·with the LVA - attacked the Labour government for 
its increased taxation of the liquor industry. Brooks was alarmed by this. 
criticism of the government and he rebuked Young for cooperating with 
the employers in the light of their continuing violations of the union's 
awards. He publicly disassociated the CHWU from the criticism of the Labour 
government. 3 
There were three further policy issues where Young and the CHWU were 
in conflict. The CHWU had sought action from Young on negotiating 
a new Chartered Clubs Award, but this had been rejected by the federation's 
management committee on the grounds that the Economic Stabilisation 
Regulations made the situation unfavourable for any renegotiation.4 Secondly, 
following the 5% GWO, effective from April 1942,disagreement had arisen 
between Brooks and Young over whether the 5% was to be applied to the 
cash value of the board and lodging allowances. Brooks believed that it should 
apply but both Young and 1he Labour D:!partment disagreed. Whether 
right or wrong, Brooks found himself arguing for a higher wage for his 
members against his own federation and it was not a position likely to 
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involvement in establishing a catering company for the Auckland water-
front. 
1 
They were opposed to both the principle of forming a company 
and to the detrimental effect that the time spent by Young on the project 
was having on the business of the HW F. 
By the middle of 1942 the CHWU had begun investigations into with· 
drawing from the federation. If the union was to remain in the HW F. 
it faced a major battle in attempting to secure sufficient support from the 
other affiliates to control or to remove Young. As secretary of the AHWU 
Young already commanded the largest voting contingent. While Brooks as 
honorary secretary of four small South Island unions besides the CHWU 
possessed a significant base of power he still required the support of the 
OHWU and the WHWU to defeat Young. In neither case was the leader-
ship of these unions prepared to enter into a battle with Young which 
would probably be long and bitter. At times they too expressed criticism 
of Young's performance but they were prepared to accept the deficiencies 
of Young's leadership along with its advantages,. In the meantime, Brooks 
proceeded to assess the possibilities and consequences of withdrawal. 
The CHWU's solicitor advised the executive that the union's members would 
sti II be entitled to the benefits of the awards that had been negotiated 
by the HW F even if the CHWU seceded. 2 Moreover, in the event that a 
majority of the HWF's affiliates, five out of nine, wished to dissolve the 
federation the current awards would still remain in force. 
Now that Brooks was assured that the conditions of his members and 
those of any other affiliates that withdrew would be secure, he called 
a conference of the South Island unions for 25 August 1942:3 All the unions 
were present except for Otago. Brooks circulated a resumed the CHWU's 
criticisms of the HWF and the opinion of the CHWU's solicitor on with-
drawal. Those present resolved to withdraw from the federation and 
each then sought the necessary authority from their members. Each union 
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Despite proposals in the 1930's to form a national union, 
the hotel and restaurant workers maintained a federal 
structure with nine autonomous district unions. The 
CHWU, together with the Auckland and Wellington 
unions were the three most powerful affiliates; and 
their respective secretaries, Brooks, F. Young and F. 
O'Sullivan, played the central role in the federation's 
direction from the 1930's to the 1950's. In particular, 
Young as secretary of the federation and the Auckland 
union from 1932 to 1963, was important in ensuring 
that the federation operated largely within the arbit-
ration system and that it wielded considerable influence 
in the wider labour movement. 




No withdrawal from the federation in fact occured. Brooks had been 
in poor health for most of 1942, a result of several years of overwork 
coupled with high blood pressure. From the middle of 1942 Brooks suffered 
1 
a stroke and was ordered to rest by his doctors. Despite recovering, the 
battle with the HWF appeared to be beyond both the personal strength 
of Brooks and the political power of the CHWU, and Young retained his 
dominance as leader of the federation. 
For the remainder of the war years the situation remained unresolved and 
relations continued to be antagonistic between the CHWU and Young. The 
CHWU did meet with Young on some industrial issues and they were 
able to maintain a working relationship, albeit an uneasy one. Brooks 
continued to criticise aspects of Young's management, criticisms that were 
occasionally echoed by F. O'.Sullivan of the WHWU and by the Otago 
and Southland unions. 2 Their action, however, never moved beyond talking 
to Young about the problem. In the meantime Brooks reduced his involve-
ment outside of the CHWU, resigning as the honorary secretary of the 
small South Island unions in October 1943.
3 
He stated that they were now 
capable of managing their own affairs but his judgement was probably 
influenced by his disenchantment with the federation and his continuing 
poor health. The battle with Young had been lost and Brooks retreated 
to his stronghold in the CHWU for the remainder of the war. 
10. THE STATE OF THE UNION IN 1944 
Sustained growth and internal cohesion had marked the unions operation 
in the first nine years of the Labour government. The introduction of 
compulsory unionism and the extension of the union's coverage to the 
public hospitals and chartered clubs generated a dramatic rise in the union's 
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TABLE 3.4 CHWU MEMBERSHIP AND FINANCE, 1935 TO 1944 
Yeur Mernueri 1 Annual lncome2 (.£) Net Aneu2 (0 






















Ai for the financial year which end1 Feb in the following calendar year. 
All financial figures are rounded to nearest £ 
The extra income that the union received in this period went primarily 
into its accumulated funds. Regular and substantial surpluses were made 
by the union not simply because of the increased income but also because 
of the effective system of collection and efficient, economical administration. 
There was only a small rise in the costs of the union's general operations 
with Brooks and one full-time organiser performing the union's industrial 
work. While the organiser had been hired after the depression his employment 
only returned the number of staff to that of the 1920's despite the unions 
membership being 25% larger. There were, however, two areas where expen-
diture did rise significantly. First, the capitation paid to the HWF rose from 
10% of the CHWU's fees in 1935 to a peak of 17.5% before declining 
again to 15.5% in 1942. 1 The extra finance supported the federation's 
higher levels of activity in the late 1930's and provided a subsidy to the 
national magazine ''Flashlight''. Nevertheless, by the 1940's the CHWU be-
lieved that some of this funding was being wasted and abused. The second 
notable rise in expenditure was in funding for the Labour Party. In 
addition to capitation fees and regular donations the CHWU made a 
special grant to the party, of £550 for the 1938 election.2 For the union 
this constituted more than 10% of its income in that year; for the 
party the total contributions of the HWF in 1938 represented the third 
largest trade union contribution.3 It was one of the more direct examples 
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The continuing accumulation of money by the CHWU did lead somemembers 
to seek a reduction in the union's fees. The fees had been increased in the 
depression to avert financial collapse. Now, with growing financial security, 
attempts were made in 1937 and again in 1941 to lower the subscription 
but on both occasions the executive was able to prevent any resolution 
being passed. 
1 
In. 1943 after further complaints from members, the executive 
itself decided to act and reduced the weekly fees from 1 /- (males and those 
females on male wage rates) and 9d (women workers) to 6d for all.2 While 
the agitation by members had not been especially large or determined, 
Brooks and the executive did believe that the union was sufficiently 
secure financially to sustain the· cut and noted that the low level of 
activity by the HWF during the war years could not justify the continu-
ance of the existing union fee. The income of the CHWU did decline 
as a consequence of th is reduction in fees but the existing margin between 
income and expenditure together with a small reduction in its costs 
enabled the union still to produce a surplus. 3 
The early years of the Labour government saw not only an increase in 
the union's financial resources but also a rise in participation by workers 
in the union's affairs. Some 220 workers crowded into the 1937 Annual 
General Meeting to discuss awards, holidays and workers' compensation 
and meetings in the next few years usually attracted between 40 and 80 
4 
members. Similarly there had been an enthusiastic response from hospital 
workers in 1937 when the union moved to extend its coverage to this 
sector. 5 Generally, the workers supported the leadership of Brooks and 
the executive and while the direction of the union's affairs remained 
largely with the executive, rank-and-file members did on occasion initiate 
their own action, as for instance when the hospital workers petitioned the 
executive for a new award in 1943.6 Similarly, there was periodic 
criticisms and questioning of the union's operations but there was no chall-
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of any pro-Lee or Communist faction emerging within the union. As to 
the executive, its membership was relatively stable between 1937 and 1944 
and it was guided by and in turn supported the views and actions of 
Brooks as secretary of the union. Elections for the executive during this 
period were largely uncontested affairs with the incumbent members 
being re-elected unopposed or the number of candidates equalling the number 
of vacancies. Most of the changes in personnel occurred through the 
executive appointing new members to fill the casual vacancies that arose 
between the elections. 1 
Nine years of a Labour government had brought substantial gains to 
the CHWU and to its members. Domestic workers now enjoyed higher 
wages, shorter hours and longer holidays, and access for themselves and their 
families to better housing, health and education. Their union had become 
financially secure, gained an influential voice in the labour movement, 
and possessed of sufficient power and skill to defend their interests in 
award negotiations and at the individual workplace. Such advances had 
been achieved by the direct actions of the Labour government and those of 
the CHWU and the trade union movement. Nevertheless, these gains 
had not been made without cor'rflict, without hesitation nor·without lost 
opportunities. For despite the very real advances that had been made, and 
the limitations imposed by the war, further economic and social reform could 
have been effected by the Labour government and the labour movement. 
Instead a lack of vision or commitment to deeper social change, already 
present among some leaders before the election 1935, came to dominate 
the government and the movement. There was a complacency with the 
achievements secured and the fear of defeat acted as a conservative brake 
on any more radical measures. When the war ended the opportunity for 
a new wave of political initiatives was not seized upon. Instead the post-war 
years saw growing tension and conflict in the labour movement over 
stabilization and the direction of the Labour government. It was a conflict 
in which the CHWU itself became embroiled as the union experienced 
a period of internal dissent. 
1. see AGM for re-elections, & E Min for casual vacancies 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A MOVEMENT DIVIDED, 1945 TO 1955 
The years 1945 to 1955 formed a decade of division and hiatus in the 
history of the CHWU. Gone was the previous decade's almost omnipotent 
apparatus of labour power, based on an interlocking of government and 
trade union leadership. From 1949 the party of government was the National 
Party. In the years that followed the tensions nascent in the labour movement 
in the 1940's exploded into the open, contributing to the duplicity and 
defeat of 1951. No new generation of labour leaders possessed of a post-
war vision for the movement emerged to 'replace the increasingly old and 
tied men whose thinking seemed circumscribed by the depression exper-
ience. As with the wider labour movement, so too with the CHWU. Brooks 
continued as its secretary, but now in his sixties and in poor health, the 
sense of purpose and vigour of earlier years was rapidly fading and the 
union began to drift. 
In the first period, from 1945 to 1950, the union was able to successfully 
negotiate improvements in its awards. However, within the CHWU there 
emerged a group of Communists and Labour Party supporters critical of 
the union's level of activity and management. Concurrent with these 
developments, the liquor industry experienced its own upheaval in the 
form of the 1946 Royal Commission on Licensing, which roundly 
criticised the profits and corruption of the trade and recommended the 
nationalization of the industry. While this did not eventuate, private 
ownership was challenged by the emergence of community-owned licensing 
trusts. 
In the second period, from 1950 to 1955, the union's history was dominated 
by three events. 1951 saw the culmination of the internal conflict in the 
labour movement between the Waterside Workers' Union and the leadership 
of the FOL. With a divided labour movement the National government 
was able to succeed in destroying the watersiders and their allies. The 
CHWU, while distrustful of the FOL leadership, and sympathetic towards 
the watersiders case did not take any action to support them. In 1953 the 
union faced an industrial struggle of its own in the licensed hotels but was 
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successful in combating the employers. attack on wages. Finally, the union 
experienced a second act of internal dissent, when opponents of the executive 
attempted to gain power in 1954. While it was again repulsed, it was the 
final scene in which Brooks would take part. After 36 years as the union's 
leader he retired in rriid-1955 at the age of 71, and an era in the 
union's history had ended. 
1. WAGES AND THE WORKPLACE, 1945 TO 1949 
Constructing an economy for peacetime, and striving to arrest the drift 
towards electoral defeat, were the twin aims of the Labour government 
in the post-war era. 1 Within the trade union movement, the left-wing 
pressed for more substantial wage increases both to compensate for the 
decline in real wages experienced during the latter years of the war 
economy, and to raise real wages in a period of labour shortage. The 
government, continuing to stress economic stability as the central element 
in its economic policy, acted to restrict wage and price increases. Such 
restraints on wages led to increasing tension between the government and 
many trade unionists, a tension that was intensified by the prospects of 
electoral defeat and the ideologically charged international political climate. 
Throughout the capitalist economies the years immediately following the 
end of World War Two brought political and industrial unrest. Conservat-
ives and Communists, Socialists and Liberals were engaged in a struggle 
for power that was fought in the-streets, in the parliaments and in the 
trade unions. While there was ideological fallout from these conflicts 
upon New Zealand, the degree of actual conflict was considerably milder 
than elsewhere. Nevertheless, the .participants judged the conflict in terms 
of their own experience, and. compared to the relatively peaceful patterns 
in industrial relations in the past thirty years the level of industrial action 
seemed excessive and inexcusable. It was made more so by the presence in 
power of the labour movement's own political party. Such a situation had 
the dual effect of raising the expectation amongst the left-wing, while 
leading the more conservative elements of the labour movement to resent 
any agitation against the government. 2 
1. 
2. 
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The government persisted with its system of economic stabilization although 
it was increasingly battered by pressures on prices and the clamour of 
wage claims. While the system of controls, including the issuing of 
Standard Wage Pronouncements by the Arbitration Court, tended to assist 
the weaker unions, they also served to restrict the stronger unions from 
obtaining the higher rates of wages that were possible in a period of labour 
shortage and economic growth. Moreover, many trade unionists perceived 
a decline in their living standards relative to the rising prosperity of the 
farming and bus.iness sectors. They too wished to share in this growth and 
not simply struggle to maintain the level of their real income at that of 
1938-40. Indeed, there was some disagreement between the government 
and its union critics, over whether there had in fact been a fall in the 
workers' share of national income between 1938-40 and 1946-48. While 
in cash wages this was partially true, the growth in social security benefits 
and other measures appeared to have maintained the workers' share of 
real income. 1 Nevertheless the demand for a better standard of living and 
not merely that of the past, persisted. 
The HWF and the CHWU did not become embroiled with the government 
over the issue of higher wages. They essentially remained loyal supporters 
of the government and were neither personally nor politically predisposed 
to attack in public their policies, both because they wanted Labour to be 
re-elected and because they largely agreed with the government's direction. 
Nevertheless, their loyalty and support was severely tested in December 1945 
over the question of the 40 hour week. When the concept of the 40 hour 
week had been introduced in 1936, the Arbitration Court had been given 
the discretion to permit those industries where the provision was regarded 
as impracticable to operate a 44 hour week. Thus workers in shops, 
tearooms and private hotels and in many hospitals continued to work a 
44 hour week until 1945. In December that year the government amended 
the Shops and Offices Act so as to provide a statutory right for a 40 hour 
I 
week for shop workers. 2 Hotels and restaurants whose operations were 
also covered by the Act were excluded from the amendment. The CHWU 
was aghast at this omission and the failure of the government to consult 
1. 
2. 
The Press 3 Mar 1949 p4. Also provides example of the 
debate within the labour movement. 
Shops & Offices Arndt Act (NZ Statutes No. 38 1945 p309) 
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Young who besides being secretary of the HWF was now also a member of 
the Legislative Council. Nor were they pleased that Young had failed to 
make himself aware of the government's plans to amend the law. Such was 
the level of dissatisfaction that the CHWU not only expressed its disappoint-
ment that after 'thirty years of loyalty such an event could occur' but 
proposed to the HWF that it disaffi Ii ate from the Labour Party and the 
FOL. 1 
The HWF did not disaffiliate as both Young and Brooks were able to 
successfully lobby the government to enact a further amendment to the 
Shops & Offices Act to include hotels and restaurants. This was passed 
in October 1946 and came into effect from July 1947.2 While the licensed 
hotels had secured a 40 hour week in 1936 through the Arbitration 
Court, and the Act simply placed into statute their existing entitlement, 
the workers in tearooms and private hotels had obtained for the first time a 40 
hour week, and equality with other workers. Similarly, 1947 saw the HWF 
negotiate a common 40 hour week for •fomestic workers in public hospitals. 3 
Prior to this there had been a mi>~ed regime where the staff of the Auckland 
and Wellington hospitals enjoyed a 40 hour week but those elsewhere 
worked between 42 and 44 and on occasion longer without any payment 
for overtime. In Canterbury the new award brought a reduction in the 
ordinary hours of work at the major ho~pitals of two hours per week and 
of four hours in the small and mainly rural hospitals. The achievement of 
a 40 hour week for all domestic workers in hotels, tearooms, chartered 
clubs and hospitals had taken the union thirty nine years since its creation. 
In reaching its goal the union had persistently pursued a course of legal 
negotiation combined with political representation, and had not employed 
direct action. Whether, given the problems of depression and subsequently 
World War Two, a 40 hour week could have been achieved earlier is 
questionable. While an opportunity did exist in the late 1930's the union 
was heavily preoccupied with extending coverage to new groups of 
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Besides achieving a 40 hour week, the late 1940's also saw the union 
make gradual but valuable progress on the wages front. In 1945 the govern-
ment had enabled a full round of award negotiations to take place. The 
new awards negotiated by the HWF incorporated the two 5% General 
Wage Orders of 1940 and 1942 and provided for a series of further in-
creases of 10/- per week for most licensed hotel workers 
1 
and 11 /- for female 
workers in tearooms and private hotels. 
2 
In the clubs and hospitals male 
vyorkers gained an extra 11 /8d per week and women workers 10/- 3 
Certain classes of cooks in the licensed hotels received higher increases, 
reflecting their higher wage rates, of between 10/6 and 15/3. However in 
relation to the cost of living, most workers in 1945 had experienced a· small 
decline in their real wages compared to that of 1938-40. 
From 1945 to the end of 1949 the weekly award wages for the union's 
members rose generally in line with the rate of inflation. However, the 
union was able to increase the actual earnings of workers in hotels and 
chartered clubs by negotiating in the course of 1948 and 1949 the 
introduction of penalty rates of pay for weekend work. The agitation . 
for this change had begun in 1948 when the Auckland and Wellington 
unions had held stop-work meetings in support of both a general wage 
rise and in particular for the establishment of penalty rates for the 
weekend.
4 
While any general rise was still limited by the Economic 
Stabilization Regulations penalty rates would effectively raise wages 
while remaining within the provisions of the regulations. In late 1948 
the chartered club employers had accepted the union's claim for penalty 
rates 
5 
but the crucial achievement was in 1949 when the unions neg-
otiated penalty rates for the largest se~tor, the licensed hotels. In the 
hotels, staff rostered to work on a Saturday received payment at time-
and-a-half on the full wage rate (i.e. including the cash value of board 
and lodging) and on Sunday an extra 6/- if they were men or worked 
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the kitchen - this reflected the differences in the basic wage rates for the 
two groups.1Thus, if a worker was employed for eight hours on Saturday as 
part of a normal 40 hour week their actual weekly wages were effectively 
increased by 10%. Chartered club workers received time-and-a-half on Saturday 
but double time on Sunday. When the new award for private hotels was neg-
otiated it provided for time-and-a-quarter on Saturday and time-and-a-half 
rates for Sunda0 While this lower level was a consequence of the lower 
profitability of the private hotels it still represented an important improvement 
in wages. 
In a seven day industry, the introduction of penalty rates constituted a sig-
nificant advance in principle as well as an important financial gain. Work on 
Saturday or Sunday was now accorded a special status recognising the sacrifice 
made by workers in terms of their family and social life. It was no longer 
regarded as part of the normal and acceptable requirements of the industry 
to which the workers simply had to acquiesce. Moreover the penalty rates 
occurred within the normal 40 hour week roster. They were not comparable 
to the overtime payments received by workers in a five day industry where 
weekend work was in excess of the normal working week of 40 hours. Relative 
to domestic workers in tearooms and hospitals the introduction of penalty rates 
represented an increase in the margin of pay for hotel and club staff. Sunday 
work was part of the routine for hospital workers who were now distinctly 
disadvantaged in comparison to hotels and clubs. A dispute did arise over the 
penalty payment for night porters, whose shifts began at 10pm but continued 
into the following day. The HWF negotiated the payment of Saturday rates 
from 1 Opm on Friday, and Sunday rates from 10pm on Saturday~ 
Aside from penalty payments the post-war period also saw the union secure 
a broken shift allowance in 1946 of 2/6 per week~ This provided some 
compensation for the inconvenience of working half the shift in the morning 
and half later in the day with two to four hours unpaid time in between -
a traditional feature in the hotels. Gains were also made in holiday pay, 
the entitlement to 'dry pay' and in the wages of casual workers. 
All sections of the union's membership received a rise in their 
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Award negotiations increased the number of statutory holidays in a year 
from seven days to nine, or eight in the case of the private hotels, and 
raised the rate of pay for working on any of those days from time-and-
a-half to double time. 1 By virtue of the 1948 amendment to the Public 
Holidays Act, 2 workers now also received the full entitlement to statutory 
holiday pay when the holiday was transferred to another day. The second 
of these specific changes was in respect of the entitlement to 'dry pay' 
under the Licensed Hotels Award. All married workers, together with 
single male barstaff, porters and general hands were entitled to choose 
to receive the 'dry pay', that is the fu II cash wage together with the 
cash value of the board and lodging allowances. The remaining staff had 
to accept board and lodging if the employer provided it. The group of 
single males, provided they lived in one of the four major cities, had had 
this right to choose since 1937. Now, in 1945 this right was extended to those 
in small towns 3 and in 1949 to all licensed hotels. 4 In the meantime, 
casual workers had their wage rates increased by at least the same, and 
in some instances more than the rise in the ordinary weekly wage for 
full-time staff. For instance, in the licensed hotels casual workers were 
now payed at the higher daily rate for the first five days of their employ-
ment instead of the previous three days. 5 Secondly, casual workers in the 
chartered clubs became entitled to a daily rate of 15% above the pro-
rata rate of full-time workers, rather than the previous margin of 10%. 6 
In addition to these specific advances in pay, the CHWU also sought to 
further extend its workplace coverage into two new areas. First, the union 
tried, without success, to include domestic workers in university hostels 
and school boarding houses under the ambit of the Private Hotels Award. 
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hostels did not fall within the definition of a private hotel.1 Moreover, 
in the event that some institutions may in the future fall within the 
definition of a 'boarding house' and hence be within the scope of the 
award, there was still a further barrier in terms of the union's own 
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rules. Only the CHWU and the WHWU provided in their rules for coverage 
of such workers, and any similar institution in another industrial district 
could not be cited as a party to any award. The court did provide, however, 
for a measure of protection for the workers at Christchurch's College House 
and exempted the Deaconess' Houses only for as long as they continued 
to pay their employees full pay during the vacations when the hostels 
were closed. 2 
The CHWU did achieve success in the second area in which it sought to 
expand, namely the private hospitals. Up until 1948 domestic workers 
in these institutions possessed no award protection. In 1947 the HWF 
had initially moved to include these hospitals within the public hospitals 
award but decided against this on the grounds that the differences in the 
type of institution made any composite agreement too difficult to negotiate. 
Thus, after the 1947 award for public hospitals was settled, the HWF 
negotiated the first award for private hospitals in 1948. There were a total 
of 68 private hospitals in New Zealand including nine in Canterbury 
and with the growth of a public hospital system under Labour their 
importance and income had declined. Nevertheless the unions were able 
to negotiate an award that provided for the same rates of pay and 
conditions as those in the public hospitals. 3 
The first five years following the war's end had seen valuable gains made 
by the CHWU in the real incomes of its members, despite the effects of 
inflation, and improvements in the conditions of work, most notably 
with the extension of the 40 hour week to tearooms, private hotels and 
hospitals. Nevertheless, there was an expectation abroad amongst workers 
of a substantial improvement in their standard of living and there was 
frustration that the rate of improvement was too small and too low. 
While 1949 did bring a number of gains for hotel workers, this frus-
tration had already become evident amongst a small group of workers 
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2. DISSENT IN THE UNION 
For 25 years Brooks and his executive had directed the affairs of the 
union unchallenged by any rank-and-file dissent. The union's leadership 
had proved to be cohesive and stable, and most importantly successfu I 
in advancing or defending the interests of its members in times of 
depression and of prosperity. The union had been moderately left-wing 
in its politics and sound in its management and finances. This tranquility 
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was broken in 1947 when a small group of Communists together with some 
Labour Party supporters, made their appearance at the union's June general 
meeting. This group voiced their criticism of the union's general effect-
iveness, the payments made to its officers and the lack of publicity inform-
ing members about meetings and the elections for the executive.1 While this 
first attack was parried by the executive and a majority of those members 
present supported the executive's viewpoint, the attack caused sufficient 
alarm for the executive to initiate an investigation into the backgrounds of 
the critics. 2 One of the leading critics was readily identified as Noel Smith, 
a Communist engineering worker who was also employed as a part-time 
barman. Brooks described the opposition as a 'group of Communists and 
fellow travellers' and the executive resolved that for future meetings 
membership cards would be checked so as to ensure that only CHWU 
members were admitted.
3 
The conflict that was to occur between the executive and this opposition 
group over the next two--and-a-half years, was a struggle over both the 
direction of the union and over specific aspects of its management. It 
was not simply an attempt by the Communists to obtain power in the union. 
While this was an element there were deficiencies in the union's operation 
and the grievances felt by the Communists and by non-Communist 
critics were genuinely held and in some cases justifiable. However, the 
wider political situation with its tensions between the left-wing of the 
labour movement and the Labour government shaped the way each side 
saw the issues and their opponents. Mutual antipathy, distrust and suspicion 
marked their behaviour rather than any reasoned and considered examination 
of the problems. To the Communists, Brooks appeared as an ageing 
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of conspirators out to seize power in the union. 
Yet underneath this general antipathy certain specific issues could be 
identified. First, the opposition group wanted a more industrially active union 
both in negotiating awards and at the individual workplace. They desired that 
the standard of living of workers should be raised substantially and swift!/ 
The executive was more cautious in its attitude. It accepted a slower rate of 
progress as being more realistic, nor did it wish to engage any industrial 
agitation that could contribute to the electoral defeat of the Labour government. 
These were fundamental differences in political outlook and were not likely 
to be resolved simply by logical debate. As to the issue of the lack of 
industrial activity by the union at the workplace, it was evident that the 
union's level of contact and award enforcement did leave scope for improvement. 
From the perspective of the past this activity was not notably deficient and was 
better than many other unions. The opposition, however, looked to improve the 
situation rather than continue as before. 
The second area of criticism was the lack of publicity for the union's general 
meetings and elections for the executive. Public notification ofthe general 
meetings was confined to inserts in the daily newspapers, and except in 1944, 
no circulars advertising meetings were sent to the workplace. The date for 
executive nominations was unspecified in the union's constitution and the actual 
notification was placed only in the union's office and often out of sight of 
2 
members. Such practices did not encourage participation in the union's affairs 
and elections for the executive were generally uncontested. The opposition thus 
had legitimate grievances with the union's procedures grievances accentuated by 
the fact that they hindered their own ability to stand candidates for the exe-
cutive elections. 
The final claim by the opposition was for a greater role in the union's 
affairs by the rank-and-file membership.3They believed that such participation 
would produce a more democratic, active union, freed from bureaucratic abuse 
and invigorated with a greater militancy in its politics and tactics. Such 
a view was often articulated by left-wing members in many trade unions. 
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low level of membership involvement, was likely to be a shift of power 
from the electedexocutive to an unelected minority of activists, such as the 
Communists, who regularly attended the union's meetings. Brooks believed 
that the control of the union by the executive ensured that a moderate policy 
in line with the views of the majority of the members was pursued and 
conducted in a responsible and efficient manner. For the opposition 
direct participation and the exercise of substantial power by ordinary 
members was an article of faith. 
These then were the themes underlying the dissent within the union, issues 
that could not be easily separated from the wider political environment 
of the labour movement nor from the personalities involved, such as 
Brooks and Smith. In responding to the opposition the executive's 
approach was two-fold. First, an .attempt was made to incorporate the 
critics into the executive structure. Brooks proposed to Smith that he 
attend and observe an executive meeting in operation. In the event that 
a vacancy might subsequently ari~e he suggested to Smith that he could 
then stand for election. 1 Smith declined such an offer, reiterating that his 
intention was not to join the executive but to increase rank-and-file 
control. Certainly as a lone voice on the executive he would have had 
considerably lesser influence than that possible for an organised group 
at a general meeting. The second step by the executive was to publicise 
the achievements that had been made by the union. For the 1948 Annual 
General Meeting they produced a comprehensive 14 page report on the 
union's past 30 years of operation. 2 The report stressed the improvements 
made in wages and conditions, the quantity of arrears in wages and allowances 
collected by the union and the wide range of work undertaken by Brooks 
both within the HWF and in the wider labour movement. Attached to the 
report were statements from the union's auditors and solicitors attesting 
to the union's efficiency in financial management and industrial litigation. 
Certainly, the executive had little to fear from any charges of dishonesty, 
nor, given its high level of activity up until World War Two, from charges 
of lethargy. It did, however, remain vulnerable to the criticisms that it 
was not currently sufficiently active and that its procedures for elections 
and meetings were inadequate, and a barrier to participation. 
1 . 
2. 
eg. Brooks report on meeting with Smith. CHW E Min 
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At the 1948 Annual General Meeting and again in the following year, the 
opposition mounted an attack on the executive and on Brooks in partic-
ular. While the debate in 1948 was vigorous and the meeting lasted for 
two-and-a-ha If hours, the executive was able to rebuff the cha I lenge. 1 
It was aided in this by the fact that the biennial election for th~ ... exe-
cutive was not due until the following year. and hence the opposition 
were unable to change the executive's membership. In 1949 however, the 
opposition group were organised and constitutionally able to elect a new 
executive. They submitted a complete list of candidates fur the .executive 
in time for the general meeting. The candidates included both Communists 
and non-Communists critical of the executive,2 with Noel Smith opposing 
the incumbent Andrew Wilson, for the office of president. Wilson, 
who was a chef by trade, had been president of the union since 1936. 
A supporter of the Labour Party he was a close and long-ti me associate 
of Brooks. 3 While the oppositio~ had prepared itself for the meeting, 
the executive had also organised its own supporters. With a total of 100 
members present the meeting proved to be disorderly and the debate was 
acrid. 4 Nevertheless, Wilson defeated Smith for the presidency by 54 votes 
to 35 while the incumbent executive was comfortably returned in a secret 
ballot by a margin of more than two to one. 5 
The internal challenge to Brooks and the executive had for the moment 
been defeated. It did, however, shatter the relative tranquility of the union's 
operat.ion and caused Brooks considerable alarm. While no changes to the 
union's operation had resulted from the challenge the threat had not 
disappeared. In the next few years events elsewhere took centre stage 
in the union's affairs, but the opposition group would reappear in 1954 
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3. THE LIQUOR TRADE 
While the CHWU had been beset by internal dissension, the liquor industry 
was experiencing dramatic developments of its own, many of which would 
ultimately affect the union's members. The overall position of the brewery 
companies was one of continuing expansion coupled with high and 
sustained profits, despite the introduction by the government of higher 
sales taxes in the course of World War Two. However, the brewery owners 
peaceful contemplation of their growing wealth was rudely jolted by 
significant developments in the mid and late 1940's. 
The first of these jolts came with the creation of community controlled 
licensing trusts as a new form of ownership for the hotel industry. 
lnvercargill was the site of the inaugural trust established in 1944. The 
city had been a 'dry' district since 1907 and when its citizens had voted 
for the restoration of licenses in 1943 there was loud opposition to the 
reestablishment of private ownership. By the lnvercargill Licensing Trust Act 
of 1944 a board of trustees - with the local authorities and the government 
each nominating three members - was created to establish, own and operate 
all facilities for the sale of liquor in the district. 1 While the project 
did encounter financial problems and difficulties in finding a suitable 
location the trust did succeed in establishing a viable operation. A second 
licensing trust followed in Masterton in 1947 2 and after the passing of the 
Licensing Trust Act of 1949, further licensing trusts were established in 
the CHWU's own district at Ashburton and Geraldine. 3 
For the hotel workers, the creation of trusts had the effect of establishing 
new job opportunities while also providing in their early years of operation 
wage rates moderately better than many other hotels. However, the HWF 
did come into conflict with the trusts over the issue of worker represen-
tation on the trust board. On several occasions the HWF unsuccessfully 
lobbied the government to obtain a worker's representation on the lnver-
cargill Trust Board. 4 In Canterbury, the relationship that developed 
between the union and the local trusts was generally an amicable one, 
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The second challenge to the power of the breweries came in the report of the 
1946 Royal Commission on Licensing. Established by the Labour government 
in January 1945 the Commission's purpose was to investigate all aspects of 
the liquor industry and make appropriate recommendations on its future.1 It 
consisted of eight members including a representative of the interests of labour 
namely F. G. Young secretary of the HWF. The Commission's report was a 
comprehensive document which made a series of scathing attacks on aspects of 
the liquor industry, especially the high profits and poor standard of its services. 
The key recommendation was to nationalise the brewery companies.2 1n the 
view of the majority, five of the eight members, the abuses that they had found 
throughout the trade stemmed from the profit motive inherent in private 
ownership.30nly some form of public ownership could ensure that the industry 
was conducted in a socially responsible manner and they suggested a combinat-
ion of a state brewery with community trust controlled hotels. 
The radical proposal of nationalisation was not favourably received by the 
brewers, the Labour government nor by Young. Together with two other members 
of the Commission, Young had strongly dissented from the majority's proposal 
for nationalisation. He supported the continuance of private ownership and 
assailed the proposal as one savouring of a 'totalitarian state' and not one for 
'freedom loving people'. 4 Given his long standing and continuing close personal 
association with the brewery companies and his conservative position within 
the labour movement, Young's attitude was not unexpected. Nevertheless, 
there was something ironic in the supposed representative of labour decrying 
nationalisation as totalitarian. The proposal did receive support from the FOL, 
individual trade unions and Labour Party branche~. Prior to the war, the 
annual conference of the HWF itself had discussed a remit from the CHWU 
for the nationalisation of the breweries but decided that it was an 'inopportune 
time' to act.
6
There was a division of opinion within the HWF and its submission 
to the Commission avoided any reference to nationalisation. Brooks, when 
presenting the submission, was asked for the federation's view. "We have always" 
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but avoided any statement that the HWF was officially for or against the 
proposal. Young, and the Labour government had no desire for national-
isation, and the 1948 Licensing Amendment Bill, designed to implement the 
Commissions recommendations, lacked any proposal for public ownership. 
However, the proposal did affect the vote for state control at the 1946 national 
licensing poll. The rise was dramatic, increasing by 66% from 123,701 to 202,664~ 
At 20.2% of the total vote it marked the highest proportion ever to be 
recorded in favour of state control and purchase. Whether the Labour govern-
ment could have promoted the concept of nationalisation and built upon the 
degree of support already evident in the community will remain a matter of 
speculation, another of the lost opportunities in Labour's last years in power. 
The Licensing Amendment Act of 194g did incorporate several of the Royal 
Commission's recommendations, but it was considerably less sweeping in its 
reforms even in those areas outside of nationalisation. The Commission's 
proposals had sought to modernise the industry, liberalise the law and improve 
the standard of services offered by the trade to the public. For instance, it 
proposed that snack foods and an adequate quantity of seating be introduced 
3 
into the hotels. All hotels would have a standard measure for beer sales and 
they should be required to use Condys crystals in their bars so as to prevent 
the recycling of beer dregs and their sale back to the customer.4 The Commission 
also recommended the redistribution of hotel licenses to meet the changes in 
the pattern of population distribution and the extension of licenses for areas 
such as chartered clubs and restaurants. These suggestions were supported 
by Young who wanted to see improvements in the quality of services but 
5 
not a change in ownership. The Act was more cautious, although it did 
establish a Licensing Control Commission to improve the supervision of the 
industry and to redistribute the existing number of licenses. In practice the 
Commission was not able to effect any significant redistribution because of the 
restriction imposed on its actions by the need to keep within the existing 
maximum number of licenses and the legal and financial barriers to cancelling 
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The Royal Commission had proposed one further radical change - the 
abolition of six o'clbck closing. The government again decided not to 
implement the recommendation but held instead, in March 1949, a 
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national referendum on the issue. Voters were offered the choice between 
continuing six o'clock closing or for later closing -but with a two hour break 
and later opening hours. By a decisive majority of 473,478 to 158,850 
New Zealanders voted to retain six o'clock but the turnout of voters was 
extremely low with less than half of those eligible actually voting~ For 
many the issue was irrelevant. The Communists and other left-wing 
elements in the labour movement saw the real issue as that of national-. 
2 
isation while liberal critics such as A. R. D. Fairburn viewed later hours 
of closing as simply the chance to spend even a longer time in the same alcoholic 
sty. 3Any fundamental change to the ownership or the conduct of the industry 
had remained in abeyance. Indeed, in the lead- up to the referendum there 
was a notable absence of any publicity supporting later closing. The only 
material that appeared came from the advocates of temperance, the New 
Zealand Alliance who together with several churches campaigned for the 
retention of six o'clock closing. 4 They had been the originators of the 
restriction and it had remained an article of faith that such a provision 
was conducive to their cause. The high profits generated in the one hour 
daily swill, also made it an article of faith to which the liquor trade was 
happy to subscribe. As a result, the trade refrained from taking any part in 
the referendum confident that no change would occur. Young did express 
support for extended hours, but neither the HWF nor any other particular 
group publicly campaigned for later closing. 
5 
In such circumstances the 
turnout of voters and the resu It were less than a surprise. 
The liquor industry had been challenged by these series of events, but with 
the exception of the continuing development of the licensing trusts the 
industry's position remained much as before and the power of the brewery 
companies continued along the high road of profitability. Any radical change 
to the industry's operations would have to wait until a second wave of 
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4. THE UNION, LABOUR AND THE WATERSIDERS 
1949 brought not merely a referendum on six o'clock closing but in 
November the end of the Labour government. While the electoral defeat 
was not large it was in a sense almost a merciful act, terminating a 
government whose last years had been marked by a loss of vision and 
acrimonious debate between the factions of the labour movement. Power, 
ideology and personal ambitions were all contributory factors to the increas-
ing factionalism and tensions that beset the labour movement in the last 
years of the 1940's. This political environment continued after Labour's 
defeat and was significant in shaping the manner in which the 1951 
Waterfront dispute developed, was fought and was ended. 
For its part, the CHWU remained largely outside of the acrimony and 
political machinations that characterised these years. Nevertheless, there were 
some instances where the union was in conflict with others in the trade 
union movement, most notably over some of the more radical public 
pronouncements of the leaders of the Canterbury Trades Council. The CTC'.s 
president, John Roberts and its secretary, ' Archie' Grant, made a number of 
statements on international events and organised activities in support of 
world peace. The CHWU executive saw the public profile adopted by the 
council as inappropriate and were concerned at the seemingly pro-Soviet 
orientation exhibited by the CTC's leaders~ Minor disputes also occurred 
over demarcation and the authority of the trades councils in places such as 
Timaru and Oamaru.2 Yet while minor they did reflect something of the 
antagonistic and uncooperative manner in which trade unionists of varied 
political persuasions conducted their relations with their supposed colleagues 
in the labour movement. 
These conflicts, while indicative of the environment, pale beside the struggle 
between the Waterside Workers' Union and the leadership of the FOL. By 
1950 the intensity of the conflict had reached the point of irreconcilible 
separation. The antagonism reflected fundamental differences in political 
outlook between the radicalism of the watersiders and the more conservative 
position of the FOL leaders, including their approaches towards the arbi-
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with the other controls of the Labour government - and now the new 
National government - were barriers to their path to higher wages, and 
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to the preservation of their pay relativities with others they sought to breech 
such barriers. The conflict with the FOL was further accentuated by the 
intense personal animosities that existed between the watersiders' leadership 
and that of the FOL and the mutual determination to win. For the FOL 
the arbitration system was an accepted part of the country's industrial 
relations while the leadership and attitudes of the watersiders were not. 
Weakening the power of the Waterside Workers Union would decisively 
curb the threat of the left-wing of the labour movement and the personal 
ambitions of 'Jock' Barnes, the watersiders' president, to the incumbent 
leadership of the FOL. Assured of the support of the moderate majority 
of its affiliates, the FOL leadership took a firm, uncompromising line with 
the watersiders that would either lead to their subordination within the 
federation or to their expulsion and isolation. 
The decisive phase in this conflict began in January 1950. The particular 
issues chosen by the FOL on which to act were not vital concerns but 
nevertheless were usefu I for the battle with the watersiders. The first letter 
sent in January by the FOL National Executive to the Waterside Workers 
Union suggested that they cease their membership of the Communist-led 
World Federation of Trade Unions. 1 This would be in accordance with the 
FOL's general policy of dissociation from the WFTU. A second letter 
sought an apology from the WWU for their criticism of the FO L's role in 
the 1949 carpenters' dispute. Predictably, the watersiders refused to do 
either and an ultimatum quickly followed from the FOL to comply or 
face expulsion fro~ the federation~ However, before this could occur 
a number of trade unions intervened on behalf of the WWU to avert 
immediate action. While not necessarily supporters of the views or actions 
of the watersiders they nevertheless regarded the actions of the FOL National 
Executive as extreme, unnecessary and unconstitutional. They succeeded 
in securing a delay in any further action until the FO L's annual conference 








The prospects for the reconciliation of the WWU and the FOL leadership 
were remote. "The position", observed Brooks who attended the conference 
on behalf of the CHWU, "looked hopeless from the start with the speeches 
of both sides containing threats."
1 
The conference passed the National 
Executive's motion calling upon the WWU to withdraw its criticism over 
the 1949 carpenters' dispute within one month. It then became clear to 
many delegates that this would enable the national executive to proceed 
with the expulsion of the watersiders, an action to which many were still 
opposed. An attempt was then made to recommit the motion but this 
failed by a narrow 149 votes to 137. The watersiders together with 60 
delegates from other trade unions thereupon walked from the conference 
hall: Some attempt was made by the secessionists to re-establish unity 
over the next few days but after these moves were rebuffed by the FOL 
the watersiders and their allies proceeded to the creation of a new national 
body, the Trade Union Congress. 
3 
The trade union movement did not divide along clear and unequivocal 
lines between supporting the watersiders or the FOL leadership. Many 
unionists while not agreeing with the political outlook of the watersiders 
nevertheless were critical of the divisive and aggressive approach being 
adopted by the FOL. The HWF and the CHWU both fell into this middle 
group and were faced with the dilemma of which side to support. At the 
April FOL conference, Young the HWF secretary, had also departed from the 
hall and joined the watersiders in their deliberations. The secessionist 
4 
unions elected Young as the provisional chairman of the new TUC. This 
placed Young in a position which directly challenged the FOL and brought 
the onset of a political crisis within the Hotel Workers' Federation. 
Young's alignment with the watersiders had come as a complete and un-
pleasant surprise for his colleagues in the HWF, including Brooks and the 
CHWU.
5 
Officially the HWF were still affiliated to the FOL. Young's 
departure from the conference had occurred without consulting his 
fellow secretaries in the federation and Brooks and the others had re-
mained in their seats. They were surprised, moreover, because the HWF 
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conference, held the previous month, had decided to adopt a neutral 
position in the dispute. The HWF would support only one national trade 
union organisation and would work to reform the FOL from within1. The 
need for change in the FOL was indeed recognised as shown by Young's 
speech to the HWF conference: 
.... the FOL has been no asset.. ... On the contrary 
it had been frequently used against us (with) 
unjust allegations against our union ..... Every 
Conference was taken up with bitter controversies 
between disputing factions ... (with disputes) 
between the National Executive and the Wharfies. 
We should refuse to be parties to a split ... re-
gardless of who was right and wrong ... (it was) 
paramount to preserve a united front against the 
Nationalist Government who would attack if we 
. . 2 
were d1s-un1ted. 
This generally reflected the critical view of the conference but such a stand 
did not entail leaving the FOL. 
Now, in the wake of the events at the FOL conference, Young interpreted 
his actions in associating with the TUC as those of a moderate counsel. 
His intention was to reunite the TUC unions with the FOL but on a new 
3 
basis. A single national body was still his aim. Skilled orator and 
tactician that he was this explanation still failed to allay the fears of his 
colleagues in the HWF including Brooks. 
At the CHWU executive meeting in April, president A. Wilson and executive 
member L. Nielson were particularly angry with Young's actions. By 
"associating with Unions .... under Communist domination", they said, 
Young had "damaged the reputation of the hotel workers': At the next 
meeting, the executive resolved to reaffirm their support for continuing 
membership of the FOL and demanded Young adhere to the policy of the 
HWF's March conference.5 
Pressure began to mount on Young as the WHWU joined Canterbury in 
its criticism and Young decided to call a special conference of the 
1. CHW E Min 24 Apr 1950 
2. HWF Min at CHW E Min 8 May 1950 
3. CHW E Min 22 May 1950 
4. CHW E Min 24 Apr 1950 
5. CHW E Min 8 May 1950 
169 
HWF to explain his position. 1 Again, claiming that his intention was to 
aid in the re-uniting of the trade union movement, Young succeded in 
evading any censure and preserved a qualified freedom of manoeuvre. 
Young was allowed to continue his association with the TUC but was 
forced to accept a deadline of 1 June 1950 by which his involvement must 
cease. Until that time he would attempt to obtain agreement for reunion 
and would not act to widen the already existing division in the trade union 
movement. 2 
On this particular' issue, unlike the conflicts of the past, it was Brooks and 
not Young that possessed the strongest position. Backed by the other 
affiliates of the HWF and free from any organised rank-and-file opposition 
within the CHWU itself, Brooks was first able to confine Young's scope 
of action and ultimately force him to retreat. Young could not look to the 
support of the FOL leadership so that on this issue he was largely alone 
and engaged in a very dangerous game. Why Young choose such a course 
is unclear. Certainly he had not undergone any transformation in his 
political views and acquired a desire to support the Communists and others 
on the left-wing of the labour movement. As with other moderate unionists 
he was dissatisfied with the achievements and tacties of the FOL and may have 
perceived his role in the TUC as an opportunity to construct a powerful· 
opposition to the Walsh leadership of the FOL and force it to compromise 
and perhaps even succumb. Without the dissenting unions within the FOL, 
it would certainly have been impossible to successfully oppose Walsh. 
Given his past ambitions, including candidacy for the presidency of the FOL, 3 
it is possible that Young envisaged a leading role for himself in any 
realignment of power that might result from the reunion of the trade union 
movement. 
As the June deadline approached unity remained a distant prospect. 
Pressure mounted within other unions who had supported the watersiders, 
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Now, with Young's attempts to arrange a unity conference of both sides 
having failed, Brooks moved to enforce the 1 June deadline. A meeting 
of the HWF was called but first Brooks prepared his own political base in 
Canterbury. On 6 Juiqe the CHWU executive met and considered Young's 
continuing work on behalf of the TUC. They resolved to re-affirm their 
support for the FOL and their opposition to Young's activities. 1 Following 
the executive meeting a special general meeting was held that same evening. 
In an animated discussion with 43 members present it resolved to endorse 
the position of the executive and issue a press statement to protect 'the 
union's good name' from allegations of Communist sympathies. 
2 
Seven 
days later the executive called for a special conference of the HWF to seek 
Young's dismissal as the federation's secretary. Despite Young's formidable 
political skills he was unable to resist the pressure from the other members 
of the HWF and he was forced to relinguish his position and end his 
relationship with the TUC. 
3 
With such a retreat, Young was allowed to 
continue as HWF secretary. Resourceful to the end Young gained the 
concession from the conference that while they would remain in the FOL 
he would draft a secret proposal to amend the FOL's constitution. It 
was agreed that their dissatisfaction with the Walsh leadership of the FOL 
would remain 'disguised' while the various hotel workers' unions considered 
4 
changes to the FO L's structure. 
In reality the forces in revolt against the FOL had broken up. The second 
half of 1950 saw the watersiders left increasingly isolated and by the time 
that the waterfront dispute commenced in February 1951 they had few 
allies left. As the conflict between the watersiders and their employers began 
to develop the HWF showed sympathy and support towards the watersiders' 
case. The watersiders' leaders 'Jock' Barnes and 'Toby' Hi II addressed the 
1951 February conference of the HWF on their dispute with the employers. 
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There was a realisation that the struggle for higher wages was a common one 
for all workers, even if the HWF would pursue a more circumspect approach 
in obtaining wage increases for its members. Moreover, the HWF recognised 
the folly for the whole labour movement to allow the National government 
to intervene in the dispute and destroy the WWU, irrespective of the particular 
circumstances of the case.
1 
As the dispute intensified in the early months of 1951 informal contact 
between the HWF and the WWU was maintained. The HWF attempted 
to act as an intermediary between the government and the watersiders. 
Young, in association with the parliamentary leader of the Labour Party, 
Walter Nash, and other Labour Party figures sought in vain to obtain a 
compromise settlement. 2 By the middle of July, with all attempts 
to reach a settlement having failed, the National government had succeeded 
in destroying the watersiders and their union. Several other unions who had 
struck in support of the WWU, such as the Wellington freezing workers and 
Wellington drivers suffered a similar fate. For the government, such a victory 
over the country's strongest and most militant union had been a dream 
which they had hardly thought possible to realise. The divisions within 
the labour movement, the persistence of the watersiders in continuing their 
struggle despite their vulnerable position and the determination of the 
government to exploit the opportunity to defeat the WWU combined to 
ensure the WWU's destruction. 
Few trade unions escaped unscathed from the trauma of 1951. Many 
experienced intense internal conflict between those for or against action 
in support of the watersiders. As the dispute intensified and the prospects 
of victory or even compromise disappeared the di lemma of whether to 
continue support or withdraw became still more actue. Feelings of solidarity 
clashed with those of reason and self-preservation. Some choose to fight 
until the end despite the hopelessness of the situation while others saw 
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The various hotel workers' unions remained outside of the dispute. They 
lacked either the strategic economic position to .influence the battle or 
the necessary commitment and experience amongst the rank-and-file to 
sustain any direct action in support of the watersiders. 
In contrast to the experience of the waterside rs, the period 1949 to 1951 
had brought several positive gains to the hotel workers. Certainly thi!re had 
been the defeat of the Labour government and the threat of voluntary 
unionism proposed by the National Party in its election manifesto. However, 
this had been averted by the FO L's representations to the government which 
had stressed the disasterous effects on the power of the moderate trade 
unions within the union movement. 
1 
For the CHWU its enactment would have 
led to a serious problem in retaining and recruiting members in the tea-
room and private hotel sectors where union organisation and trade union 
consciousness were weak. The more positive events for the CHWU lay in 
securing major gains in the licensed hotel section, first in late 1949 
with penalty rates for weekend work (see section 1 aboJe) and then in the 
next award round in 1951 with further increases in wages for barstaff. 
Thus despite its expressions of dissatisfaction over wages the union was, 
in a relatively short period, able to achieve the advances it desired without 
recourse to industrial action beyond stop- work meetings. Despite the apparent 
darkness of the defeat of the watersiders the experiences of many other 
unions including the CHWU was of modest success. Thus while the waterfront 
dispute was the most dramatic event in post-war labour .history it was but 
one part of a picture which had light as well as dark features; that 
showed success as well as martyrdom and defeat. 
5. WAGE CONFLICT IN THE LICENSED HOTELS 
< 
The awards covered by the CHWU had all received the 5% interim General 
Wage Order of 1950, and in the following year the Arbitration Court's 
full order of 15% - from which the interim ff/o was deducted. These increases 
applied to the cash wage, board and lodging allowances and to uniform 
expenses, and the overall effect was to adjust real wages by slightly less 
than the movement in prices. 
1 . Bassett p206; n46 p223 
THE COOKS 
In the licensed hotels males held the senior cooking position . s 
in the kitchens. In tearooms, private hotels and hospitals 
all grades in the kitchen were normally staffed by women. 
In the licensed hotels kitchenstaff had a long established 
right to equal pay for equal work; in the rest of the industry 
women were paid less for the same job. As the most ' 
skilled section of the union's members the cooks earned 
the highest rates of pay and were among the more active 
in union affairs. In theyears 1936 to 1970 they provided 
four of the CHWU's five presidents - Wilson, Nielsen, 
Tremaine and Dyer. 
(Alexander Turnball Library) 

The key change in this period for the CHWU was in the licensed hotels 
where a special service allowance was introduced in 1951 for barstaff.1 
After completing 12 months continuous service with the same employer 
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at the same establishment, a bartender now received an extra payment of 
10/- per week, representing an effective increase of 6% on the full weekly 
wage of £8 10/8d. Such an allowance avoided the relativity constraints 
of the Arbitration Court over the weekly wage for semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers. With the majority of barstaff eligible to receive the payment 
they had made a significant gain in their wages relative to other workers 
in the licensed hotel and other workers generally. Moreover, with the 
principle of a 12 months service allowance established in the industry, 
the union .could, and did, claim for its extension to other licensed hotel 
workers. It was not until 1960 however that this was finally achieved. 
Besides the service allowance the 1951 award negotiation had also secured 
a three weeks annual holiday for all licensed hotel staff after five years 
service. 
2
0btaining these two gains had entailed several months of concili-
ation talks with the employers. The issues were resolved however without 
the necessity for any direct action nor recourse to the Arbitration Court. 
Such a pattern of direct negotiation, with the court playing an essentially 
passive role, became the characteristic feature of the union's award rounds 
in the 1950's. 
After the union successES in the 1951 negotiations, a counter-offensive was mounted 
by the licensed hotel employers (the LVA) in 1952. The LVA proposed 
that the 10/- service allowance for barstaff be removed together with all 
the permit requirements restricting the. use of part-time barmen and cleaners. 3 
While these were the LVA's official claims it soon became clear to the HWF 
that the originators and motive force for the proposals lay with the two 
major breweries - New Zealand and Dominion - and the secretary of the 
4 
Auckland LVA. Understandably the CHWU along with the other affiliates 
of the HWF were alarmed by the employers' attack, as the unions had 
intended to lodge claims for a further weekly wa~e rise for all workers to 
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The response of the HWF to the employers was to hold stop-work meetings in 
Auckland and Wellington and to hold private discussions with the management 
1 
of Dominion and New Zealand Breweries. The stop-work meetings rejected 
the employers' claims, expressing disbelief that the ordinary members of the 
2 
LVA were responsible for such propositions. Workers were asked to contact 
their own employers about the claims and their subsequent responses indicated 
that most were either unaware of, or did not support, the LVA's position. 
After these preliminary skirmishes, the HWF and LVA met in conciliation 
in Apri I 1953. The assessors for the LVA were predominately from the 
three largest breweries, Dominion, New Zealand and Ballins, while on the 
unions' side the HWF had appointed the vice-president of the FOL F. P. 
Walsh as its advocate. No agreement was reached and the meeting was 
3 
adjourned. 
The HWF now moved to strengthen its negotiating position by initiating 
the selective boycott of brewery owned hotels in Auckland and Wellington 
by trade unionists. Action was postponed however until the parties met 
again in conciliation on 28 May. The employers and in particular the major 
breweries had modified their position and were willing to accept the 
existing wages and conditions and in addition offer a rise of 5/- per week 
for all workers effective from 1 June 1953, with a further increase of 5/-
to be considered in the light of any General Wage Order from the Arbitration 
Court. 4 
This new offer represented a considerable movement by the L VA from its 
original position, which had been influenced by union pressure even though 
up until this point such pressure had not as yet reached the stage of 
direct industrial action. However, from the perspective of the HWF the new 
offer simply returned the negotiations to a realistic basis eliminating any 
question of a wage cut. The new offer was still unacceptable and the 
conflict now shifted to the size and date of a wage increase instead of 
l(Y.hether any increase would even occur. To press their case for a higher 
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meetings were held in Auckland and Wellington and a strategy of on-the-
job agitation was adopted as the means of achieving its goal. Selected hotels 
would again be boycotted but this time hotel barstaff would institute 
work practices designed to lower sales and profits. 
1 
For instance, each 
drinker would be closely scrutinized to ensure that they were over the legal 
drinking age of 21, a practice that would slow service and hence sales. The 
nine ounce beer handles would be filled to the brim by barstaff who would 
also refuse to engage in any of the highly profitable, if illegal practices 
of after-hours trading. The unions would not issue any further part-time 
permits for barstaff ;and part-time workers, who were generally employed 
in the peak trading period of 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. would be asked to withdraw 
their labour. If they did not, then the full-time barstaff would refuse to 
work alongside any part-timers. Such tactics struck at the ability of the 
hotels to sell their prcduct without generally affecting the wages of the 
workers. As a further measure a. fighting fund was established, funded by 
voluntary donations to pay for the pickets to be posted at boycotted hotels~ 
From 10 to 24 June these tactics were employed in Auckland and 
Wellington with mixed success. In Auckland the union distributed 26,000 
pamphlets explaining their case to the public,while the employers attempted 
to reduce the pressure on their hotels by shifting beer supplies between 
them. The employers' resistence was apparently strengthened by rumours 
that the government would be opposed to any increase in beer prices if 
the employers accepted a 10/- wage rise. The government denied such a 
suggestion. 3 
With continuing opposition to a higher wage offer coming from the employers 
in the South Island, the southern affiliates of the HWF wer.e requested to take 
some direct action to place pressure on their local employers. In Canterbury, 
the CHWU executive was reluctant to act. Brooks believed that it was 
difficult to obtain support in Christchurch as many staff were experienced and 
were paid above the award rates, and a substantial proportion of the city's 
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Other members of the executive expressed similarly pessimistic views, 
stating that workers in Canterbury wou Id accept the employers' last offer 
of a 5/- increase. Nevertheless, the executive decided to call a special meeting 
of the federation to be held in Christchurch, which would be able to hear 
the latest report on the situation and generate publicity for the union's 
wage claims. 
On 30 June 1953 the special conference was held and it was resolved that 
the Taranaki and South Island unions should take some form of direct 
action, although it left the specific measures to the discretion of each 
executive.2The FOL was requested to consider obtaining the assistance of 
the brewery workers and brewery drivers while affiliated unions of the 
HWF would approach individual hotel licensee; to seek a full 10/- wage 
increase. The CHWU obtained the support of watersiders and seamen at 
Lyttelton and initiated selected boycotts of hotels in the port while 
plans were also made for action on the West Coast.3These were modest 
steps but the threat of further industrial action and the determination of 
the unions to persist in their campaign was sufficient to alarm the employers. 
By 6 July the LVA was prepared to offer an immediate increase of 5/-
per week with no qualification as to any future wage order that might 
be issued by the Arbitration Court nor the term of the award. In Young's 
view, the threat of action being expanded in the South Island had been 
a 'material assistance in bringing the Dispute to a final settlement'. 4 
Meetings of workers in Auckland and Wellington voted for the acceptance 
of the offer and the L VA and HWF reached formal agreement. 5 
This rise was a reward for the persistence of the HWF and it completed 
the series of gains that the unions had made in the licensed hotels since the 
end of World War Two. While weekly wages had largely maintained their real 
4. 
5. 
CHW E Min 22 Jun 1953 
CHW E Min 6 Jul 1953 
CHW E Min 27 Jul 1953; Federation circular op cit for 
West Coast. 
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value the introduction of penalty rates, changes to holiday pay, and the 
new service allowance had all boosted real earnings for licensed hotel workers. 
As Table 4.1 indicates the wages earned by barstaff rose particularly signifi-
cantly and as a bonus all licensed hotel staff had an expanded entitlement 
to annual and special holidays. 
TABLE 4.1 LICENSED HOTEL AWARD, 1945 TO 1954 
Item 1945 1949 1951 1954(Nov) 
Annual holidays 2 wks 2 wks 2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs 2 wks; 3 after 
service 5 yrs service 
1 
7 (TY:.) Special holidays 9 (DT) 9 (DT) 9 (DT) 
Saturday/Sunday Sat TY, 
Sun 6/- or 3/-2 
Both TY. Both TY:. 
Weekly Wages £ £ £ £ 
Chef 10+hk 7-1 9-19/10 12-3/11 13-19/7 
Chef 6hk 6-5/3 7-18/2 9-16 11-11 /9 
2nd cook 4hk 4-0 5-9/11 7-0/6 8-10 
Kitchen hand 3-10 5-3/8 6-16/11 8-6 
Waitress or maid 2-6/6 3-11 /2 4-12 5-12/5 
Barman 4-5 5-15/5 7-6/10 to 7-18/43 8-17 /2 to 9-10/2
3 
4 
Add board & lodging 1-10 1-13 1-18 2-2/11 
Wages : Casual per weekday 5 
Chef 
Barman 
1 to 1-10 
1-5s 
1-10 to 2-0/11 
1-15/5 
1-17/4 to 2-9/10 
2-3/7 
2-4 to 2-18/9 
2-11/4 
Waitress (single meal) 8/6 8/6 1 5/6 19s1d 







If worked, payment at time-and-a-half or double-time 
Plus 6/- per day males and kitchenworkers ;3/- other females. 
Higher figure includes service allowance payable after 12 months service with the same 
-employer which was effectively an increase in wage rates. 
Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid. 
First 3 days only thereafter at ordinary rate in 1945 and 1949. Every weekday in 1951 
and 1954. 
DISSENT IN THE UNION 
A period of internal quiescence had followed the defeat of the opposition 
group in the 1949 executive election. However, in 1954 the opposition 
reemerged with essentially the same personalities including Noel Smith of 
the Communist Party. Once again the group was a heterogenous collection 
of Communists and independent critics and again at the centre of the 
debate was the union's alleged inactivity and the deficiencies in its 
meeting and electoral procedures. The opposition had two objectives: 
first to contest and win the 1955 elections for the executive; and second 
... 
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to amend the union's rules. Specifically, they wanted to improve the publicity 
for the union's general meetings, improve the opportunity for members to 
stand for the executive and transform the position of secretary from that 
of a permanent appointment to one requiring regular election. The last 
proposal together with the contesting of the executive elections posed a 
clear challenge to Brooks as secretary and the incumbent executive. 
It was ironic that the challenge now being mounted was against an executive 
that had changed significantly in its personal composition since the first 
conflicts with the opposition group in 1947. With the resignation of president 
Andrew Wilson in 1952 only four of the nine members of the executive had 
held office prior to 1947. 1 The group that had been associated with Brooks 
since the early 1930's had been replaced by a more diverse executive. 
Amongst the new members was Colin Mccready, one of Brooks' critics 
in the late 1940's, who had been appointed to a casual vacancy by the 
executive in 1952. 2 A young chef at the United Service Hotel he belonged 
to a new generation which looked to the problems of the future rather than to 
the triumphs and conflicts of the past which still seemed to shape Brook's 
outlook. One sign of the changing times on the executive was the disagreement 
between Brooks and McCready in early 1955 on the union's relations with 
HWF secretary, F. Young. Brooks had drafted a letter to Young criticising 
the federation's work and recalling several of the past points of disagreement 
between the CHWU and the HWF. McCready and president 'Lou' Nielsen 
opposed Brooks and successfully insisted that several of the issues contained 
in the letter be deleted. 3 As Mccready put it "it was time that we stopped 
arguing over things in the past .... not getting [us]anywhere .... He would not 
support sending the letter until he had read the letter and the minutes 
himself." 4 What was significant was that Brooks' judgement was openly 
challenged and his views, which on the HWF as well as on industrial issues 
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For the 1955 executive elections the opposition submitted a complete list 
of candidates. The executive was surprised and early in March discussed 
the issue and decided to make certain concessions to the opposition. 
While the cost, some £250, was cited as a factor in not wishing to contest 
a postal ballot, the primary purpose of the concessions was to avert any 
1 
potential takeover by the opposition group. F. Gerard, an elderly long 
serving member of the executive together with the president Lou Nielsen 
agreed to forfeit the dual positions they held as both trustees and as 
executive members. In addition Mrs Keats, who was in poor health and now 
indeed a small employer, would be requested to resign. As a result of these 
steps three vacancies would be created on the executive which would be 
offered to the opposition group at the Annual General Meeting.2 Before 
this the executive he Id a further discussion of the situation on 28 April 
and on this occasion McCready questioned the continu.ing membership of 
three executive members. 
3 
F. Gerard, Mrs Webster and Mrs Donaldson, 
the first two of whom had been on the executive prior to 1947, had all 
ceased to work in the industry or to be financial members of the union. 
'If questions were asked at the AG M' suggested Mccready 'then the rest of 
the executive could be embarrassed.' 
4
Mrs Webster replied that she 'knew 
5 
a great deal about the industry and was intensely interested' and for the 
moment the matter rested. 
In March 1955 the union held its Annual General Meeting. With 80 members 
present the meeting witnessed a vigorous challenge by the opposition group. 6 
They first unsuccessfully attempted to have the union's balance sheet 
printed and distributed to all members. Brooks defended the existing 
arrangement of limiting access to those members in attendance at the 
general meeting or those who choose to visit the union office where they 
could also see a copy. However, the opposition had more success on the 
question of who would be the returning officer for the forthcoming executive 
1. CHW E Min 14 Mar 1955 
2. Ibid 
3. CHW E Min 28 Apr 1955 
4. Ibid 
5. Ibid 
6. CHW Min 28 Mar 1955 
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elections. The executive had appointed Tom Martin of the Seamens' 
Union--a long time associate of Brooks-ils the returning officer but this was 
rejected by the meeting who recommended instead that a neutral official 
from the Labour department conduct the elections.1 While the powerto make 
the decision was entirely in the hands of the executive, they decided to 
follow this recommendation~ 
With the opposition having rejected the offer of three seats on the executive 
the postal election had proceeded. Before it could be completed, however, 
two factors intervened to force its abandonment. Firstly, the opposition 
alleged that by marking on the circular to members the names of the 
incumbent members of the executive, the executive had attempted to 
influence the ballot. 3 It was the second factor, though, which proved to be 
decisive. As four of the incumbent members of the executive standing for 
re-election were no longer financial members of the union, the returning 
officer ruled them ineligible and the ballot void. 4 Brooks consulted Young 
on the problem but it was clear that the ruling was legally correct. 
5 
Following the advice of the returning officer the executive called a special 
meeting of the union to cancel the ballot and reopen nominations.
6 
There was 
disagreement with the opposition over whether the ballot should be for all 
the executive positions or only, as the opposition wanted, for a limited 
number. After a long discussion the meeting agreed to a full new ballot 
being conducted. 
7 
In August 1955 the executive election finally took place. With several 
incumbent members no longer eligible a number of new candidates appeared 
outside of the opposition group, several of whom had been encouraged to 
stand by the executive. The election saw the defeat of all the opposition 
candidates except for one non-Communist, B. Franklin.8 Politically, the 
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to the conciliation and arbitration system. Nevertheless ,the personal 
composition of the executive had undergone a further change which 
marked the final stages of its break with the personal associations 
and values of the 1930's. Now only the president 'Lou' Nielsen had 
been a member of the executive prior to 194 7, out of a total executive 
membership of 12, six of whom were members for the first time. 1 
In the course of the turmoil over the elections Brooks had been increas-
ingly absent from the conduct of the union's affairs. The union's day-to-day 
operations rested with Les Short, the assistant secretary since 1954, 
president Lou Nielsen and the office manager Miss Humm. 2 Brooks 
now aged 71 was in poor physical health and his condition had been 
exacerbated by the psychological stress of recent events. In June 1955 
he tendered his resignation as secretary of the union, trusting the respon-
sibility for defending the union against the opposition to Short and Nielsen. 
3 
Before the election result of August 1955, the opposition had taken the 
initiative in June on its second objective, the amending of the union's 
constitution. On 13 June a petition was delivered to the executive 
containing the constitutional amendments, the most impor~ant of which were 
the proposals for a biennial election for the office of secretary and a 
mandatory circular to members notifying them of the opening of nominations 
for the executive elections. 
4 
On 14 June, with 35 members attending, the 
general meeting considered the constitutional changes. However, the majority 
felt that the instability introduced by a biennial election for the secretary-
ship was likely to undermine the union's effectiveness and along with the 
other proposals the amendment was decisively rejected by the meeting. 5 
Throughout the conflict with the opposition there had been two dimensions 
to the criticism of the union's management. The Communists disliked the 
union's arbitrationist approach and the emphasis on professional officials, 
such as Brooks, to perform the union's work. As George Finlayson, one 
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the National Union of Railwaymen - put it, they disliked the 'fancy 
filing and record systems' 1 and preferred direct action by the ordinary 
workers. For the Communists the proposed reforms to the constitution 
sought to produce both a more radical, rank-and-file controlled union 
and the elimination of procedural deficiences. The independent critics in 
the opposition were primarily concerned with creating fair and democratic 
procedures,rather than producing a more radical union. Short, who was 
acting as secretary for the June general meeting in Brooks absence, was 
prepared to cooperate with the opposition in removing the short-comings 
in the union's procedures but without surrendering control of the CHWU 
to the opposition group. Unlike the personal animosities that had developed 
between Brooks and his critics, Short was able to reassure the opposition 
that he was open to suggestions of reform. He indicated his support for the 
principle of a regularly elected secretary but preferred that the term be longer 
than only two years. Short further suggested that a committee be formed 
to consider the procedural changes to the constitutiorf. As no notice of 
such a proposal had been given, unanimity was required and this was not 
obtained. However, Short called a further general meeting the following week 
and a committee was then formed comprising Noel Smith and B. Franklin 
from the opposition and four union officials.
3 
The committee presented a final report in December 1955 which was 
ratified by the union's general meeting~ The reports recommendations 
satisfied the main criticisms made by the opposition group over the union's 
procedures. On the crucial issue of the secretaryship the committee 
recommended that henceforth a four-yearly election should be held by 
postal ballot. From now on the opening of nominations for the executive 
would be publicised in a circular sent to each workplace three weeks prior 
to the Annual General Meeting. Casual vacancies would also require an . 
election by ballot and the executive would only retain its traditional power 
to make an appointment where the vacancy arose within six months of a 
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union's name by including 'hospital' in the title to reflect the large number 
of workers in this sector under the union's coverage. Henceforth the union 
would be officially known as 'The Canterbury Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant 
and Related Trades 1.U.W.' 
1 
All these recommendations were incorporated 
into the union's constitution and came into effect from the beginning of 
1956. 
2 
The conflict with the opposition had once again seen the electoral defeat of 
their candidates - except for B. Franklin. On this occasion, however, several 
reforms had been made which largely met their demands. Nevertheless, control 
of the union remained in the hands of Labour Party supporters and while the 
personalities of the executive had changed the power of the executive 
compared to rank-and-file members, remained virtually intact. There was a 
postscript to the saga of dissent. The new constitutional provision for an 
elected secretary enjoyed but one brief trial, with Short decisively defeating 
the Communist candidate. In 1957, executive member and union organiser 
Murray Rhodes successfully persuaded the union's general meeting to delete 
the elective provision and return once more to a permanent appointment.3 
Short and others on the executive remained neutral towards the change and 
with no appearance at the meeting by the Communists, Rhodes' amendment 
was passed. Thus, the opposition were ultimately thwarted in one of their 
central demands. 
7. THE END OF THE BROOKS ERA 
With his resignation in June 1955, Reg Brooks had ended his 36 years of 
leadership of the CHWU and a chapter in its history. The combination of age, 
deteriorating health and the turmoil of recent events in the union had forced 
Brooks to depart. He left, however, satisfied that his assistant secretary, 
Les Short, would prove an able and honest successor. Since his appointment 
first as the union's organiser in September 1953; Short had demonstrated 
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daily rounds of workplace visits and had then gained experience in award 
negotiations as a member of the HW F group of assessors in 1954. 
1 
Now 
finally he had been tested in the fire of internal dissent and along with 
the union survived intact. 
Brooks left to his successors both a viable organisation and a number of 
achievements in the wages and conditions of the workers he had represented 
for more than three decades. In the last ten years since the war, the wages 
and conditions of the CHWU's members had continued to move forward, 
albeit at times more slowly and modestly than many might have desired. 
Nevertheless, a real gain in incomes had been obtained for most of the 
union's members in the course of the period from 1945 to 1955. As with the 
wider labour movement the union's members shared in the growing prosperity 
of the New Zealand economy but the relative gains by labour were less 
than those made by the business and farming sectors of the econom/ A 
period of labour shortages which continued to be a feature of the economy 
did aid the union's case for raising wages. As to the comparability between 
the union's sections, Table 4.2 shows the decisive margin held by the workers 
in the licensed hotels. While all had made some real gains in wages the 
introduction of penalty rates and the service allowance in the case of the barmen 
had increased the gap between this section and other sectors. The most 
significant development for those workers in the post war decade had been 
in the lowering of their ordinary weekly hours from 44 to 40. 
As to the union organisation, the end of Brooks' secretaryship had left 
the union financially strong and with a large and still growing membership. 
In the ten years since the war's end the CHWU had expanded by 703 
members to reach a total membership of 2713 by the end of 1955. 3 
Similarly its annual income and nett assets had more than doubled in the 
4 
same period to reach respectively £7868 per annum and £ 15,026. The 
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Wages : Weekly 2 
(inc b & ll 2 
1st cook 4hk 
2nd cook 4hk 
Kitchen hand 
Waitress or maid 
Barman/Steward 
Porter/Orderly 
Wages : Casua1 6 
1st Cook7 
Waitress (single meal) 8 
Licensed Hotels 
2 weeks; 3 after 5 years 
9 (OT) 
Both TY:. 







2-2/3 to 2-16/1 
18s 4d 
Notes (see Note on Tables) 
















2 weeks; 3 after 10 
years 
7 (TY,) 2 (OT) 9 (OT) 
















Public Hospitals Private Hospitals 
2 weeks 2 weeks 
9 (OT) 9 (OT) 
Sun OT Sun OT 
F F 
10-2/lf 10-2/6 5 
9-8/10 9-8/10 
7-9/6 7-9/6 
7-1 /1 7-1/1 
9-18/0(M) 9-18/0(M) 
+20% +20% 
1~ All rates as at Nov 1954 including 13% GWO of Oct 1954 except Tearooms Feb 1955. Chartered Clubs rate based on 1952 award still current 
and adjusted by GWOs. 
2. Wage rates include cash value of board and lodgings 
·3. Includes service allowance of 13s (11s 6d + GWO) 
4. Rates for stewards serving alcohol for more than 20 hours per week 
5. Rate for 1st and 2nd cooks in kitchens with subsistence of 201-300 meals 
6. Each weekday for five days in LH but for Private Hotels, and Tearooms 1st 3 days only, thereafter the pro-rata of the ordinary rate. Higher 
weekend rates in LH. 
7. Lower rate for less than 3hk; higher 3hk plus 





The accumulation of a substantial cash reserve had led the executive as 
early as 1946 to purchase an office building for the union in the form of 
a two-storey building in Ferry Road~ At a cost of £2600 the building 
was intended to provide a secure investment for the union as well as 
office facilities. However, no actual transfer of the unions office occurred 
and when the union sold the Ferry Road building in 1951, it continued 
to operate from its rented rooms in Manchester Street. 
2 
The only 
other important financial development in the period was the increase in 
the unions fees from their 1945 level of 6d per week to 1/- by 1953. 3 
This together with the rising membership and austere financial management 
assurred the union's continuing accumulation of funds. 
The largest deficiency in the union's operation was in the low level of 
membership activity. In the licensed hotel dispute in 1953 this weakness 
had been most recently evident. The union leadership had made no serious 
attempt to lead, involve and organise its members and although many 
unions in the arbitration tradition suffered from such a problem, both 
the Auckland and Wellington unions had demonstrated on this occassion 
that a higher level of activity at the workplace was possible. Brooks was 
reluctant to rectify this with more workplace contact. 
Nevertheless Brooks had succeeded in charting the union vessel through 
three turbulent decades including the storms of the depression. Friends 
and critics alike acknowledged his ability, commitment and integrity. The 
commitment of the union had dominated his life and he was to die only 
a year after his resignation. His relations with the union in these last 
months were not entirely pleasant as Brooks had expected some form of 
pension from the union for his services. He bitterly rejected the union's 
offer of a gift in the form of an arm-chair, and the subsequent offer of 
£ 1.10 per week for the rest of his life. 4 Neither the executive or the general 
meeting were prepared to make any substantial on-going payment 
especially in the light of the recent dissension within the union. When 
Brooks suffered a fatal stroke in 1956, an obituary appeared in the "Standard" 
,vr 
praising Brooks for his honesty and hard work for the CHWU and the Labour 
5 
government. 
1. CHW E Min 13 Aug 1946 p54; AR 1946-7 
2. CHW E Min 15 Jan 1952 
3. CHW E Min 27 Jul 1953 
4. CHW Min 13 Sep 1955 
5. Standard 25 Jul 1956 p20 
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With the passing of Brooks a decisive phase in the union's history 
had ended. A phase in which the union had been rebuilt, 
achieved significant gains for its members and entered into a close 
alliance with the labour movement. Now in 1956 the union had a new 
secretary, a largely new and younger executive, a new name, and the new 
challenges of a different era to face. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AMITY AND AFFLUENCE, 1956 TO 1969 
The years 1956 to 1969 brought a period of economic prosperity to 
New Zealand and its people. The standard of living rose, unemployment 
virtually disappeared and many New Zealand industries expanded and 
modernised. These changes occurred in a period of relative tranquility 
in politics and in industrial relations. It was not until the last years of 
the 1960's that New Zealand again experienced significant industrial 
conflict between workers and their employers. 
These dominant tendencies of prosperity, modernisation and industrial 
peace, also marked the experience of the hotel, hospital and restaurant 
workers in these decades. The hotel industry witnessed radical change in 
its operation,,first with the 1962 Sale of Liquor Act and then with the 
introduction in 1967 of 10 o'clock closing; while the rise of the motor 
hotel largely supplainted the traditional type of private hotel. It was in 
the areas of the restaurants, clubs and hospitals that the largest expansion 
took place. In particular the number of food outlets, diverse in their 
variety, proliferated, reflecting the growth in population, in national prosperity 
and the growing trend to eat away from home. For the union, the period 
also brought a modest advance in the prosperity of its members and the union's 
organisation - advances achieved largely free from either industrial or 
internal strife. There was, however, the growing challenge for the union 
of labour casualisation. Despite some successes by the CHWU in slowing 
its development and in ensuring that adequate wages were paid for part-time 
and casual workers, the tendency for employers to casualise the industry's 
workforce continued to increase between 1956 and 1969. With the onset 
of the 1970's this process rapidly accelerated leading to a further decline 
in regular full-time employment, with the majority of the industry's workers 
becoming part-time or casual employees. 
The last years of the 1960's also witnessed a change from the previously 
tranquil nature of industrial relations. Parallel with developments in the 
wider labour movement, the CHWU became involved in a greater degree of 
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industrial conflict. Sparked by the introduction of 10 o'clock closing the 
union initiated strike action in 1967 and in the course of the next two 
years the union became more active by expanding its coverage to include 
domestic workers in rest homes and, following the AHWU, the Air New 
Zealand Flight Kitchen. By 1970 the level of industrial conflict in New 
Zealand industry was substantially above that for the period from 1952 to 
1969, and the conflict would further intensify in the early 1970's in both 
the hotel and restaurant industry and throughout the New Zealand economy. 
1. THE NEW FACE OF THE INDUSTRY 
In the early 1960's the hotel and restaurant industry underwent a series of 
changes that marked its entry into the modern era. With changes to the 
licensing laws in 1961 and again in 1962, the first fresh winds of change 
began to disperse the dust and cobwebs that had gathered around the 
licensed trade's operations since World War One. At the same time, the 
old inner city private hotels largely gave way to the new motor hotel and 
the city's landscape became dotted with new tearooms and quick-lunch 
outlets. For the staff of the hotels change also came to the training of 
workers, with the creation of a chef training scheme that formed an import-
ant part of a concerted campaign to raise the status and quality of the catering 
industry and its workers. 
The promise of licensing reform, contained in the report of the 1946 Royal 
Commission had failed to eventuate in the 1950's. In 1959 a fresh initiative 
emerged. In a new attempt to overcome the increasingly antiquated I icens-
ing laws and liquor facilities parliament established a select committee to 
examine the situation. Its report led first, to the Licensing Amendment 
Act of 1961 1 and then to the 1962 Sale of Liquor Act.
2 
These two 
measures inaugurated the beginning of a new look for the industry. Chief 
among the initial reforms was the commencement of a comprehensive 
review by the Licensing Control Commission of all those establishments 
operating a liquor license. 3 Existing licences became provisional and in 
the course of the next six years the Commission visited the hundreds of 
2 
3 
Licensing Amendment Act (NZ Statutes No. 135 1961) p2013 
Sale of Liquor Act (NZ Statutes No. 139 1962) p1101 
Licensing Arndt Act op cit, for the CHWU's attitude to reform 
see CHW Min 11Jul1960 
PARK AVENUE MOTEL, CHRISTCHURCH 
The phenomena of the motor hotel, or motel, as 
it became known, reached New Zealand in the late 
1950's. Growth was rapid and within a few years 
the motel was the dominant type of private hotel. 
Normally providing accommodation alone, the motel 
usually employed only one or two female domestic 
workers, and this sector remained an area of low pay 
and weak in trade union consciousness. 
(G. Patterson) 
:, ·--· . ;_~. :, \' ,· .. 
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hotels throughout the country, examining their location and the standard 
of their service. A permanent licence was issued by the Commission only 
when the hotel complied with its requirements. The investigations revealed 
numerous sub-standard facilities which frequently had 'non-existent 
accommodation services', despite their legal obligations to provide such 
a service.
1 
Now, under the new 1961 Act, a hotel was no longer legally 
required to provide accommodation and the Commission could issue a 
separate tavern-only licence. The 1962 Sale of Liquor Act further aided 
in this modernisation by providing for two distinct licences, one for the 
premises and the other for the individual publican. This enabled action 
to be taken by the various authorities against a reprobate hotelkeeper 
without removing the community's liquor facility, a consequence which 
had restricted the Commission's work in the 1950's. The third important 
change to the liquor trade came in 1960 with the licensing of restaurants 
to provide liquor, although initially this was limited to a total of ten 
licences for all of New Zealand. By March 1966 the number had risen to 
44, including seven in Christchurch.2 
While these steps towards modernisation were taking place in the licensed 
hotel sector, the face of the private hotels had undergone a radical transformation. 
The steady decline in the old style of private hotels since the end of 
World War Two had culminated in the late 1950's with the emergence 
of the motor hotel or motel in their stead. The traditional private hotel 
provided low priced accommodation and meals, but without 
liquor sales they were never a particularly profitable activity. Patronage 
of the private hotels declined in the post-war period and the owners generally 
lacked the desire or the resources, or the prospect of a viable return on 
their investment, to upgrade or modernise their hotels. Located in the inner 
city with poor vehicle access the facilities generally became rundown. In 
their place arose the phenomenon of the motel which was already established 
in the United States of America and Australia. These modern facilities 
with self-contained units were orientated towards the new and growing 
·"' market of the car travelling guest. From the perspective of management, 
motels avoided the costs associated with providing any food service and 
2 
For reports on the progress of the Commission see AJHR H3 
(1955 to 1971) 
AJHR 2 H3 (1966) p15 
... 
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required only a minimal number of staff besides the owner-manager to 
service the rooms. While the CHWU maintained its coverage of the part-
time workers that remained organising the workers remained difficult and 
they continued to follow behind the wage movements of the licensed hotels. 
Meanwhile the tearoom sector had undergone a rapid expansion, reflecting 
the growth in population. and in its affluence but also a change in life-
styles towards more eating out. The predominant growth was in daytime 
tearooms providing lunches and afternoon teas supplemented by increases 
in the number of take-away food outlets. These operations were 
generally small-scale and operated by a private individual or a family 
rather than by any large company. Although several department 
stores did operate tearooms, the development of food outlets under 
the control of large businesses, in the form of multi-nationals such as 
Kentucky Fried Chicken, 1 did not occur until the late 1960's and 
it was not until the following decade that this new form became a firm 
feature of the cityscape. Similarly, from the late 1960's onwards 
licensed restaurants and other facilities orientated towards evening meals 
rapidly grew adding yet another dimension to the industry. 
The last of the significant developments in the hotel and restaurant 
industry was in the field of staff training. Until the late 1950's no 
formal system of training existed for cooks or other catering staff 
and skills were acquired either on the job, in the home, or through 
previous experience as cooks on ships. Aside from a small section 
of licensed hotels and restaurants in the upper end of the market, 
there was no requirement for the production of a sophisticated cuisine. 
In most establishments the meals were relatively basic and of a limited 
variety. The training scheme that was developed in the late 1950's for 
cooks was directed largely towards that upper end of the market. 
Jointly owned by the New Zealand food company 
Watties and the American company Kentucky Fried 
Chicken. 
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Together with several Auckland chefs, Young, the secretary of the 
HWF, inaugurated a trial training scheme in 1957. 1 In the course of 
the 1960's the number of cooks undergoing training continued to 
rise and by the decades end, after considerable difficulties, training 
schemes had been established in several technical institutes. Christ-
church did not establish its polytechnic scheme, however, until 1972. 
Parallel with the development of training, the HWF and the CHWU 
had supported a general effort to raise the professional standard and 
status of cooking. The unions had played a key role in the late 
1950's in forming a National Chefs Association which aimed to raise 
the status of the catering trade and the occupation, promote training 
and improve the wages and conditions of chefs. 
2 
Their activities 
were intended to supplement the work of the union and indeed the 
leadership of the association lay with key union officials. George 
Armstrong, the assistant secretary of the AHWU, became the national 
secretary of the association while in Canterbury, Les Short undertook 
the job of the lo~al secretary with Lou Nielsen, the CHWU president, 
acting as the local association's vice-president. 3 In addition to the support 
of the Chefs Association the union became involved in the Food and 
Cookery Association, which also aimed to promote the catering industry 
and in loca I competitions that provided a testing arena for the ski I ls 
of chefs~ 
Taken together these four changes, in the licensed hotels, private 
hotels, tearooms and in staff training, led to the reshaping of the 
industry to rreet the changes in life styles and rise in prosperity. By 1969 
the industry was significantly different in its character from that of 
the post-war era, and would experience 
in the 1970's. 
even more radical changes 




See FL 1 no 18 1968 p15. Young had raised the issue 
earlier in 1946 see CHW E Min 22 Jul 1946 
CHW E Min 14 Oct 1957 
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While the industry was undergoing these changes, the dominant place 
held by full-time workers was also beginning to be eroded. Increasingly 
employers were hiring regular part-time workers or casual staff to meet 
particular daily, weekly or seasonal needs. There had, of course, always 
been an element of casualisation present in the industry reflecting the 
variations in work requirements, especially for workers such as waitresses. 
Nor indeed did the changes in the 1960's establish casual labour as the 
dominant form in the industry. That radical change would have to 
await the decade of the 1970's. In the meantime while the movement 
towards such a position was accelerating, the majority of employees 
in hotels and restaurants continued to be full-time. Where casuals 
were introduced, they were usually in the expanding sections of the 
trade, such as evening bar-work (following the introduction of 10 o'clock 
closing in 1967), licensed restaurants and tearooms. As the industry 
as a whole expanded, both full-time and casual numbers grew, but the 
relative proportion of casuals increased. 
Nevertheless, the significant feature of New Zealand's hotels and restaurants 
was that regular full-time employment had remained so dominant for 
so long. Such a feature distinguished the New Zealand industry from 
its international counterparts where casualisation had assumed a major 
role at an early stage and where many workers consequently lacked 
the security or income of regular employment. To explain why this 
was a common international experience is to identify certain funda-
mental features of the industry's operations. To understand the second 
issue, why the New Zealand experience was distinct, requires an examination 
of the roles played in the industry's history by prohibition and compulsory 
unionism. 
The hotel and catering industry is an industry of peaks and lows in 
work requirements. At certain points in the day large numbers of 
fr 
staff are required to serve a meal and to clean away afterwards. 
Similarly, the requirements for kitchenstaff, barstaff, serving and 
cleaning staff vary between different times in the day, the days in 
a week and the period of the year. In a highly labour intensive 
industry maximising the efficient use of labour is central to the 
profitability of the employers. To ensure that each hour of labour 
... 
time was productive, workers would be hired only for a particular 
meal or task and the down-time - the time in which no or only 
marginally productive work is performed - consequent in employing 
full-time workers could be kept to a minimum. Furthermore, in 
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small hotels and restaurants it was more expensive to employ a full-
time cleaner than to hire labour for a short period of intense cleaning. 
To meet the differing labour needs of each employer a variety of 
practices developed varying between the type of establishment and the 
type of work. Such practices also changed over the years as the 
enterprise changed and various practices were found to be more or less 
efficient. Generally, senior cooks remained full-time workers while 
serving and cleaning staff might be employed on a regular basis each 
week but only for a few hours in each day covering the busiest period. 
Alternatively, one worker might perform a combination of duties such 
as waitressing during meal times with work as a housemaid in the 
morning period. Again, a hotel might employ staff in combinations 
of full-time workers and casuals to cover the wide time spread of the 
three main daily meals. 
The demand by employers for casual labour was only half the 
equation. A potential supply also had to exist in the form of workers 
to work irregularly or on a regular but part-time basis. While some full 
time workers sought a secondary job, the general international pattern 
was for the supply of labour to come from married women, students 
and the marginalised unemployed, often from among migrants or 
ethnic minorities.
1 
Women predominated because of the gender role 
associations of domestic work and because of the suitability of combining . 
part-time and flexible work hours with family demands. The low pay, 
status and level of skill was unattractive to male workers who had the 
opportunity to seek more skilled or career-orientated jobs. Moreover, 
while women might seek both full-time and casual work, male 
workers continued to be full-time workers in order to support either 
fr 
themselves or their families. Thus in some areas such as cleaning, 
where both full-time and part-time labour were suitable options, the 
unavailability and usually higher wage rates for male workers led 
1. D. Morse The Peripheral Worker (New York: Columbia Univ.-
ersity Press, 1969) 
... 
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employers to hire large numbers of part-time women, who were available 
and cheaper. 
In the early years of low pay and long hours, in New Zealand as 
elsewhere, there was little necessity for employers to employ casual 
labour. In New Zealand in the early twentieth century workers could 
be employed from 70 to 90 hours a week up to 13 hours on any one 
day, each and every weekend, with the cost to the employer being 
seldom more than a t 1 a week. (see Chapter 1) With no penalty payments 
for statutory holidays or the weekend and little if any overtime, 
the employer could meet the demands of the wide time spread of 
meals and always have a supply of labour on hand. Casuals were used, 
but in an essentially supplementary role, to meet especially heavy 
demands and for special catering occasions, such as banquets. Nevertheless 
the necessity for casualisation was low because of the low wages and 
long hours of full time workers and also because of a second factor, 
namely the family structure of most enterprises. This structure led 
to the use of family members but also to a less professional and 
aggressive approach to business management. As the century progressed 
there was increasing competition and especially from the 1950's onwards 
in areas such as the licensed hotels there was a greater professionalism 
in management and attention to organising labour in the most profitable 
manner possible. 
While the profit motive underlay changes in the pattern of employment 
leading to more casual and part-time labour, this tendency could be 
modified by the collective strength possessed by that country's workers 
and by the intervention of the state. Where unionisation was weak, and 
restraints from the state, either in respect of labour laws or liquor 
laws, few, then the employers could exercise the power to substitute 
casual labour for full-time in order to maximise their profits. 
In New Zealand the experience of the hotel and restaurant industry 
,,~ 
was different largely because of the collective strength acquired by the 
workers and limitations on the industry imposed by the state. In 
particular, the licensing laws prevented the development of a night-time 
dimension to the trade. The six o'clock closing of hotel bars from 
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1917 provided hours of work suitable for full-time regular employment, 
with the two hour peak in sales between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. being 
met by the hiring of part-time workers. Similarly, the absence of 
virtually any licensed restaurants further limited the scope for casual 
labour which was normally employed for the evening business. The state's 
second variety of intervention added to the strength of the workers. 
The system of compulsory arbitration provided a valuable framework 
in which unionism could emerge in the industry and secure a minimum 
set of conditions. In an industry where the organising of workers was 
historically and internationally a difficult objective to realise, this 
system was an important aid. With the establishment of compulsory 
unionism by the first Labour government in 1936, the relative power 
of the workers in the industry was further reinforced. From this 
position of strength the union was able to secure, maintain and enforce 
award provisions that circumscribed the employer's power to deploy 
labour when and where they required and in particular to limit and 
regulate casual labour. Thus the power of the unions, supported by 
state legislation in the fields of labour and liquor, constituted a force 
sufficiently powerful to meet and defeat most attempts by the employers 
to casualise the industry's labour. 
The battles between the employers and the workers in New Zealand 
over casualisation occurred in two general stages. In the 1940's the 
labour shortages occasioned by the war led to staffing problems in the 
hospitals. At the same time the licensed hotels for financial reasons 
as well as because of the shortage of labour moved towards contract 
cleaning in the bar areas. In the public hospitals cleaning had been 
preformed by male domestics and wardsmaids employed by the local 
hospital board. The labour shortages originating in World War Two 
continued on into the 1950's accentuated by the expansion of the 
hospital system. As a consequence, employers hired married women 
as part-time domestics. First in Canterbury in the late 1940's and then 
elsewhere in New Zealand, the employment of casuals became intimately 
linked with contracting. The Crothalls Company developed this system 
in Christchurch which transferred the employment and management of 
cleaning staffs from the hospital board to the contractor. From the 
board's perspective this shifted the management problems and theoritically 
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led to a cheaper cleaning cost as a result of the particular management 
expertise of the contractors. The CHWU was able to ensure that 
Crothalls were made a party to the Hospital Domestic Workers' Award, 
the contract workers were members of the union, and that they hence 
gained protection in terms of pay, conditions and security of employment~ 
Beginning in 1944 several arrangements covering part-time staff were 
agreed between Crothalls and the CHWU. 2 In 1949 they negotiated a 
more comprehensive wage regime that provided for payment based on 
broad categories of hours rather than the specific number of hours 
that an individual worked. Essentially this provided that the worker 
would receive the maximum payment for each category, minimising the 
fluctuations in wages and imposing a penalty on the employers for the 
use of part-time labour. If a cleaner worked up to and including 
10 hours in a week, wages for the full 10 hours would be paid even 
if the worker was employed for only 8. This structure continued on 
up until 30 hours with rates set for 15, 20 and 25 hour periods 
and those workers between a category receiving payment for the maximum 
period. 3 
Licensed hotels were the second area where casual cleaning was introduced 
in this first period. Previously, a hotel would have employed a full-time 
male porter-barman, who combined cleaning duties with the carrying of 
goods, a miscellany of minor tasks and the relieving of the barstaff 
during their meal break. With the introduction of part-time cleaners 
under a contractor only the cleaning duties in the bar room area 
would be performed and each and every hour would be spent working, 
thus eliminating any cost arising from unproductive time. Once again the 
unions were able to ensure that the contractors in the licensed hotels 
were covered by the award and that the scope of their operations 
were restricted. No contract cleaning was permitted in the accommodation 
areas of the licensed hotels which remained the preserve of the housemaids~ 
A minimum hourly wage rate was set in the Licensed Hotel Awards 





B Aw 47 (1947) p3041 
CHW E Min 9 Oct 1944; 11 Sep 1945 
CHW E Min 9 Aug 1949 
see B Aw 51 (1951) p1921 
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for one-and-a-half hours work. The award further noted that by 
accepting casual labour the unions were making a special concession 
in recognition of the difficulties in obtaining full-time labour. They did 
not accept that the hiring of casual labour was in any sense a divine 
right of management. Rather, the question was one for negotiation and 
agreement between the union and the employers. 
This principle of union control in the area of casual or part-time labour 
was embodied within the general award provisions. Firstly, the employment 
of any part-time workers was subject to the issuing of a permit by 
the union secretary in that district~ The fact that permission had to 
be sought, underlined the union's insistence that the principle of a 40 
hour week was the norm for the industry. Deviation from that principle 
required either an approval from the union or incurred a penalty 
rate of pay which was the second means the unions possessed to 
restrict the use of casual labour. Under the first mechanism, the part-
time permit the employer was required to specify the name and numbers 
of the workers that he or she sought, the place of work and the 
period of hours. The union was able to use this system to limit the 
employment of part-timers as well as to obtain concessions in exchange 
for cooperation in issuing permits or conversely employ it as a sanction 
against difficult employers. For instance, in the 1960's the CHWU agreed 
to issue part-time permits to the White Heron Hotel in return for a 
wider dry pay entitlement and free meals.
2 
On other occasions the 
threat of cancelling permits placed pressure upon the employer to 
cooperate over a particular issue in dispute while in 1964 the union 
used it to cancel a large number of part-time positions leading to the 
creation of 25 additional full-time jobs. 
3 
Despite periodic agitation by 
the employers the permit system persisted although in practice it did 
not always work as effectively as the union might desire. Any union action 




A standard mechanism existed in the industry's awards which 
remained largely unchanged over the decades. See eg B Aw 
51 (1951) p1921 
CHW E Min 17 Nov 1969 
CHW Min 6 Apr 1964 
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the inevitable peak periods of demand that could only be met by 
casual labour. Nevertheless, the union was able to influence the deve-
lopment of casualisation to the advantage of its members. 
Penalty rates for employing casual labour was the second of these 
general award mechanisms. Casual workers could be hired either for a day 
or in the case of waiters and waitresses for a single meal. To do 
so however, cost the employer 20% more than the pro-rata rate for a 
full-time worker.1 The penalty was intended to help protect full-time 
workers while also benefitting casual staff. Once more the contrast 
between such a provision and the common overseas experience is sharp. 
In Britain, for instance, with a mere 5% of hotel and catering workers 
in trade unions, many casuals could be hired for rates of pay not 
simply lacking any penalty element but devoid of any minimum award 
rate. There was a legal state minimum wage but this was extremely 
low and in practice frequently violated. 2 A casual worker in New 
Zealand received a higher basic rate of pay, additional penalty payments 
for weekend and holiday work and the benefits of award conditions. 
Moreover, such pay and conditions were likely to be effectively enforced 
through the presence of an active union. 
When the second stage of casualisation developed and accelerated in 
the late 1960's and into the 1970's these award provisions assisted 
the union to ensure that wages for full-time, part-time and casual 
labour were protected. The union also slowed the spread of casual-
isation but was unable to withstand the force and breadth of the 
trend as the industry developed new areas especially suitable for casual 
labour and became increasingly competitive and concerned to maximise 
the use of labour. These new areas included the introduction of 10 
o'clock closing in the licensed hotels and the rapid growth of rest-
aurants. More New Zealanders, following the international pattern, 
ate more meals away from home. As a consequence thousands of new 
food establishments providing lunch and evening meals as well as 
1. 
2. 
see Table 5.1 
L. Mackie & P. Pattulo Women at Work (London: Tavistouk, 
1977) pp51-4 . 
... 
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takeaway food emerged, which required large numbers of casual 
serving staff for short periods of time. This change to eating habits 
reflected the changing role of women in society, more of whom in the late 
1960's and the 1970's were seeking full time employment and were not 
prepared to simultaneously preform full-time unpaid domestic labour 
at home. Thus casualisation was a consequence not simply of legal 
changes to the hotel and restaurant industry but a consequence of its 
reconstruction to meet the new demands of society and deliver its 
services as profitably as possible. 
One further effect of casualisation should be noted. Casualising labour 
generally had an adverse effect on the level of union consciousness 
and the collective strength of hotel and restaurant workers. For most 
casual workers, work in the industry was secondary to their main 
employment, to tertiary education or served to supplement the primary 
full-time income of their spouse. There was a strong tendency for 
workers to feel a lesser degree of concern with their wages and 
conditions. Their energies, interests and whatever trade union consciousness 
the worker did possess were focussed elsewhere. Employed in small 
workplaces with a high turnover of staff, casual workers frequently 
lacked contact with other workers and with their union. This lack· 
of contact and the diverse experiences and interests of casual workers 
acted to hinder the development of a common workplace consciousness 
and the action that would result from such an awareness. Nor, given 
the payment of penalty rates and the protection of award provisions, 
was there a strong material incentive for workers to organise. From 
the perspective of many casual workers their brief time in the industry 
could provide them with a good income in a short period of work 
from unskilled or semi-skilled labour without any apparent need to 
become active in their union or in contesting work practices imposed 
by the employer at the workplace. These problems while present in 
the 1960's intensified with the growth in casualisation in the 1970's 
and posed a significant problem for the long-term effectiveness of the CHWU. 
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3. WAGES AND THE WORKPLACE, 1956 TO 1966 
Casualisation was an ongoing challenge for the CHWU. It was however 
far from being the only industrial issue that confronted the union in the 
1950's and 1960's. Wages and conditions remained at the forefront 
of the union's activities, and, as with the wider trade union movement, 
the CHWU was able to make modest advances between 1956 and 1966. 
Real wages rose in a period of acute labour shortages and sustained 
economic growth. In certain sectors, such as transport and in the new 
industrial projects, the actual rates of pay secured through unions neg-
otiating individual agreements with their employers were substantially 
in excess of the minimum rates prescribed in the awards. For other 
workers, including those in the hotels, hospitals and restaurants steady 
but less dramatic rises were secured through the process of conciliation 
hearings with employers, supplemented by the occasional General Wage 
Order of the Arbitration Court. Direct action was unnecessary in terms 
of the union's claims and recourse to the court for a settlement was 
rare for most unions. While groups such as the CHWU did receive some 
indirect benefit through the higher wages being obtained in certain 
sectors affecting the general wage rates of the labour market, they 
generally lost ground relative to more skilled workers over the course 
of this period. 1 
Within the industry, the relativity between the union's various awards 
remained essentially as before, with the licensed hotels being the sector 
with the highest overall pay rates. While in the licensed hotels, male 
and female kitchen workers were paid the same rate for the same work, 
a different and lower rate persisted for female workers in the tearooms 
and private hotels for all categories of work. In practice, few males 
were ever employed so that virtually all workers in these sectors were 
female and poorly paid. In the hospital sector, public hospital workers 
maintained their traditional wage margin over their counterparts in the 
private hospitals and while the conditions were generally identical, the 
fr 




See N. S. Woods Troubled Heritage: The Main Stream of 
Developments in Private Sector Industrial Relations in New 
Zealand (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington, 1979) 
see Table 5.1 
This was the overall pattern between 1956 and 1966, but within this 
period certain specific changes also occurred. In the licensed hotels 
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the payment of the 12 months service allowance, which the bar staff 
had possessed since 1951, was extended to all workers in 1960 although 
at a lower rate. Thus while the 1960 Licensed Hotel Award provided 
for a rate of 14/3d per week to bar staff who had completed one year's 
service all other staff received an extra 5/-.
1 
This effective wage rise for 
licensed hotel workers outside of the bar further increased the margin 
between them and the unions members in other sectors. A second 
1 
important development came in the public hospitals with the reclassification 
of the smaller kitchens which had the effect of raising the pay of workers 
in the smaller hospitals up to a common rate for those with 100 beds 
or less. 
2 
A more significant advance was made in 1965 with the extension 
of equal pay to female cleaners working on contract in the licensed hotels. 
Now, both females and males received an hourly rate of 8/3d where 
previously the rate for men had been 7 /7d and for women only 6/5d 
3 
per hour. In addition, the minimum period for which payment had to 
be made was extended by 30 minutes to two hours. The final develop-
ment in incomes during this period was the series of attempts by the 
CHWU to raise the number and the dollar amounts for special payments 
covering uniforms, work tools and laundering. These were only 
partially successful and claims for allowances for barstaff for shoes and 
ties were usually conceded in the course of negotiations for higher 
weekly wages. 4 
The award conditions relating to workplace facilities for staff remained 
essentially unchanged from those of the early 1950's. Except for the 
tearoom sector many staff continued to live at their work institution 
and hence it was important to monitor their living conditions. These 
resident workers were entitled to adequate sleeping and toilet facilities 
lockers, laundries and sitting-rooms and an area in which to eat. Non -
resident workers were similarly legally entitled to changing and eating 
fa'C:ilities. Enforcement to ensure that these conditions were met was one 
1. B Aw 60 (1960) p1117 
2. B Aw 61 (1961) p1901 
3. B Aw 65 (1965) p1281; of B Aw 63(1963) p673. 
4. For examples of these claims see CHW Min 18 Dec 1955 
(shoes); E Min 15 Jul 1959 (ties); E Min 27 Oct 1964 
(trousers); & E Min 14 Mar 1966 
... 
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of the first initiatives undertaken by Short, the union's new secretary, 
in 1956. Investigations revealed inadequate facilities in several Christ-
church licensed hotels. At the United Service, the laundry and its 
washing machines were unsatisfactory, while the Warners and Excelsior 
hotels required new staff rooms and the Clarendon both a sitting room 
and an improved laundry.1 The union successfully persuaded the 
management to. improve their conditions to a satisfactory level. Similarly 
at the public hospitals the union was also successful in improving the in-
adequate laundry facilities, lockers and sitting rooms~ 
In the area of specia! leave and holidays the union had mixed success 
in the early 1960's. Paid sick leave remained an entitlement that was 
confined to public hospital workers and the union consistently failed 
in its claims to extend the provision into other awards. No provision 
existed in any of the union's awards for bereavement or any variety 
of domestic leave, a situation that was typical of most awards and agree-
ments of that time. On holidays the union, did make some progress. 
First, in 1961, the payment for a statutory holiday was extended to 
workers who were not rostered to work on that particularly day.
3 
In a seven-day-industry, the practice of rostering had meant that those 
who did work on a statutory holiday received payment at time-and-
a-half or double-time, but those who did not remained unpaid. In other 
five-day-industries, a worker who did not work on a statutory holiday 
effectively received a paid holiday. Now, as from 1960, hotel, restaurant 
and hospital workers gained the same right. The second improvement 
came initially in 1964 as part of the general advance of the trade union 
movement, with the securing of an extra special holiday, January 2nd. 
4 
In 1965 the entitlement to three weeks annual holiday after a period 
of service was extended to private hotels and in 1966 to tearooms. 5 
The union's members in the licensed hotels and hospitals already 
possessed such an entitlement after completing five years service, but 







CHW Min 27 Jun 1956 
CHW Min 18 Dec 1956; AR 1955-6 Feb 1956 
They received an extra day's annual holiday B Aw 1961 
(61) p257 
Frrst CHWU award to benefit was the Tearooms Award May 
1964 B Aw 64 (1964) p577. The other awards followed as 
they aro~efur renegotiation over 1964 and 1965. 
B __ -6~. 65 (1965) p2539 (PH); 66 (1966) p1441 (Tearooms). 
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The mid-1960's also brought a change to the basis for calculating 
overtime and weekend penalty payments for hospital workers. Over-
time became payable at the rate of doubletime after three hours in 
any one week instead of the previous four. This level had already 
been achieved by the licensed hotels and clubs in the previous decade 
but it was now extended to tearooms ( 1964), private hotels and 
hospitals. (1965)1 Hospital workers made a further gain by obtaining 
their long sought after claim for a penalty payment for work on 
Saturdays.
2
The establishment of a rate of time-and-a-quarter recognised 
the applicability of the five-day-week principle to all industries and brought 
the hospitals into line with the rest of the union's awards where 
penalty rates existed for both days of the weekend. Although the new 
rate was still less than the time-and-a-half rate of the licensed hotels, 
hospital workers were eligible for double-time on Sundays compared to 
only time-and-a-half for the workers in licensed hotels. 
Enforcement at the workplace of the awards provisions continued to 
occupy the union's daily routine but few disputes of significance emerged 
between 1956 and 1966. The union was usually able to resolve a dispute 
with an employer without recourse to any form of direct action. 
Twice, however, the CHWU did act to withdraw from a hotel the supply 
of beer. For instance, at the Royal Hotel in 1964 the publican had 
refused to discuss with the union his employment of a non-unionist 
in the bottle store who also lacked a part-time permit. 3 In addition, 
the publican was employing some eight barmaids contrary to the agree-
ment between the LVA (the employers association) and the CHWU 
which prevented their employment.4 If the hotel was permitted to 
act in this way then a dangerous precedent could be created. However 
the publican persisted in his position until Short, in his other capacity 
as the secretary of the Canterbury branch of the Brewery Workers' 
Union (see below) organised the cutting of the hotel's supply of beer. 
The publican soon capitulated and agreed to cease the employment of 
tlfe barmaids and ensure that the bottle-store worker joined the union, 







B Aw 64 (1964) p577 (Tearooms); 65 (1965) p2561 
(Public Hospitals); p2539 (PH). 
B Aw 65 (1965) p2561 
The Press 14 Aug 1964 p1; see 13 Aug 1964 p1 for the 
beginning, of the dispute. 
CHW Min 12 Dec 1961; see section on women below. 
The__.Ei:ess 15 Aug 1964 p4 
The only notable instance of direct action by workers took place at 
the Ashburton Licensing Trust in 1965. The new award increased the 
level of wages for licensed hotel workers and the Trust management 
had decided to alter the hours worked by the bar-staff in order to 
eliminate a broken shift allowance that the staff had received since 
1958. The overall effect of the change was to lower the award 
increase so that workers would only receive an effective rise of 4/-
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for an extra two-and-a-half hours work. After a meeting of the workers 
resolved to withdraw their labour, the Trust agreed to return to the 
previous payments and apply the full award increase.
1 
The period brought forth only one major dispute over an award 
interpretation, when in 1960 disagreement arose over the payment of 
transport expenses for hospital workers. Essentially, the award provided 
that the employer would either provide transport or pay an allowance 
to those workers who commenced or finished work outside the normal 
hours of public transport. The ambiguous construction of the clause 
led to a dispute between the AHWU and the Cook Hospital Board that 
eventually required a national resolution by the Arbitration Court. 2 
On the suggestion of the court the clause was subsequently amended in 
1963 with the new provision providing a clear statement of rights. 
Henceforth, all hospital domestic workers living beyond half-a-mile from 
their workplace, beginning or finishing their work shift outside of the 
hours of public transport would be conveyed to and from their homes 
at the expense of the employer. Where they used their own transport 
an allowance of 1/- per day would be paid by the employer.3 
Overall, the ten year period from 1956 to 1966 brought modest advances 
in wages and conditions for the union's members. They were achieved 
in a climate of relatively peaceful industrial relations. The comparative 
positions of the union's sectors (as shown in Table 5.1 below) again 
showed that licensed hotel workers enjoyed the highest rates of wages. 
1'!; terms of conditions the decade had seen the other sectors obtaining 
provisions that brought them almost to a level of parity with the licensed 
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superior entitlement namely sick leave which reflected the greater risks 
of i II health for staff in hospitals. 
1 
In the second half of the 1960's 
there was a noticeable rise in the industrial temperature and while no 
major disputes arose in the majority of the union's sectors, the workers 
in the licensed hotels did become involved in widespread industrial 
action following the introduction of 10 o'clock closing in 1967. 
4. 1967 
The Labour and National Parties, continuing the tradition of a bi-
partisan approach to licensing reform, had both promised in their 1966 
election manifestoes to hold a referendum on the abolition of six 
o'clock closing. 
2 
Accordingly, the National government upon its re-
election introduced legislation in May 1967 to hold a national poll. 
The government proposed that the ballot form would provide for two 
options: the continuance of six o'clock closing, or the introduction 
of 10 o'clock closing, providing that the total weekly hours of opening 
would remain the same and that hotels would close for an evening 
meal break. 3 By the time the select committee had finished its delib-
erations the form of the ballot had been reworded to provide for a 
more simple choice. 
Support for the extension of licensing hours was widespread. The public, 
politicians and the industry favoured reform. The Statutes Revision 
Select Committee received submissions from the Hotel Association and the 
Hotel Workers Federation supporting later closing but opposed to the two 
hour evening meal break during which the hotel bar would be closed.4 
Opposition to the principle of later closing was confined essentially to 
the temperance movement.5 When the bi II reemerged from the committee 
in late June the proposal for an evening meal break had been deleted and 
the ballot form no longer included any specific reference to the total 







The entitlement for sick leave for domestic workers in public 
hospitals was consistent with the general practice for employees 
in public hospitals to receive compensation for the health risks 
of their workplace. 
N Zf:ll_ 350 ( 1967) p859 
Ibid 




accommodated the requests for flexibility from districts that preferred 
11 p.m. as the closing time. The effect of these changes was to maximise 
the potential support for later closing and avoid any cornplicat ions on 
the form. 
When the referendum was finally held on 27 September 1967 the voters 
had a simple choice between the continuance of six o'clock closing and 
"later closing, the actual hours of sale to be decided according to 
1 
local conditions." With a high poll of 71% of the electorate, later 
closing was carried by a margin of two to one. 2 Having secured this 
mandate the government then proceeded to introduce legislation to 
establish ten o'clock closing as the normal late hour for trading but 
empowered the local licensing committees to vary the exact hours of 
opening and closing provided that the maximum operating hours did 
not exceed 11 per day. The new hours were to commence on 9 
October 1967. 
Clearly the introduction of later closing would mean that the barstaff 
would be preforming night duties and hence raised the question of 
payment for night work. This problem did not however suddenly arise 
as both the HWF and the HANZ had believed that later closing would 
be the probable result of the referendum. Consequently earlier in 1967 
they had discussed the issue of payment for night work as part of the 
general negotiation for the new Licensed Hotel Award. While the parties 
had reached agreement on a number of the union's claims only partial 
settlement had been made over the wages and conditions for night work. 
The union did secure an amendment to the award so as to give preference 
for any overtime work to fulltime staff before casual workers. They could 
only agree however to reopen negotiations on night work in the event 
that later closing was carried in the referendum. 
When later closing was carried on 27 September, negotiations recommenced 
but broke down on 6 October only three days prior to the inauguration 
of 10 o'clock closing. The employers offered an additional 10c per hour 
1. 
2. 
NZPD 351 (1967) p1996 
NZ£D_ 353 ( 1967) p3495 
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for work perform.ed after 7 p.m. while the HWF claimed 15c per hour. 1 
From the union's perspective the offer was especially inadequate in that 
many workers presently eligible for broken shift allowances would receive 
virtually no overall increase in their pay. 
With no agreement reached by Friday 6 October, the leadership of the 
Hotel Workers Federation decided to initiate direct but selective action 
to begin on the first night of the new 10 o'clock regime. The action 
would be selective in three senses. First only those workers seeking the 
extra payment, namely barstaff and bottlestore staff, would be involved. 
Secondly, the action would be confined to certain major cities, while 
thirdly it would be limited to the withdrawal of labour from 7 p.m. 
onwards each night.2 Normal service would continue during the day. 
This proposed strategy was referred to the executive of each of the 
federation's unions for its consideration. Short, the CHWU secretary who 
had been involved in making the initial decision obtained the support 
of the Canterbury executive for immediate action. At its meeting on 
9 October they recommended that Christchurch barstaff withdraw their 
labour from 7 p.m. onwards, beginning as of that evening. 3 They also 
called a special stop work meeting of the city's barstaff for the 11th 
to endorse the executive's recommendation. With 300 members in 
attendance the stop work meeting voted overwhelmingly in favour of 
ceasing work at 7 p.m.4 Their resolve was strengthened by pledges of 
support from the Drivers and Brewery Workers' Union and by the news 
that the Hotel Association intended to take legal action against Short 
for organising a strike without a secret ballot of the CHWU's members. 
Short responded that the union was not on strike, rather its members 
were continuing to work normal hours but declined to commence 
additional evening work when the terms for which had yet to be 
5 agreed. As is often the case in industrial issues it would be the success 
or failure of the action that would ultimately settle th~ issue rather than 
~the nuances of legal interpretation. 
1. CHW E Min 9 Oct 1967 
2. Ibid 
3. Ibid 
4. CHW Min 11 Oct 1967 
5. Ibid .. 
(RIGHT)L. N. SHORT, CHWU SECRETARY, 1955 to 1974 
(le FT). R. A. FERGUSON, CHWU PRESIDENT, 1959-61, 67-70 
& 77-83 AND VICE-PRESIDENT 1971-77 
Short and Ferguson belonged to the new generation of 
union leaders who had experienced the depression while 
young rather than as union members. Both were born in 
New Zealand, whereas Barr and Brooks had migrated 
from Britain; both had worked in the hospital sector 
of the industry, whereas their predecessors had only 
worked in hotels. Ferguson was the first working barman 
to become president of the union in forty years, while 
in the 1970's Short became the first Canterbury secretary 
to attain the secretaryship of the federation. Finally 
Short and Ferguson would lead the CHWU into the 





Within a few nights of this industrial action, the pressure upon the 
employers had become obvious. As patrons crowded enthusiastically 
into the city's bars after 7 p.m., the publicans attempted to quench 
their thirsts. Aided by family members, a handful of non-unionists 
but few union barstaff, the publicans were able to keep their hotels 
open but with only one or two bars operating. Legally the employers 
were in a difficult position as the licensing laws now required that their 
bars remain open until 10 p.m. Employers in different districts sought 
the approval of the local licensing committees to close all hotel bars 
after 7 p.m. but it appeared that they lacked the authority for such 
a step. 1 
Industrial action had been taken by workers in Auckland, Hamilton, Well-
ington and Christchurch~ By confining the campaign to only selected 
cities the unions had concentrated their efforts on the strongest and 
most trade union conscious of its members. There was neither sufficient 
time nor the organisational strength, or the resources to mount and 
sustain industrial action throughout the country. Moreover, the action 
in the main centres was sufficient to place pressure on the employers. 
The campaign did however suffer two setbacks. One major centre, Dunedin, 
voted against taking any industrial action, 3 while in lnvercargill the 
union's suffered a largely symbolic defeat. lnvercargill as such did not 
represent an essential centre for the HWF's strategy, but it was the home 
town of the national president of the federation, 'Dot' Delaney. Delaney 
had been the secretary of the Southland Hotel and Restaurant Workers 
Union since the 1940's. Of a broad frame and standing in excess of 
six feet her formidable character had become something of a legend 
in the industry and she had achieved the distinction of becoming the 
first woman president of the federation, although the power in the 
HWF continued to rest with the secretary. In 1967 Delaney had wanted 
the hotel workers in lnvercargill to cease work after 7 p.m. as part of 
the national campaign, and she had come to see the issue as one of 
cbnfidence in her own leadership. 4 By a narrow margin - 32 to 26 
the local workers voted against taking any action and consequently 
1. The Press 12 Oct 1967 p1; 14 Oct p1 
2. The Press 10 Oct 1967 p1 
3. Ibid 
4. Short Oral op cit 
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Delaney tendered her resignation as secretary of the Southland union. 
While this was a defeat in the short term Delaney did in fact return as 
secretary in 1968. 
Yet despite these setbacks in the south, the overall position of the 
HWF remained strong. It was strengthened further by the announcement 
that Auckland and Wellington brewery workers would cut-off the 
supply of beer to any hotel that was employing non-union labour 
during the evening. 2 By 17 October, eight days after selective action 
had begun, the Hotel Association met with the HWF and a settlement 
was reached. An extra 12c an hour would be paid to barstaff working 
after 7 p.m. with a minimum payment of 25c per night. Each worker 
would receive .an evening meal or an allowance in lieu of 50c per night. 
In addition, any worker who was transferred from an existing broken 
shift arrangement would suffer no reduction in their pay. Both parties 
agreed to the negotiati.on of a new award in four months time. 
3 
The settJement was a small.victory for the unions. The campaign had 
produced a clear material gain for barstaff without any loss to their 
normal weekly pay. The demands were obtainable and the strategy 
proved to be correctly attuned to the situation. Moreover, besides the 
immediate material benefit, the action effected a change in the union 
consciousness and the self-confidence of many hotel workers. In 
Canterbury, for the first time, a general campaign of direct action 
had been organised and a victory had been won, 1967 provided a 
practical demonstration of the effect of collective action and the ach-
ievement of success left a feeling of exhilaration amongst many workers. 
Three years hence, the union would again embark upon direct action 
and the strength of its members would be more severely tested. 
5. THE UNION AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1960's 
The industrial action of 1967, while atypical for the CHWU in terms of 
its intensity, did i,ndicate the field in which the union was primarily 
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its industry. Indeed, industrial issues assumed such an importance for 
the trade union movement, as well as for the CHWU, that their political 
activity between 1955 and 1970, declined to its lowest level since the 
1920's. This decline was a consequence of a political environment in 
which an ideological consensus had settled upon the Labour and National 
Parties. While National remained in office for virtually all of this period, 
it did not initiate any major assault upon either the labour movement, 
the welfare state, or indeed upon much of the economic ownership and 
controls that had been erected by the first Labour government. Certainly 
there was a poverty of innovation and in the later years signs of 
weathering to the welfare structure, but there were neither divisive 
actions taken by the government, nor radical demands by the labour 
movement that led to any fundamental political cleavages. In a period 
of rising national prosperity and full employment the trade unions saw 
little need to mount any concerted challenge to the National government 
in order to elect a Labour Party, which while offering differences in 
emphasis had no radical vision to change economic ownership or the 
power of workers at the workplace. Nor indeed did most trade union 
ists desire any dramatic changes to New Zealand society. Rather they were 
satisfied to extract better conditions within the system through their 
negotiations with the employers. There were elements within the Labour 
Party and the trade unions who did speak of social ownership and class 
struggle. For instance, K. Baxter, secretary of the FOL, reiterated in 
1963 the Federation's commitment to achieving the socialisation of the 
economy by democratic means, in response to the comments of the then 
leader of the parliamentary Labour Party A. Nordmeyer, that questions 
of class and ownership were 'outdated Marxist' concepts. 1 Baxter's 
comments were not however typical of the views that dominated the 
FOL leadership for most of the 1960's. 
A characteristic feature of the 1960's was the increasing separation 
between the Labour Party and the trade unions, as both arms of the 
labour movement operated within their own compartments. Each sought 
to improve living conditions for New Zealand workers not by uniting 
to redesign the entire house but rather by rearranging the furniture 
1. See CTC A3 (p) letter Baxter to McDonald 27 Nov 1969 
& article 'What of tomorrow' Oct 1963 by Baxter 
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in their own private living rooms. While many unions, including the 
CHWU, did remain as loyal affiliates of the Labour Party, active invol-
vement within its structures declined to a minor activity inconsequential 
beside their industrial affairs. With the contest between Labour and 
National virtually reduced to questions of traditional loyalites, person-
alities and nuances of emphasis, the vigour and substance of the CHWU's 
support for Labour pales beside its efforts in the 1930's and 1940's, 
which had included organisational support and donations of £500. 
(See Chapter 3) Now, except for the 1957 general election when the 
CHWU ·organised and helped finance the election of N. Pickering as the 
member for St Albans, 1 no major organisational efforts were made by 
the CHWU on behalf of the Labour Party in any municipal or national 
election between 1955 and 1970. 
The Labour Party, similarly exhibited scant concern to retain and sustain 
trade union support or re-invigorate the relationship between political 
and industrial labour. Its brief term of government between 1957 
and 1960 brought little in the way of political vision or reform nor the 
development of a intimate relationship with the trade union movement, 
which had marked the first Labour government. With the return of 
National in 1960 the gulf between the party and the unions continued 
to widen and the trade unions sought to reach their own modus 
vivandi with the employers and the National government. 
Outside of the realm of parliamentary politics, the CHWU did perceive 
a legitimate if modest role for itself on wider economic and social 
questions. While the union's actions were normally confined to motions 
of principle, small donations or press statements, it did recognise that 
the union had a right to comment and act upon issues outside of the 
immediate concerns in its industry. Generally its stance was a progressive 
one, opposing apartheid and the Vietnam War as well as the involvement 
of New Zealand in the International Monetary Fund. 2 Similarly, it 
~ 3 
gave support to the nuclear disarmament movement and to bodies such 
as the Maori Education Fund 4 and the Workers Educational Association.
5 
1. CHW E Min 9 Oct& 6Nov 1957; Min 14 Oct 1957. 
2. CHW E Min 12 Jun 1961 
3. CHW E Min 21 Jul 1958 
4. CHW E Min 16 Apr 1962 
5. This was 'a long running annual donation, dating from the 1920's 
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It was an outlook perhaps best described as social democratic rather than 
radical. Up until the later years of the 1960's, when the issue of the 
Vietnam War rose to prominence, there were few moments of intense 
political controversy between 1955 and 1960 and although the union's 
executive did debate several of these issues, few discussions occurred 
among the union's rank-and-file within any of the CHWU's structures. 
The leadership did however take a position of opposition to nuclear 
testing in 1964, 
1 
and in the following year, Short the union's secret-
ary was sent by the CTC as its delegate to an Australian conference 
on nuclear war.
2 
Racism in New Zealand and in South Africa both 
featured in the union's discussions, and along with the CTC the union 
recorded its opposition to the 1960 All Black Tour of South Africa, 
if Maori players were excluded from the team, and gave support to the 
campaign of the 'Citizens against the All Black Tour'., despite the 
unpopularity of such a stance in 1960.
3 
With the intensification of the 
war in Vietnam, the CHWU expressed its opposition to the American 
invasion, in line with the general stance of the FOL and the Labour 
Party which called for the withdrawal of United States forces from 
South Vietnam: While never in the forefront of its activities the 
views expressed by the CHWU do indicate an awareness of the wider 
political issues of the 1960's and reveal the general political outlook 
of the union's executive. 
Within its own industry, the CHWU enjoyed a period of generally amicable 
and constructive relations in the 1960's with the Hotel Workers Federation. 
The CHWU was the third largest affiliate of the HWF and its secretary, 
Short, came to play an increasingly important role in the federation's 
business in the course of the decade. Up until his death in 1962, 
Frederick Young continued to dominate the federation's affairs as both 
the secretary of the largest affiliate the AHWU, and of the HWF itself. 
Young's formidable negotiating skills and knowledge of the industry made 
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enged as the secretary of the HWF and while still an important figure 
within the FOL he no longer possessed the power and influence that 
he had held in the years of the first Labour government~ Young 
enjoyed his last years of power before his death, but was no longer 
striving to meet any personal or political challenges. Upon his death 
the assistant secretary of the AHWU, George Armstrong, acceded to 
the offices of Auckland and federation secretary. A long-time associate 
of Young, Armstrong's election as HWF secretary essentially saw the 
continuance of his predecessor's policies in respect of industrial action 
and politics. Having received his trade union training amongst a generat-
ion of determined and ruthless leaders in a period of factions and pol-
itical tensions, Armstrong was an experienced and strong negotiator 
but his thinking remained fixed in terms of past experiences rather than 
open towards future challenges. Improving wages and conditions for his 
members was the priority for Armstrong and he had little interest 
in achieving any wider social changes. Bitterly anti-Communist he 
continued the pattern of antagonism that had existed between the 
AHWU and the Communists on into the early 1970's. It was an 
antagonism that moved beyond ideology to embrace issues of power and 
personality. The CHWU did not become involved in such a conflict 
but maintained a satisfactory relationship with the AHWU on the issues 
of securing better wages and conditions for their members. 
Relations with the trade union movement in Christchurch during the 
1960's were similarly harmonious in their character. At the official 
level, Short was an executive member of the Canterbury Trades 
Council from 1955 and vice-president from 1963 to 1970~ Polit-
ically the union remained firmly in the middle stream of the labour 
river and continued to be loyal members of the CTC, the FOL and the 
Labour Party. The CHWU provided financial and moral support to other 
trade unionists engaged in industrial struggles and Short was active in 
the wider concerns of the movement as both the vice-president of the 
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discussions with Short op cit, R. Ferguson (Oral 1984} and 
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He also assisted in resolving several demarcation disputes between other 
unions that occurred in the course of the 1960's. Short's re-election as 
vice-president throughout the 1960's pointed to the standing of himself 
and the CHWU in the CTC. While the union was not noted for its 
industrial militancy, it did constitute a major voice in the movements 
affairs. For most of the decade it was the third largest union in Canter-
bury with a membership that increased from 3,800 to over 5,000 by 
the decade's end. 1 
The union's closest relationship with another trade union was that with 
the Brewery Workers Union? Such an association would seem natural 
enough, but in fact little contact had existed between the two unions 
prior to the 1950's. Each was concerned with the problems in its own 
industry and the organising and amalgamation of the workers in its 
sector. In September 1958, Short the secretary of the CHWU became 
the secretary of the Canterbury branch of the Brewery Workers Union. 
He was to hold that position until 1969 and the two unions were able 
to work closely together, for the first time. As both unions dealt with 
the major brewery companies they had a number of issues in common. 
For the brewery workers, the association with the hotel workers gave 
them access to a skilled secretary with office facilities at a relatively 
cheap cost. For the hotel workers, the link increased their bargaining 
strength through the sympathetic hearing they were likely to receive 
to requests to cut the supply of beer in times of industrial action. 
Nevertheless, no formal merger of the two unions took place, each 
retaining a separate executive and identity. A joint secretary was a 
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local arrangement, as any formal merger would have required a national 
agreement between the New Zealand Brewery Workers Union, which was 
organised on a national basis, and the federally organised HWF. When 
Short resigned, as the secretary of the Canterbury branch of the Brewery 
Workers Union in 1969, he was succeeded by Gordon Walker.3 Walker 
had been an organiser with the CHWU in the 1960's and he continued 
the»close relationship between the two unions. In this capacity, as well 
as subsequently as the secretary of the CTC, he proved a useful ally 




see AJHR H11 (1960, 1965, 1968) 
CHW E Min 5 Oct 1959 
CHW E Min 30 Jun 1969 
The 1960's had been a decade sparse in political achievements for the 
CHWU or for the wider labour movement. The union had played a role 
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in the movement and expressed its views on wider issues, while continuing 
to enjoy amicable relations with other trade unionists, free from the 
political strife of earlier decades. Yet this absence of strife was not 
unconnected to the absence from political office and power of the Labour 
Party. Such power would have generated both the challenges and the inevit-
able conflicts. Similarly, such political quiesence also reflected the labour 
movements acceptance of the prosperity it had been able to secure within 
the system free from the threat of depression and from political attacks 
upon its existence. 
6. MONEY, MOTELS AND MEMBERS 
Free from economic or political threats, the union and its members had 
prospered in the course of the 1960's. Nor was this prosperity disrupted 
by any internal dissensions within the union. Rather the CHWU grew larger 
and wealthier in an atmosphere of calm and confidence. By 1970 its annual 
income had tripled, in comparison to that of 1956, to reach $47,000.1 Its 
net assets in the same period had risen to $86,706.
2 
The primary cause 
of this growth had been the dramatic increase in membership, with the 
union's subscription having remained static from 1955 to 1967~ Table 5.2 
below indicates the sustained growth in money and members, although in 
the last years of the 1960's the effects of inflation tended to reduce the 
real value of the increases in revenue. Membership growth also slowed 
in the last years of the decade, with virtually no increase between 1967 and 
1970. 












MEMBERS1 ANNUAL INCOME {$r2 NET ASSETS ($) 2 
2300 15,736 30,052 
3884 21,932 43,340 
4676 27,866 61,284 
5093 47,288 80,325 
As at 31 December 
Financial year ends 1 Mar or 4 Feb of following year 
All financial figures have been converted to dollar equivalents. 
CHW AR 1970-1 
Ibid 
CHW Min 3 Apr 1967 
323 MANCHESTER STREET 
Purchased in 1957, this was the first headquarters which the 





In the light of the cash reserves that the union had already accumulated 
in the Brooks era, the 1956 executive had discussed the purchase of 
a building that would serve as both a base for the union's operations 
and as a sensible investment of the union's funds. A suitable large 
two-storey house was selected in Manchester Street priced at £6350, 
and approval was given by a Special General Meeting of the union 
in March 1956. 
1 
Unlike the earlier building in Ferry Road purchased 
in 1949 (see Chapter 4), the CHWU did take occupancy of its Man-
chester Street home and remained there until 1968. Such a purchase 
was a first for a' hotel workers' union in New Zealand and stood apart 
from the common pattern for unions of remaining tenants in the local 
trades hall. While extensions to the Canterbury Trades Hall had been 
discussed, no clear plans had emerged and the union decided in favour 
of developing its own facilities. 
2 
As early as 1963, the executive of the CHWU had considered acquiring 
premises larger than its Manchester office with provision for a social 
hall. After deciding against extending these off!ces, the union resolved 
upon a larger three-storey building at 127 Lichfield Street and commenced 
negotiations. 3 They proved long and torturous and it was not until 31 
January 1968, that the union finally acquired possession of its new 
facilities. 
4 
The final purchase, costing £37,000, included two three-
storey buildings linked together. The second had cost only a fraction of 
the total price and enabled the union to acquire a substantial complex, 
which provided office space, two union halls, an internal car park with a 
further one-third of the area still available for commercial rental. 
A programme of renovation and development commenced and in 1970 
space was let to a retail shop, which would also provide discounts for 
union members. The new building provided the union with a secure 
asset, a source for future income and sufficient space to accommodate 





CHW Min 20 Mar 1956 
Ibid 
CHW E Min 9 Nov 1963 
CHW E Min 10 Apr 1967 
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127 LICHFIELD STREET 
The union's home since 1968, this three-storey, twin building 
complex provided the union with sufficient space for a set 
of offices, two halls, a boardroom, carparking and a further 




Besides these moves to secure its financial future, the union executive 
had been anxious to develop new welfare services for its members. The 
casual employment agency, which had been opened in the 1920's 
continued to operate but by the mid-1950's the executive was looking 
to the creation of new services. One proposal was for the establishment 
of a sickness fund. Except for those workers in public hospitals, no other 
members of the union were entitled under any award to paid sick leave. 
Investigations, however, revealed a number of legal and administrative 
difficulties and the investigating committee recommended not to proceed 
with the idea. 1 
It was as a consequence of this search for new services, that the proposal 
arose for holiday motels. The union would own and operate these motels 
in order to provide low cost holiday accommodation to its members. 
The rentals, it was intended, would repay the mortgage and help finance 
further purchases. 2 In 1959, the general meeting of the union approved 
3 
the scheme and a section was purchased in Akaroa. Unfortunately it 
soon became apparent to the executive, that the number of rooms 
annually available in the motels for hire, would be insignificant in com-
parison to the potential demand ,of the union's large and growing member-
ship. The benefit would inevitably accrue to a few workers and dissen-
sion would soon arise amongst thos~ who were excluded. 4 In 1963 the 
executive decided to abandon the motel scheme and direct the union's 
finances to other activities which were capable of providing more wide-
spread benefits.5 The general meeting. confirmed this change in direction
6 
and the executive turned its attention to the development of the union's 
social facilities and the creation of a bulk-purchase scheme for its members. 
It was the former which took precedence with the union acquiring its 
new building complex in 1968, to meet the financial, organisational 
and social needs of its members. The subsequent development of a 
retail shop providing discounts to union members went someway towards 
meeting the second intention of enabling workers to obtain cheaper goods. , .. 
1. CHW E Min 15 Jun 1959 
2. Ibid 
3. CHW Min 29 Sep 1959 
4. CHW Min 15 Jul 1963 
5. CHW E Min 8 Jul 1963 
6. CHW Min,15 Jul 1963 
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Within the union, the relationship between the membership and the 
executive was free from any of the acrimony that had marked the latter 
years of the Brooks era. The level of involvement by workers in the late 
1950's and early 1960's was generally low with meeting attendances usually 
between 14 and 30. 1 Low participation was a feature common to many 
trade unions in the quiet years between 1955 and 1966, and not unexpected 
in a union with dispersed workplaces and a high turnover of members. There 
was, however, a distinct change in 1967, when the CHWU held its first ever 
mass stop-work meeting over the payment of a night allowance, after the 
introduction of 10 o'clock closing. The series of stop-work meetings that 
were held demonstrated clear, sustained and enthusiastic support by the 
rank-and-file for the union's strategy. The barstaff maintained their 
industrial action and their unity ensured that the union was able to secure 
a satisfactory settlement. In 1970 the union's members in the licensed hotels 
would again demonstrate their determination by sustaining direct action and 
winning a substantial rise in their wages. (see Epilogue) Generally it was 
this sector, especially the male barstaff, and the male cooks, that were the 
most active in the union, both as participants in general meetings and as 
the source which provided most of the members for the executive. 
By the end of the 1960's the union was stable, large and financially 
secure. Its weakness remained in the low level of union consciousness 
and activity amongst the majority of its members, especially those in the 
tearooms and in the private hotels. While its past gains had been largely 
achieved by the union's executive and officials, both 1967 and 1970 
provided powerful examples of action being successfully undertaken by 
the union's rank-and-file under the leadership of its executive. However, 
the full picture of the union, its members and their experiences would be 
incomplete without depicting the special features of the union's largest 
group of workers, women. 
7. WOMEN 
Women workers, like their male counterparts, were affected by the 
improvements in wages and conditions that the CHWU secured for its 
1. see CHW Min 1956 b 1970 
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members in the course of the post-war era; but they were not 
affected in the same way, for there were a number of special 
circumstances that shaped their experiences in the workplace and within 
the union itself. Their work, their pay and their power changed 
little between 1945 and 1970 relative to male workers in the industry. 
The division of labour between male and female workers was in essence 
the same as it had been since the end of the First World War. 
Cooking, serving and cleaning were tasks performed overwhelmingly 
by women. Males did dominate the higher skilled strata of chefs in 
the licensed hotels, but in other grades and in other establishments 
such as hospitals and private hotels virtually all kitchen workers 
were women. A similar exclusiveness applied to the serving of food 
where waitresses and female counterhands constituted the workforce. 
Women also were the main source of cleaners in the hospitals and 
private hotels and the maids in the licensed hotels. In short, to 
work in most sections of a hospital, tearoom, or hotel was to work 
almost exclusively amongst women. The only areas exempt from 
this pattern were the higher strata of chefs, the hospital orderlies and 
the barstaff. 
It was in the serving of liquor that a change to the traditional 
division of labour did occur. Since the Licensing Amendment Act 
of 1910, the employment of barmaids in New Zealand had been 
proscribed and those already in employment gradually departed from 
the trade. Thus, for the next 50 years the serving of liquor in 
New Zealand was a task that society assigned almost exclusively to 
men. Internationally the function of serving liquor was 
assigned by some societies to men, by others to women, 
and yet by others to both. 1 Such was the cultural 
For a discussion of the division of labour in restaurants 
in the USA see J. P. Spradley and B. J. Mann. The Cocktail 
Waitress : Women's Work in a Man's World (New York : 
John Wiley & Sons, 1975) 
flexibility with which societies could determine the division of labour. 
In New Zealand in 1960 the law was again amended but this time 
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to permit the reintroduction of barmaids. 1 In the course of the rest of 
the decade there was a slow rise in the number of barmaids but the 
majority of staff continued to be men. For the CHWU, as for the 
other hotel workers unions, the priority was to protect the full-time 
employment of married men. They opposed the reintroduction of barmaids 
and after the enactment of the new law, they reached agreement with 
the Hotel Association to restrict the employment of barmaids. A joint 
committee of employers and union representatives was established in 
the various union districts to consider applications by employers to 
hire barmaids. No barmaid could be employed in a public bar without 
the committee's approval and no barman was to be dismissed and re-
placed by a barmaid. 2 The agreement was effective in maintaining 
the predominance of male barstaff for most of the 1960's. 
3 
While the agreement in the licensed hotels was generally supported by 
the employers, problems did arise in the chartered clubs and in the 
licensed restaurants. In the late 1950's certain chartered clubs uti Ii sing 
an anomaly in the law were able to employ women to serve liquor.4 
More importantly however, the CHWU discovered that women were 
being illegally employed in licensed restaurants to serve liquor. They 
complained to the Licensing Control Commission but rather than agreeing 
with the union the Commission decided to give a new interpretation 
to the law. Henceforth, a waitress could be employed to serve wine 
providing they were 25 years of age or over. 5 The union made its 
criticisms known to the Commission, but was unable to change the 
decision. 
In the 1960's the principle of equal pay for men and women had 
continued to be strongly held by the union, but it was only partially 






Licensing Arndt Act 1961 op cit 
CHW Min 12 Dec 1961 
Agreement was reaffirmed in 1967 CHW E Min 12 Jun 1967 
CHW E Min 9 Oct 1957, 21 May 1958 
The Press 12 Apr 1965; Short to Harris 14 Apr, H to S 
28 Apr, & S to H 30 Apr 1965 CTC A3r 1965. 
' 
kitchenstaff in the licensed hotels. Similarly,, cleaners and barstaff -
since the reintroduction of barmaids in 1961 - together with casual 
waiters and waitresses had also gained equal pay. Fulltime waiters and 
waitresses remained, however, on different rates of pay. Outside of 
the licensed hotels, lower rates of pay for female workers persisted. 
While there was no particular financial incentive. for employers in 
licensed hotels to prefer women workers, the employers in the other 
sectors stood to make a larger profit from hiring lower paid women 
workers. As a consequence few men were ever employed in tearooms 
or private hotels and the award provisions for male wage rates were 
in reality only nominal. Compared to the women workers in the 
licensed hotels women in these sectors generally received a lower 
weekly income. 
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Aside from receiving a lower rate of pay for many jobs which were the 
same, women workers were also concentrated in the lower paid jobs 
in the industry. The differences in pay rates between jobs, in part, 
reflected differences in skills, with the higher pay rates applying to the 
more skilled work performed by chefs and senior cooks. Few women, 
however, occupied these jobs although many did work as second and 
third graded cooks. Among semiskilled and unskilled workers the 
differences in pay - for instanc.e. between barmen and waitresses and 
maids - was more a consequence of gender and trade union consciou'sness 
than purely a reflection of skill. Overall, the lowest paid jobs, namely 
as waitresses and maids, were o~cupied exclusively by women. 
In the period from 1945 to 1970, the relative position of waitresses 
and maids did improve compared to barmen, the largest group of male 
workers. As Table 5.3 shows while barmen remained ahead their margin 
TABLE 5.3 RELATIVE MOVEMENTS IN MALE AND FEMALE 
WAGE RATES 1945 TO 1970 
;.-
Weekly Wage Rates Licensed Hotels Award 
Item 1945!tl 1954(.[) 1965(£) 1970 ($) ( [) 
lfiaitress or 
Maid 3·16/6 7·15/4 11-16/9 37.04 (18·10) 
Barman 6-0 11-13/1 16·1/11 47.37 (23· 13/8) 
Kitchen hand 5-0 10-8/11 15·0/2 45.40 (22·14/9) 
Waitress rate as 
% or barman 
rutc 63.75% 66.6% 73.54% 78.19% 
Note: 
1. All rates include lJoard and loduing and services allowances 
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decreased. The ability to narrow the margin was constrained, however, by 
the wage rates for male and female workers elsewhere in the workforce, 
where higher rates for men tended to pull up that for barmen, while the 
lower rates for women, especially with the persistence of junior rates 
for the large number of female shop assistants tended to push down the 
pay of waitresses and maids. Even in 1970 these junior rates ranged from 
$14.15 a week to only $28.20 for 21 year olds. 
Low rates of pay were not the only problem that confronted women at 
the workplace. Sexual harassment by male employers, customers or workers, 
was a hazard of employment in hotels and restaurants as it was in many 
other occupations. Indeed, the overseas experience and the experience in 
colonial New Zealand, point.ed to the hotel bar as a high profile area for 
exploitation and harassment of women as workers and as customers. The 
passing of the Licensing Amendment Act in 1910 however led to the rapid 
removal of barmaids from hotels while through both legislation and social 
approbation, women largely ceased to be customers in the main bars of 
hotels. As a consequence the potential area of harassment was reduced 
through the removal, for other reasons, of the victims if not the offenders. 
In other areas of the hotel and to a lesser extent in tearooms and restaurants 
there continued to be contact between female workers and men. There is 
an absence of sufficient recorded evidence to establish accurately the degree 
and extent of harassment. It is unclear whether the incidence increased, 
declined or fluctuated but there are some isolated reports that do confirm 
that the problem existed. To some extent this absence of evidence could 
point to differences in social attitudes that accepted or submitted to 
behaviour of a kind that today would be identified as sexual harassment. 
One incident is reported, where the CHWU had no doubts as to the un-
acceptability of the employer's behaviour. At the Culverden Hotel in 
1939, the male employer was found not only to have failed to pay the 
wages of several women workers, but to have undertaken a campaign of 
"' 
harassment. Sexual favours were demanded by the employer, the boyfriends 
of staff prohibited from the premises and the female staff subjected to 
a continual campaign of spying. The staff had contacted the police, and 
the union supported the non-renewal of the hotel keepers licence. 1 
1. CHW E Min 24 May 1939; Also see EL 1 No. 18 1968 
or sexual harassment by French Rugby team in Auckland. 
' 
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There was one further dimension to the special circumstances of women 
workers, and that was their participation in the decisions and actions of 
the CHWU. The past pattern of male barstaff and cooks being the union's 
most active members continued on through the 1960's. At the level of 
rank-and-file involvement few women attended the union's general meetings, 
while at the level of the executive their participation in fact declined. 
In the 1940's there had been at least three women members of the 
executive, but out of a total of 10 positions in the 1960's there was a 
mere one or two held by women.
1 
Aside from one woman vice-president, 
all major positions secretary and assistant secretary were occupied 
exclusively by men. It was a pattern repeated throughout the country's 
hotel workers' unions with only two women having obtained the office of 
secretary, both in minor unions. 'Dot' Delaney, the long-serving secretary 
of the Southland Hotel Workers' Union became the fast woman president 
of the HWF in 1963, but her prominence was the exception~ Such a 
disparity was especially noticeable in relation to the composition of the 
union's membership two-thirds of whom were women. The low level of 
involvement reflected both the traditional difficulties in organising the 
small and dispersed workplaces where large numbers of women worked 
and the part-time and casual nature of much of the female workforce. 
Yet it also reflected the shared attitudes of male and female workers 
that men had a more important and legitimate role to play in the union. 
Thus, while the full-time male workers had developed a tradition of 
activity in the union's affairs there was no expectation that women would 
do the same and no specific campaign was launched by the union in the 
1960's to encourage such involvement. Moreover, as with workers as a 
whole, the absence of any severe exploitation in the industry, removed 
any compelling necessity to become involved in the union's affairs, with 
many being content to leave the direction of the CHWU to the executive. 
8. NEW ADVANCES: 1968 & 1969 
The last two years of the 1960's saw a number of gains being made 
by the CHWU, but not without considerable struggle. This struggle 
was however confined to the courts and conciliation. In 1968 the major 
1. 
2. 
see CHW ARs 1955 to 1970 
CHW E Min 2 Sep 1963. The other secretary was Ms 
Mitchell in Nelson in the 1940's. There was a woman president 
Ms Green in Southland in the 1930's. 
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battle arose over the issueing of a General Wage Order by the Arbitration 
Court. This issue was fought by the FOL and while the CHWU gave 
its support it was not necessary for them to take any direct action. 
The HWF had already completed its award negotiations in early 1968, 
n evertheless most of the increases it had obtained in wage rates only 
partially compensated for the rise in prices since the previous negotiations. 
In order to rectify the decline in real wages of workers, the FOL 
applied to the Arbitration Court for a General Wage Order. The court, 
however, rejected the application and issued the now 'infamous' nil 
wage order. While it agreed that a small fall in real wages had occurred 
the court declined to compensate for this fall on the basis that the 
New Zealand economy was in a poor condition. In response industrial 
action was initiated by several of the FOL's affiliated unions and after 
a new combined approach by the FOL and the Employers' Federation, 
the court reconsidered its position and issued a 5% General Wage Order 
in August 1968.
2 
For the CHWU, the overall effect of its award 
negotiations and the GWO was to produce a small rise in the real 
incomes of its members. In some instances a more substantial gain was 
made, through increases in the service allowances in the licensed hotels 
that were negotiated in the 1968 award. For instance, kitchenstaff 
secured the same level of allowance that was paid to barstaff, once they 
had completed 12 month's service.
3 
Previously the latter had received 
an allowance of $1.55 per week but kitchen workers merely 75c. Now 
both were paid $1.59 per week. In addition waitresses and maids in the 
licensed hotels also obtained a rise in their service allowance to $1.39 
from 75c. 
In the following year the union's members benefited from improvements 
in their leave entitlement and holiday pay. Workers were now eligible for 
long service leave, a provision which had already been recently obtained 
in several other industries. Henceforth after a worker completed 20 years 





B Aw 68 (1968} p1281 
Ibid p1334. The employer and worker representatives on the 
court both supported the increase, while judge Tyndall 
believed that 5% was still too high. 
Ibid p97 
special leave, with the entitlement rising to five weeks special leave 
after 40 years service. 1 The second change to conditions occurred in 
the payment for annual holidays, which was negotiated with the gov-
ernment by the FOL on behalf of all trade unions. Where previously 
the basis for determining holiday pay had been the ordinary weekly 
wage, from 1969 onwards the rate was set according to the "average 
weekly taxable earnings", a figure which included overtime and special 
payments. The level of the new figure was set at a maximum of 30% 
above that of the ordinary rate.2 However the HWF was able to 
agree with their employers to amend their awards so as to include the 
penalty rates paid for Saturday and Sunday within the definition of 
the ordinary rate.3 This raised the effective maximum and together 
with special payments and overtime, the overall effect was to substan-
tially raise the holiday pay for the CHWU's members. 
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It was in the area of award coverage, that the most significant deve-
lopments occurred for the union in 1969. On the one hand the union 
fought and lost a battle over which of its awards should cover certain 
types of motels. On the other the union achieved two notable successes 
by expanding its coverage into two new areas, namely Rest Homes and 
the Air New Zealand Flight Kitchen. 
The dispute over award coverage in the motel sector had begun in 
1968, although it was not settled until 1969. While the majority of 
motels continued to be drive-in accommodation facilities, some bearing 
the same motel nomenclature had developed very different characteristics. 
A normal motel was covered by the Private Hotels Award and as such 
operated no liquor facilities. Some establishments designated as motels 
did provide liquor facilities but operated under a tourist hotel licence 
and despite their designation were covered by the Licensed Hotel Award. 
The problem area for the CHWU was rather with those motels operating 
a licensed restaurant facility not under a tourist hotel licence. By remaining ,.. 
under the Private Hotels Award they could pay a lowerpay rate than that 




B Aw 69 (1969) p2736 (LH); 
see CHW AR 1970-1 
B Aw 69 (1969) p2736 
From the union's perspective these hybrids of motels with a restaurant 
attached or in close proximity, were operating a profitable liquor 
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outlet yet paying poor wages while competing with a normal licensed 
hotel. In order to rectify this problem, the HWF and the Hotel 
Association agreed in 1968 to extend the award definition of the licensed 
hotel industry so as to include 'licensed motels' and 'motels with Licensed 
1 
Restaurants attached'. For the moment the Arbitration Court accepted 
this extension but it reserved the right to rule on the principle of 
coverage when the motels concerned lodged a specific case in the court. 
In December 1968 the specific issue of award coverage came before 
the court and it duly ruled against the HWF and against the inclusion 
of such motels within the Licensed Hotel Award. 2 While accepting that 
these motels did show a number of similarities to a licensed hotel, 
the court also held that there were important differences. To include 
these motels within the Licensed Hotel Award, would in the courts view, 
lead to their domination by the employers of the licensed hotels in award 
negotiations resulting in settlements acceptable to the majority group but 
possibly quite unacceptable to the motel employers. Forcing their 
inclusion would be likely to generate more problems than it would solve. 
In the meantime, unti I the nature of motel operations developed further, 
the motel would remain within the Private Hotels Award and any ass-
ociated licensed restaurant within the scope of the Tearooms Award.3 
The union s did however achieve success in their second battle over 
award coverage, namely the securing of an award for workers in Rest 
Homes. Small, privately owned rest homes had emerged in the 1960's 
to provide permanent accommodation together with meals and support 
services for the aged. In 1968 the CHWU had cited the 'Cedar Nursing 
Home', a Christchurch rest home, as a party to the Private Hotels Award.
4 
The home employed a staff of 10, including three with nursing or nurse 
aid training, to service its 20 elderly residents. In deciding against the union's ,,,. 
application the Arbitration Court ruled that such a home was distinct from 
1. B Aw 68 (1968) p97 see Memorandum attached. 
2. B Aw 68 ( 1968) p2178 
3. Ibid 
4. Ibid p1931 
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a private hotel in that its services were not for the general public, 
but rather were only suitable for a specific group, i.e. the aged. As 
an alternative claim, the CHWU had sought to include the rest homes 
within the Private Hospitals Award. This was also rejected by the court, 
on the grounds that a hospital provided medical care, while a rest home 
furnished no such care but simply a place of residence.
1 
The decisions of the Arbitration Court, while legally sound, still left 
the domestic workers in rest homes bereft of award protection. In 
response to this the CHWU decided to initiate an award to specifically 
cover rest homes. In July 1969 the union obtained an award covering 
20 Christchurch rest homes, which included all their staff except for 
d "d . 2 nurses an m1 -wives. This was a first for New Zealand and provided 
a 40 hour week, with special payments for work on weekends and special 
holidays. Allowances were provided for broken shifts, night work, transport 
and uniforms and the wage rates were generally comparable to workers 
in the hospital sector. 
While the CHWU had been expanding its coverage to rest home workers, 
the AHWU had negotiated an award with Air New Zealand for their 
Auckland ground kitchen. Settled in February 1969, the new award 
covered those workers who prepared the food for cabin service~ In 
August this new award was extended to the Christchurch flight kitchen.
4 
The wages and conditions compared favourably with the union's leading 
award for the licensed hotels and indeed certain entitlements in respect 
of conditions were superior. For instance, all shift workers received 
three weeks annual holiday entitlement, while all staff were eligible 
for sick leave. No workers under the Licensed Hotel Award were eligible 
for comparable entitlements. 
By the end of 1969, the membership of the CHWU encompassed 
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B Aw 69 (1969) p1471. The court award embodied the 
agreement reached in negotiations between the union and 
the rest home employers. 
B Aw 69 (1969) p160 
Ibid p1683 
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public and private hospitals, chartered clubs, tearooms, takeaway bars 
and restaurants, industrial cafeterias, rest homes and the Air New Zealand 
Flight Kitchen. The union's membership exceeded 5,000 workers including 
full-time, part-time and casual employees, and the majority of members 
were women. In the years from 1956 to 1969 the union had become a 
stronger and richer organisation, while securing for its members a rise in 
their real wages, through both the weekly wage, but also through allowances 
and changes to the basis of payments. In addition there had been some 
improvements to conditions. Nevertheless, much remained to be done and 
the effects of rising prices in 1969 and 1970 began to erode the gains 
in wages. In 1970 the CHWU confronted this challenge and undertook 
the most significant campaign of industrial action in its history. 
CHAPTER 6: EPILOGUE 
1970: A NEW MILITANCY 
The last years of the 1960's revealed fractures in the industrial 
tranquility that had been so pervasive throughout labour relations 
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in New Zealand since 1955. The break had become clearly visible in 
1968 after the FOL had successfully challenged the Arbitration Court 
over the nil General Wage Order. The direct industrial action taken by 
several of its affiliates in support of its claim for a wage rise marked the 
beginning of the demise of the approach of the recent past. 
The process of breakdown had its origins in the peaceful decade that 
followed 1951. 1 Industrialisation and labour shortages enabled those unions 
in a position of industrial strength to obtain ruling wage rates substan-
tially above the minimum rates prescribed in awards. Separate settle-
ments were entered into between these unions and individual companies 
especially in the Auckland district. As the Arbitration Court tried to 
maintain the consistency and relativity between awards it tended to 
produce conservative decisions that lead to frustration among many trade 
unionists. Those unions in less industrially strategic positions, who continued 
within the traditional award system, such as the hotel workers, wit-
nessed the decline in their award rates relative to the actual rates 
of pay being secured by the stronger unions. By the middle years 
of the 1960's there was a growing tendency for unions to leap-frog 
one another in order to maintain their relativities. Increasingly, direct 
action proved to be the most effective and expeditious means of 
achieving such ends. Inflation further fuelled the problem, but under-
lying the chorus of claims for higher wages, was a rising expectation 
among workers as to the standard of living to which they believed they 
were entitled in a period which had produced a substantial rise in the 
total wealth of the nation. 
By 1970, there was a current of industrial tension in the thoughts 
and actions of employers and workers. The arbitration system was 
proving unable to meet the demands of labour with many employers 
1. see N. S. Woods op cit 
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resisting a settlement in conciliation and relying instead on the Arbit-
ration Court to impose a more conservative decision. At the annual 
conference of the Federation of Labour in May 1970, president, Tom 
Skinner, articulated the frustrations of the labour movement with the 
situation: 
It has been this pattern of stone-walling {Py 
employers) which has compelled the unions to 
turn away from the full machinery of concil-
iation and arbitration and instead to insist 
on settlements directly with their employers 
..... In the final analysis, workers have little 
choice but to move away from reliance on 
arbitration and engage in direct bargaining 
with their employers.
1 
The successes already achieved by direct action, and the comments of 
the FOL president did not pass unnoticed by either the leadership or 
the members of the CHWU. In Canterbury, as elsewhere, there was a 
growing demand among hotel, hospital and restaurant workers, that their 
wages needed to be raised, urgently and 'substantially. Their thinking 
was influenced by the daily news and daily experience of rising prices, 
but also by an awareness of a loss of relativity to other workers, 
whose direct action had secured for them higher rates of pay. In March 
1970 the HWF had negotiated a 13% rise in pay for public hospital 
workers,2 but the pressure for a larger and immediate increase in the 
licensed hotels continued to build. 3 In response, the federation decided 
to initiate the early renegotiation of the Licensed Hotel Award, which 
was not due to expire until November. 
On 1 July, the HWF met with the Hotel Association, but the assoc-
iation declined to discuss the union's claims until they had consulted 
their own members further. They proposed that the opening of formal 
negotiations be postponed until 22 July. Such a delay was rejected by 
the HWF who were anxious to achieve the earliest possible increase in 
pay. In response they decided to place pressure upon the employers 
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meetings in the country's major cities. In excess of 700 licensed hotel 
workers attended Christchurch's stop-work meeting on 6 July. 1 Short, 
the CHWU secretary, spoke of the increased wages secured by other workers 
and the consequent loss of relativity for hotel workers. Moreover, he 
noted, the employers were enjoying sufficient profitability to enable 
them to pay a higher wage. Walker, secretary of the CTC and the Can-
terbury branch of the Brewery Workers Union, followed Short and 
pledged the support of the Canterbury Trades Council. After further 
discussion, the union president R. Ferguson, put the motion to cease 
work for the remainder of the day and to withdraw their labour on 
each future Saturday. No total strike would be undertaken but instead 
selective action would occur the employer's highest day of trading, 
Saturday. While workers would lose some income they would still be 
able to maintain a reasonable weekly wage and sustain the action for 
a longer period. 
How long the campaign might last, was unknown, but with the strong 
support for action shown by workers in Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch, the HWF re-entered negotiations with a strengthened 
position. With the unions seeking a 30% wage increase, the employers 
were only prepared to offer a 15% rise. As a consequence a further 
series of stop-work meetings were held on Friday 17 Jul/ They 
confirmed their leadership's rejection of the 15% offer, while in Wellington 
the workers decided to expand the industrial action to include Fridays 
as well as Saturday. At the Christchurch meeting, members authorised 
the executive to enter into separate agreements with any hotelkeeper 
who was prepared to grant a 30% wage increase to all male and female 
employees. In addition an emergency fund was established to provide 
financial aid to any worker temporarily in difficulty.3 
A pattern had now evolved, of weekly negotiation, a stop-work meeting 
on the Friday, followed by industrial action on the Saturday. This ,,,. 
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resolve and the employers were placed under increasing pressure. In 
Canterbury, industrial action was being undertaken by all three sections 
of licensed hotel staff - the barstaff, kitchen workers and those employed 
in the accommodation side of the hotel. Geographically, action was 
centred in Christchurch but included the approximately dozen hotels in 
Lyttelton, Governor's Bay and Kaiapoi, three centres close to Christ-
church. Morale among the workers continued to remain high throughout 
July, and indeed the freedom from work on Saturdays enabled many 
workers to participate in weekend social activities which their normal pattern 
of work had often precluded. Some staff, living"in at their place of work 
had the ironic treat of seeing their employers or managers working, while 
they themselves were still able to receive the accommodation and meals 
provided under the award. 
Meanwhile at the negotiating table the employers had altered their offer 
to provide a range of increases from 11 to 16.5%. This was as unaccept-
able as before to the HW F but the employers had agreed to move on the 
union's second claim to bring the date for commencing any new rates 
forward to 6 July. This was the situation that the CHWU reported back 
to its members on 24 July. 1 The executive recommended that while the 
new wage offer was unacceptable, industrial action for Saturday should be 
suspended pending further negotiations. However, this was decisively 
rejected by the stop-work meeting, where a secret ballot showed a 
2 
majority of 322 to 202 in favour of continuing the industrial action. 
While the ranks of the workers were exhibiting firm determination, those 
of the employers were showing signs of division. From as early as 8 
July there had been reports that some of the independent publicans in 
Christchurch had favoured a more generous offer than that of the 
3 
brewery-company-dominated Hotel Association. Approaches had been made 
by some publicans to the CHWU and on 24 July The Press reported that 
faight city hotel owners had agreed to a 30% wage rise. 4 In the meantime 
the HWF had proceeded to complete negotiations with the tearoom and 
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a 20% rise in wages. This had the effect of strengthening the HWF's 
position in relation to the licensed hotel employers, as any offer less 
than 20% would produce rates less in the licensed hotels than in the other 
traditionally weaker sections. (In reality the lower rates of pay for most 
women workers in tearooms and private hotels would still leave these 
sections in arrears, but the full male rate would be lower.) 
Faced with the developments within its own sector and in the tearooms 
and private hotels, the employers raised their wage offer to 25% for all 
male and female workers, including casuals, effective from 6 July 1970. 2 
In addition, the night shift allowance for waitresses would be increased, 
the entitlement to an annual holiday of three weeks became available 
after only three years of service - instead of the previous five-and for the 
first time a paid sick leave provision of five days per annum was intro-
duced. The HWF recommended the acceptance of the offer and the 
stop-work meetings voted overwhelmingly in favour of endorsement.3 
The dispute was now over and it was clear that the unions had achieved 
a major victory. To explain why there was such a victory is to ask first, 
about the relative strengths of the contenders and second, the topography 
of the field in which the duel was fought. The HWF decided upon a 
strategy and set of tactics that proved appropriate to their goals. There 
was a considered national decision, which did not suffer from the disorder 
of spontaneity or regional dissent. While the strategy ensured that the 
employers did suffer financially the jobs and incomes of workers were 
maintained and enabled them to sustain the action. As in 1967, indus-
. trial action was focussed on the major centres where the union was 
strong, while other towns such as Gisborne continued to work normal 
hours but sent financial assistance to workers taking action~ The union's 
leadership remained sufficiently united throughout the course of the 
campaign and was able to keep in close contact with members through the 
regular weekly stop-work meetings. The fundamental strength on the union's 
>~side was the commitment and unity of rank-and-file members, who were 
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substantial rise in their annual wage. They were convinced they had a 
good case and showed suficient confidence in themselves and their leaders 
to believe they could win. Nor was their confidence undermined by the 
emergence of any complicating factors. Throughout the dispute the focus 
remained on a 30% wage rise backdated to 6 July. In contrast, the 
employers, despite their initial resistance, showed a lack of unity and 
resolve and were not prepared to sustain financial losses for more 
than one month. 
The environment in which the issue was played out was also favourable 
to the union. There was relatively full-employment which removed the 
fear of being made jobless and limited the prospect of 'scab' labour; 
there was sufficient prosperity to enable workers to sustain a temporary 
loss in income. Moreover there was little prospect of any immediate 
intervention by the state on behalf of the employers nor was there any 
economic controls which prevented the union seeking such a rise. The 
media, in Christchurch at least, was neutral towards the action and 
did not portray the hotel workers as 'militants', ~communists' or 
'privileged workers'. Thus there was little media or indeed public pressure 
upon the union urging it to acquiesce to the employers as the union 
action left them largely unharmed. Finally, the union had the support 
of the· trade union movement and could rely on action by brewery 
workers and b~ewery tanker drivers if the situation became difficult. 
These then were the elements in the equation, but ultimately as a contest 
between people the result could never be predicted with certainty. The 
particular settlement was a consequence of the specific interplay of the 
negotiators and their members. While in broad terms the substantial 
achievements made by the HWF reflected the underlying situation, it 
was still conceivable that either side could have altered the outcome at 
various stages to produce a smaller or even a higher increase. 
Tile benefits secured in the licensed hotels flowed on to the workers 
in the hospitals and chartered clubs. In addition to the 17% that the 
HWF had obtained for public hospital workers in March, a further rise 
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of 13% was now negotiated.1 Private hospital workers received a total 
rise of 31% to reach a level of wage parity with the public sector,2 
while in the chartered clubs workers obtained a 25% rise,
3 
the same as 
that for the licensed hotels. Similarly, club workers also obtained a sick 
leave entitlement of five days per year under their new award. 
1970 had brought a significant advance by the union in its otherwise 
steady progress since the mid-1950's. While wage rates throughout the 
economy had moved by an average of 20% during 1970-71, the CHW 
had achieved a better than average gain. Overall there had been a rise 
in the real incomes of all the union's members and an improvement in 
their conditions of work, especially in respect of various leave entitle-
ments. Table 6.1 indicates the progress made in the union's largest sector 
the licensed hotels. In other sectors there had been similar progress and 
a noticable reduction in the gap between the conditions prevailing in 
the licensed hotels and those in the other sectors. 
The relative positions of the union's awards in 1970, continued to show 
that the licensed hotel sector possessed the best overall provision among 
the union's general awards. (see Table 6.1.) Although the new Flight 
Kitchen Award provided the best wages, except for kitchen hands for 
any single group of workers. As in the past the most significant 
difference between the wage rates of pay in the licensed hotels and those 
for hospitals, tearooms and private hotels, lay in the existence of lower 
rates for women workers. With virtually all kitchen employees, serving 
and cleaning staff being women, it was their pay rate and not the award 
rate for men which was relevant to any comparison. In the 1970 round 
of negotiations the 25% increase obtained for the licensed hotels widened 
the margin over tearoom and private hotel workers who only received 
the 20% rise. Equal pay for equal work for all domestic workers, would 
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TABLE 6.1 LICENSED HOTEL AWARD: 
1955 TO 1970 
Item 1955 1965 1970 
Annual holidays 2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs 2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs 2 wks; 3 after 3 yrs 
Special holidays 9 10 10 L.S.1 
Saturday/Sunday Both TY:. Both TY:. Both TY:. 
Sick leave days 
p.a. 5 
Wages : Weekly: £ £3 $3 (app£) 
Chef 10+ hk 13-19/7 18-16/2 55.57 (27-15/8) 
Chef 6hk 11-11/9 15-11/7 46.54 (23-5/5) 
Chef 4 hk 10-14 14-9/1 43.44 (21-14/5) 
2nd cook 4 hk 8-10 11-16/10 36.08 (18-0/9) 
Kitchen hand 8-6 11-11/3 35.40 ( 17-14/0) 
Waitress or maid 5-12/5 8-8/3 26.96 (13.9/7) 
Barman 8-17/2 to 9-10/22 12-13/52 37.29 ( 18-12/11) 
Add board & lodging 4 2-2/11 3-8/6 10.08 ( 5-0/9) 
Wages Casual eer day 
Chef5 2-2/1 to 2-16/2 3-11 /1 9.76 (4-17/7) 
Waitress (single meal) 6 18s 4d 1-2/9 2.45 (M/6) 
Cleaners on contract 
(hourly) 6s 9d(M) 5s 7d (Fl 18/3 1.02 ( 10s 2d) 
Barman 2-9/2 3-2/6 9-13 (4-11/3) 
Note (see Note on Tables) 
1. Long Service leave 
2. Includes service allowance of 13s 
3. Include service allowance of 15/6 week barstaff and 7/6 week other 
workers (1965) and allowance of 1.74 for all 1970 
4. Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid 
5. Lower rate for less than 3 hk; higher rate 3 hk plus 1955, 1965 & 
1970 all kitchens. 
6. For first 2 hours. 
Item Licensed Hotels Private Hotels 
Annual holidays 2 wks; 3 after 2 wks; 3 after 
5 yrs 10 yrs 
Special holidays 10 & LS2 10 & LS 
Saturday/Sunday Both\% Both TY, 
Sick leave days p.a. 5 
TABLE 6.2 INTER-AWARD COMPARISON, 1970 
Tearooms 
2 wks; 3 after 
10 yrs 
10 & LS 
Sat TY:. Sun OT 
Chartered Clubs 
2 wks; 3 in 
10 & LS 
Sat TY, Sun OT 
5 
Public Hospitals 
2 wks; 3 after 
5 yrs 
10 & LS 
Sat TY, Sun OT 
10 
Wages : Weekly (inc B & u 3 $ $ $ $ $ 
... 
1st cook 4hk 
2nd cook 4hk 
Kitchen hand 
Waitress or maid 
Barmen/Steward 
Porter/Orderly 
Wages : Casual per day 
1st cook 7 
Waitress (single meall 8 

















































Negotiated in March 1971 
Long Service Leave 
Wage rates include each value of board and lodgings 
Includes Service allowance of $1.74 for all LH staff 
Rate for stewards serving alcohol for more than 20 hrs per week. 
In addition eligible for various special allowances related to tasks performed 
Rate for first 5 days in LH, but only first 3 days in PH & T and thereafter at ordinary rates. 
For first two hours 
Pro-rata of weekly rate plus 15 or 20%. Casuals rarely used in hospitals. 
Private Hospitals 1 
2 wks; 3 after 
5 yrs 
10 & LS 










Rest Homes 1 Air N.Z. 
Flight Kitchens 
2 wks; 3 after 2 & 3 wk 
5 yrs 
10 10 











Growth and success were the two central characteristics of the CHWU's 
first sixty years of activity. The growth of the union from 294 members 
in 1908 to more than 5,000 in 1970, was a consequence of the expansion 
of the hotel and restaurant industry and the extension of the union's 
coverage into new areas such as hospitals, chartered clubs and rest homes. 
Growth within the industry had been uneven, with the largest expansion 
occurring in the tearoom sector, while the number of licensed hotels 
had largely remained static. The mode of operation in the industry and 
the pattern of ownership had also undergone change. By 1970 the typical 
licensed hotel in Canterbury was a tavern providing alcohol but no accomm-
odation; the typical private hotel was a modern self-contained motel, while 
an array of diverse food outlets, from tearooms to takeaway bars and 
restaurants had developed in the tearoom sector. The pattern of family 
or individual ownership still predominated in the tearoom and private 
hotel sectors, but in the licensed hotels corporate enterprise in the form of 
Dominion and New Zealand Breweries dominated. Some corporate enterprise 
did exist in the tearoom sector, where department stores had a traditional 
share of the luncheon and afternoon tea segment of the market, and the 
formation of the joint New Zealand-American enterprise, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, further increased the role played by corporate operations. The 
overall expansion and continuing prosperity of the industry assisted the 
union by providing an economic environment that favoured the securing 
of better wages and conditions. The change towards more corporate 
ownership, tended to distinguish more clearly between employer and workers, 
reducing the family or personal relations hips at the workplace which had 
generally lessened the level of trade union consciousness. Nevertheless, 
the continuing supremacy of family and individual ownership in numerous 
small tearooms helped to ensure that union consciousness did remain 
weak in this sector of the industry. 
The success of the CHWU in raising the real wages of its members and 
improving their conditions of work, was in part a consequence of the 
general material progress obtained by the New Zealand trade union movement 
in the course of the twentieth century. Such progress reflected the rise 
in the national economic prosperity of New Zealand, but the labour 
movement had to struggle to secure its share of that wealth, and in turn 
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the CHWU and the other hotel workers' unions had to strive to ensure 
their members at least maintained the level of their incomes relative to 
other workers. In comparison to similar groups of workers in New Zealand 
(i.e. groups of largely unskilled or semi-skilled women workers) the CHWU 
achieved a greater rise in the levels of real incomes. In relation to hotel 
and restaurant workers in other western nations, those in New Zealand 
achieved a greater degree of success both in terms of their wages and 
conditions and in the universality of union coverage. Internationally, 
hotel and restaurant workers were among the poorest paid sections of 
the working class, and where union coverage did exist it was confined 
usually to the licensed hotel sector. 
The reasons for the success of the CHWU were a combination of structural 
and political factors. Compulsory arbitration and compulsory unionism had 
given the union strength and security in negotiating and enforcing awards. 
It further provided the union with a suficiently large membership base to 
finance a strong union organisation. With the union operatingthroughout 
the labour market for hotel and restaurant workers no sector with low 
paid non-union labour could emerge to undermine the overall wage levels 
of the industry's workers. The close association with the wider labour 
movement over several decades, and in particular with the Labour govern-
ment between 1935 and 1949, ensured that the problems facing the union's 
members were given attention and that the union exercised an important 
influence in shaping decisions affecting its members. The influence within 
the movement possessed by the CHWU and the Hotel Workers Federation, 
was a consequence firstly of the size of their membership and finances, 
and secondly a result of the determined and skilled leadership shown by 
individuals such as Young, Brooks and Short. For while the structural 
and political factors clearly brought opportunities to the CHWU to improve 
the wages and conditions of workers, it required competent leadership 
backed by a united organisation, to exploit them successfully. 
f'hroughout its history the industrial strategy pursued by the CHWU was 
one of caution. It was an approach which had enabled the union to 
survive the dark years of the early 1930's and yet had not prevented it 
from securing several important advances in the wages and conditions of 
work of its members. From 1908 until 1967, the union pursued its 
objectives without recourse to either strike action or on-the-job agitation. 
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Such an experience was typical of the other hotel workers' unions, except 
in two instances. The Auckland and Wellington hotel workers' unions had 
both taken industrial action in the 1952 licensed hotel dispute, while the 
Auckland union had participated in the general strike of 1913. As the 
third largest union in the industry, the CHWU could have been expected 
to have undertaken some industrial action in 1952, but Brooks and the 
CHWU executive were not confident of membership support. Rather, 
from the foundation of the union until 1967, the primary weapons 
of the CHWU's arsenal were the skills of its officials and the sanction of 
the law. When award negotiations became particularly difficult the union 
benefited from being part of a united federation and to some extent 
could rely on the prospect of industrial action by the AHWU to place 
pressure upon the employers. It was a distinct change, therefore, when the 
CHWU took strike action in 1967 and again in 1970. In both instances, 
the resolve and unity shown by the licensed hotel workers demonstrated 
that a new dimension had been added to the union's strength. 
The CHWU had retained its identity as an autonomous union but with a 
reputation for loyalty to the labour movement. It determined its own 
direction on industrial and political issues, but pursued a path of close 
cooperation with the Hotel Workers' Federation and with the wide.r labour 
movement. Within the movement the size and resources of the union had 
given it considerable influence, but unlike unions such as the freezing 
workers, watersiders or miners, it lacked a traditional militancy at the 
workplace. Without this strength it had been unable to play a leading 
role in industrial struggle. The successful industrial action of 1967 and 1970, 
had shown that the CHWU did possess a substantial degree of support 
at the workplace which could be mobilized to obtain the union's demands. 
It was a power nevertheless still confined to licensed hotel workers. 
Moreover, the force of the union's demands for better wages and condit-
ions remained subject to two further constraints: the majority of its members 
lacked a monopoly of certain skills that other trade unionists could use to ,,_ 
bid-up the price of their labour, and the workforce as a whole was not in 
a strategic position in the economy which could be used to gain bargaining 
leverage. These factors limited the heights to which the CHWU could 
aspire to reach in the overall hierarchy of wage rates. 
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In the course of the first sixty-two years of its existence, the CHWU 
had experienced the adversities, dissensions and challenges that had 
confronted the working class. Its members had suffered the scars of 
depression, the hardships of low pay, long hours and squalid work-places 
and had been subject throughout their working day to the power of the 
employer. Their response had not been that of stronger and more militant 
unions, but they had, nevertheless, struggled to defend their interests 
and to contribute to the general defence of the labour movement. 
In 1908, the workers in hotels and restaurants had been at the margins 
of the working class: isolated from one another and the wider working 
class, and outside of the struggle of the labour movement. In the early 
years of the century they developed a sectional consciousness - an 
awareness of the antagonistic nature of their interests and those of the 
industry's employers but not one which identified themselves with other 
workers. In the course of six decades of union activity, a consciousness 
evolved which did identify with the interests of labour, both the Labour 
Party and the trade union movement. This development was uneven, 
with many members of the CHWU working in tearooms and private hotels 
having not moved beyond a sectional consciousness. Nevertheless, hotel, 
hospital and restaurant workers, generally saw themselves as part of the 
working class - their experiences at work, family relation.ships and values 
constituted the matrix of this consciousness. It was not a revolutionary 
class consciousness. Workers did not seek the destruction of capitalism, 
either by radical reform or sudden revolution, but it was none-the-less 
a consciousness of a distinct and opposing set of interests determined 
by the economic and social relationship of class. 
By the end of 1970 the CHWU represented a large and growing group 
of workers who formed an increasingly large section of the New Zealand 
working class. On the margins of that class in 1908 they had by 1971 













APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT 
EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CHWU 
EVENT 
Canterbury Hotel & Restaurant Workers Union formed 
on 24 Feb. Hon J. Barr (M LC) elected president; R. T. 
Bailey elected as secretary. 
First award in Canterbury for licensed hotel workers in 
May. Provides 65 hr week and covers Chch city. 
Union joins CTLC. 
First award in Canterbury for tearoom workers in December 
provides for 62 hr week (males) and 52 hr week 
(females) and covers Chch city. 
Barr elected to replace Bailey as secretary. 
Union disaffiliates from CTLC. 
Licensing Amendment Act prohibits hiring new barmaids. 
LH award extended to outer Chch and hrs cut to 62 
(males) and 52 (females) in LH. 
First LH award in South Canterbury. Covers Timaru and 
Washdyke. 
Waihi strike. CHWU takes no action. 
Shops & Offices Act amended permitting Arbitration Court 
to provide six day week for hotel and restaurant workers. 
General Strike. AHWU strikes in support of six day 
week. No action by CHWU. 
Arbitration Court grants six-day week in hotel and 
tearoom awards. 
Six o'clock closing introduced for LH bars as temporary 
war measure. 
Barr resigns as secretary and seceded by Evans. 
Private Hotels included for first time in a Canterbury 
award. 
Hours of work in hotels and tearooms cut to 56 (males) 
Evans resigns as secretary and is succeeded by R. A. Brooks. 















Prohibition fails to win December referendum 
by only 3263 votes. 
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Brooks resigns as secretary and is replaced by Gilmore 
for three months, but returns in February 1921. 
East begins 15 year term as president. 
48 hour week introduced for hotels and tearooms 
by Shops & Offices Act. 
Arbitration Court orders wage cut of 5/- per week in 
May and a further cut of 3/- to 1/6 in December. 
CHWU joins CTLC, NCLRC and HWF. 
Dominion awards established for LH and tearooms. 
CHWU leaves CTLC. 
Dominion award for PH. 
HWF affiliates to the Alliance of Labour. 
Brooks resigns as secretary and is replaced by Niall. 
Niall forced to resign by CHWU executive. Brooks 
returns as secretary for third and final time. 
In line with government policy, Arbitration Court cuts 
wages by 10%. 
Government abolishes compulsory arbitration. 
PH and tearoom awards expire. 
HWF secures protection from Arbitration Court for 
minimum wage rates for women in PH. 
Young elected secretary of HWF. 
After lengthy struggle, HWF accepts 5% cut in 
LH award. 
Unemployment reaches 79,435 
Labour government elected. 
Labour government introduced 40 hr week, minimum wage 
and compulsory unionism. Compulsory arbitration and 
10% wage cut of 1931 restored. 














East dies and Wilson elected as new president, beginning 
16 year term in office. 
FOL formed and CHWU affiliates to reorganised Canterbury 
Trades Council. Brooks elected as council secretary 
(resigns 1938). 
Wage rates in CHWU awards reach peak level. 
CHWU begins organising domestic workers in public 
hospitals and chartered clubs. 
First industrial agreements obtained for public hospital 
workers. 
J. A. Lee expelled from Labour Party. CHWU supports 
expulsion. 
First award for public hospital workers. 
Brooks reelected secretary of CTC. 
General Wage Order of 5% issued. 
Second GWO issued of 5%. Economic Stabilization 
introduced. 
Conflict between CHWU and HWF reaches crisis. CHWU 
organises disaffiliation of South Island unions but ultim-
ately no withdrawal occurs. 
Annual Holidays Act provides for two weeks paid leave 
a year. 
First licensing trust created in lnvercargill. 
First full round of award negotiations since 1940. Rises 
of between 10 and 11 /-. 
Contract cleaning of hospitals begins in Chch. 
Royal Commission on Licensing recommends national-
isation of the brewery industry. Young of the HWF 
opposes plan. 
40 hr week extended to PH, tearooms and public 
hospitals. 
I 














Penalty rates of pay introduced in LH, PH and chartered 
clubs for weekend work. 
Referendum favours maintaining six o'clock closing. 
Labour government defeated at November election. 
Split in FOL between Watersiders and National Executive. 
Young elected chairman of break-away Trade Union 
Congress. CHWU and other HWF affiliates oppose Young's 
association with TUC and force him to leave TUC. 
Waterfront dispute. CHWU remains neutral but sympathetic 
to watersiders. Young acts as mediator between National 
government and watersiders. 
Service allowance of 10/- week secured for barmen. 
Employers attempt to cut wages in LH award. Campaign 
led by AHWU and WHWU defeats attempt and gains 
further wage rise. 
Opposition group within CHWU attempts to defeat 
executive in election. After internal conflict, opposition group 
defeated. 
Brooks retires as secretary after 36 years and is succeeded 
by L. N. Short. 
CHWU moves its operations to its newly purchased premises 
in Manchester St. 
Beginning of new era of licensing reforms with Licensing 
Amendment Act { 1961) and Sale of Liquor Act ( 1962). 
Young dies after 30 years as HWF secretary. 
10 o'clock closing carried in referendum. National 
industrial action by LH barstaff who refuse to work 
after 7 p.m. unless higher nightshift allowance paid. 
Unions win 12c an hr. 
CHWU moves into newly purchased Lichfield Street 
building. 
Nil Wage Order issued by Arbitration Court results in 







First award for Air New Zealand Flight Kitchen staff in 
Auckland followed by Chch in August. 
First award in New Zealand for rest home workers 
secured by CHWU. 
National strike action by LH workers to secure immediate 
30% wage rise. Labour withdrawn every Saturday for one 
month in selected cities. Unions win 25% rise plus sick 
leave and extra holidays. 
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APPENDIX B: OFFICIALS OF THE CHWU 
1908 TO 1970 
President Secretary 
Hon J. Barr 
(MLC) 1 ( 1908 ) R. T. Bailey (1908) 
J. Mulligan (1909-1911) Hon J. Barr 
(MLC) 1 (1909-1918) 
F. Crawford (Nov 1911-Feb 1912) 
P. W. Evans (Feb 1912-Apr 1912) 
J. Springer (1912) 
P. W. Evans ( 1913-1916) 
B. Lauder ( 1916-1917) 
Ms Etheridge (Nov 1917-Feb 1918) 
F. Norwood (Feb 1918-Apr 1918) P. W. Evans (Feb 1918-Sep 1918) 
A. Malloy (1918) R. A. Brooks (1918-1920) 
A. Currie (Feb 1919-Jun 1919) 
G. Ellison (1919-1920) 
A. Currie (Sep 1920-Mar 1921) T. Gilmore (Sep 1920-Feb 1921) 
L. Cotton (Mar 1921-May 1921) R. A. Brooks (1921-1929) 
E. G. East (1921-1931) 
R. A. Brooks (Mar 1931-May 1931) F. J. Niall (1930-1931) 
E. G. East (1931-1936) R. A. Brooks (1931-1955) 
A. Wilson (1936-1952) 
L. Nielsen (1953-1959) L. N. Short (1955-1974) 
R. A. Ferguson 
(1959-1961) 
A. Tremaine (1961-1964) 
H. Dyer ( 1964-1967) 
R. A. Ferguson 
( 1967-1970) 
Note: 
1 Member of the Legislative Council 
I 
APPENDIX C: MEMBERSHIP OF THE CHWU: 








1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 
YEAR 
Figures as at 31 December 
Source : Annual Reports of the Department of Labour 
H 11A or H 11 AJH~ 
262 
1960 1970 
NOTE ON SOURCES 
In recounting this story the minute books of the CHWU have been of 
immeasurable assistance. Besides providing a complete record of executive 
and general meetings from 1908 to 1970, they also contain numerous and 
detailed reports on the union's industrial, political and internal activities 
between 1920 and 1955. Several of these reports provide an interesting 
and as yet largely untouched, source on the developments in Canterbury 
and in New Zealand in the wider labour movement. The minutes of the 
HWF, the national magazine Flashlight, and the Roberts Papers provided 
very useful material on the 1930's, and in the case of the former also on 
the 1940's. Throughout, the Book of Awards provided the necessary 
award statistics as well as decisions and memorandums of the Arbitration 
Court on claims and disputes. 
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Several other sources performed a useful supplementary role. In the first 
decade, the NZPD and AJH R provided useful data on the conditions of the 
workplace, the debate over the six-day week and award coverage for the 
private hotels. For the 1960's and 1970, the Christchurch Star and The 
Press provided coverage of the union's industrial action. In addition, the 
minute books of the CTLC and NCLRC shed light on the relationship 
between the union and the wider labour movement, and Fryer's research 
essay was informative on the experiences of the Auckland union prior 
to World war one. 
Several secondary sources provided both comparative and theoretical 
perspectives. Particularly valuable were, Braverman, Hyman, Mackie and 





Minutes of the North Canterbury Hospital Board 1863 -
1959 (Canterbury Museum, Christchurch) 
b) Unofficial 
Minutes of the Canterbury Branch of the N.Z. Brewers, 
Bottlers, Bottle-washers and Aerated Water Employees I UOW 
1930 - 1958 (University of Canterbury Library, Christchurch) 
Minutes of the Canterbury Hotel Workers Union* 1908 - 1970 
(inc general and executive minutes, annual reports and quarterly 
and special reports for period and Correspondence 1908 to 1912 
Office of CHWU, Christchurch) 
Minutes of the Canterbury Trades and Labour Council 1900 to 
1970 (General and executive minutes also Correspondence 1960 
to 1970 University of Canterbury library, Christchurch) 
Minutes of the NZ Federated Hotel Employees IAW* 1923 to 
1942 (Management committee, national council and conference 
minutes, Office of HWF, Auckland) 
Minutes of the North Canterbury Labour Representation 
Committee 1923 to 1970 (University of Canterbury Library, 
Christchurch) 
Minutes of the Wellington Hotel Workers Union* 1925 to 1940 
(Executive and general minutes, Office of WHWU, Wellington) 
The Roberts Papers D 118, 137, 145, 151, 166, 178, 242, 243, 
257, 261, 275, 276; G 130, 141, 151; I 12, 15, 34 (Beaglehole 
Collection, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington) 
The Walsh Papers No. 6, 7, 37, 65, 342, 343, 347, 440, 602 
618-621, 677 (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington) 




Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives 
5 (1913); H II in volumes from 1909-1971; H3 1964-1970 
Book of Awards 1906 to 1971 (Dept of Labour, Wellington) 
Employment in the Restaurant & Hotel industries (Dept of 
Labour, Wellington 1975) 
New Zealand Official Yearbooks 1908, 1912, 1916, 1919, 1949, 
1950 and 1976 (Dept of Statistics) 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 153, 161, 166, 167, 
170, 181, 186, 189, 193, 197, 237 
New Zealand Royal Commission on Licensing Report 1946 
(Wellington : Gvt Printer) 
New Zealand Statutes 1909 to 1967 
b) Newspapers 
Christchurch Star, Christchurch, 1960 to 1970 
Flashlight (official magazine of the HWF, Vol 1 Aug 1937-
Jul 1938 office of AHWU, Vol 2 Aug 1938-Jul 1939 office 
of HWF, Vol 3 Aug 1939-Jul 1940 office of CHWU; no 
issues from 1940 to 1963, recommenced 1963 copies office of 
CHWU) 
Lyttelton Times, Christchurch, 1907 to 1919 
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People's Voice Auckland, 1944 to 1949 (University of Canterbury) 
Ill. Oral 
Standard, Wellington, 1956 (General Assembly Library) 
The Press, Christchurch, 1908 to 1919, 1938 to 1949, 1960 to 1970. 
Brooks, W. G. (Christchurch Apr 1984) 
Ferguso'n, R: A. (Chi'i'stchurch :Jul, Oct and· Nov 1984) 
Mccready, C. (Christchurch Jul, Sep and Oct 1984) 
Short, L. N. (Auckland May 1983 and Jun 1984) 
B. SECONDARY 
I. Published 
a) New Zealand 
Baker, J. V. T. The New Zealand People at War: War Economy 
Wellington : Historical Pub. Branch, 1965 
Bassett, M. Confrontation '51 : The 1951 Waterfront Dispute 
Wellington : Reed, 1972 
Bollinger, C. Grog's Own Country : the story of liquor licensing 
in New Zealand (2nd ed) Auckland : Minerva, 1967 
Brown, B. M. The Rise of New Zealand Labour Wellington 
Price Milburn, 1962. 
Child, J. "Wages Policy and Wages Movement in New Zealand 
1914-1923" Journal of Industrial Relations 13 (1971) 
Cyclopedia of New Zealand : V3 Canterbury Christchurch 
The Cyclopedia Company Ltd 1903 
Gustafson, B. "Rise of the Labour Party" New Zealand Heritage 
76 (1972) 
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Lee, J. A. Socialism in New Zealand London T. Werner Laurie, 
1938. 
Mine is the Kingdom Martinborough : A. Taylor, 1976 
- The John A. Lee Diaries 1936 to 1940 : Christchurch: 
Whitcoulls, 1981. 
McNeish, J. Tavern in the town Wellington AH & AW Reed, 
1984 
Olssen, E. "The Working-Class in New Zealand" N.Z. Journal 
of History April 1974 
- John A. Lee Dunedin : University of Otago, 1977 
Paul, J. T. Humanism in Politics Wellington : NZ Labour Party, 
1946. 
Richardson, L. _Ihe Denniston Miners' Union : A Centeno ial 
History Westport : Denniston Miners' Union Centennial 
Committee, 1984 
a) Roth, H. 0. Trade Unions in New Zealand Wellington Reed, 
1973 
-"In the beginning; the early years of hotel unionism 
in New Zealand" Flashlight 1 No. 6 1965 
-"Under the Arbitration Act" Flashlight 1 No. 7 1965 
Scholefield, G. H. A Dictionary of New Zealand Biography 
(2 volumes) Wellington 
Scott, D. 151 days (rpt) Christchurch Labour Reprint Society 
1977. 
Sinclair, K. Walter Nash Auckland Auckland University 
Press, 1976 
Social Class in New Zealand ed D. Pitt Auckland Longman 
Publ. 1977 
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Stone, R. C. "Unions and the arbitration system, 1900-1937" 
Studies of a small democracy ed R. Chapman and K. Sinclair 
Auckland : University of Auckland, 1963 
The Liquor Laws of New Zealand eds L. H. Southwick, A. 
Dormer and G. R. Halford Wellington : Butterworth, 
1983. 
Woods, N. S. Troubled Heritage : The Main Stream of Develop-
ments in Private Sector Industrial Relations in New Zealand 
Wellington : Victoria University of Wellington Industrial 
Relations Centre, 1979. 
b) General 
Braverman, H. Labour and Monopoly Capitalism : The Degradation 
of Work in the Twentieth Century New York : MR Press 1974 
Cantor, M. &. Laurie, B. (eds) Class, Sex and the Woman Worker 
Connecticut : Greenwood Press, 1977. 
Freeland, J. M. The Australian Pub. Melbourne Melbourne 
University Press, 1966. 
Hyman, R. Strikes London : Fontana, 1972 
Kotas, R. (ed) Managerial Economics for Hotel Operation. 
Surrey University Press, 1980. 
b) Lewenhak, S. Women and Trade Unions : An Outline History 
of Women in the British Trade Union Movement London 
Ernest Benn, 1977 
Mackie, L. & Pattulo, P. Women at Work London : Tavistock, 
1977. 
Morse, D. The Peripheral Worker New York Columbia 
University Press, 1969 
Palmer, B. D. Working-Class Experience : The Rise and 
Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1980 
Toronto : B utterworths, 1983. 
Spadley, J. P. & Mann, B. J. The Cocktail Waitress : Woman's 
Work in a Man's World New York : John Wiley & Sons, 
1975. 
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Wertheimer, B. M. We Were There : ·The Story of Working Women 
in America New York : Pantheon Books, 1976 
Your Manpower : A practical guide to the manpower statistics 
of the hotel and catering industry. National Economic 
Development Office (UK) London : HMSO, 1967. 
II. Unpublished 
Fryer, G. J. 'Auckland Hotel Workers' Union 1908-1914 
Research Essay, University of Auckland, 1977. 
McCready, C. Feeding New Zealand Short seminar paper held 
by author, 1982. 
Mowatt, J. Independent Labour : A Study of the Christchurch 
Labour Movement 1905...,.-1913 Research Essay, University 
of Canterbury. 
Plumeridge, E. W. Labour in Christchurch : Community and 
Consciousness 1914-1919 Thesis, University of 
Canterbury 1979 
Thornton, E. M. A History of the Prohibition Movement 
Thesis Canterbury University College, 1936 
